AMARINDER SINGH v. SPECIAL COMMITIEE, PUNJAB VIDHAN ,SABHA & OTHERS ·.I

;:· 1 ~;~~~~ •• ·.L~$ttiption orita1se 1 '·ca~Js against the officers A' · concerned who were collecting information for the purpose of an answer to a certain question that had been asked in the House. The nature of punitive action to follow was left to the wisdom of the House. On 19-12-1978, the House adopted a motion which .· B recommended Mrs. Gandhi's expulsion a!J'.iong ' other things. However, this expulsion was Ul)done during the term of the Seventh Lok Sabha, wherein I ; there was a substantive debate on whether the House had the power to expel its members in the c exercise of privileges. At that point of time, the majority of the House had resolved that there was · no power of expulsion in such circumstances. However, the position has since been clarified in Raja Ram Pal's case (supra.) which has 0 recognised the power of legislatures to exp~1. their members, subject to the judicially presc"ribed guidelines. Nevertheless, what is relevant for the present case is that the initial recommGndation for e~pulsion wa~(t~ig~~.d b.y condu·c..tll!·t·.h·. ··~.t bore a E direct causal lin~to~eg1Slatjl{e functions;.;<

Another comparable instance was flOted by S.C.. Agarwal, J. in his dissenting opinion in P. V. Narasimha Rao v. State, (1998) 4 SCC 626, wherein it was observed: F

"25. It does not, however, constitute breach or contempt qf the House if the offering of payment of bribe is related to the business other than that of the House. In 1974, the Lok Sabha considered the matter relating to offer or payment of bribe in the import licences case wherein it -G was afleged that a Member of ~ok Sabha had taken bribe arid forged signatures of the Members for fu'1hering the cause of certain applicants. The question of privi:ege was disallowed since it was considered that the conduct of the Member, although improper, was not related to the· H

1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 4 S.C.R.

A business of the House. But at the same time 1t was held that as the allegation of bribery and forgery was very serious and unbecoming of a Member of Parliament, he could be held guilty of lowering the dignity of the House.

(See: Kaul and Shakdher at pp. 254, 255)." B

37Copy pinpoint37. As outlined earlier, the respondents have also contended that the power of a legislature to punish for its own contempt should not be seen as incidental to its' power of self- composition and that it should have a wider import than the remedial power of preventing obstructions to legislative functions. It will be useful to refer to the following extract from the respondents' written submissions:

" ... Even if the House of Legislature has limited powers, such power is not only restricted to ex facie contempts, but even acts committed outside the House. It is open to the Assembly to use its power for protective purposes, and the acts that it can act upon are not only those that are committed in the House, but upon anything that lowers the dignity of the House. Thus, the petitioners' submission that the House only has the power to remove obstructions during its proceedings cannot be accepted."

In pursuance of this line of reasoning, the respondents have argued that the appellant's actions have lowered the dignity of the house and the same amounts to conduct unbecoming of a member of the House, even though such conduct had no bearing on legislative functions. It was urged that the underlying motive behind the expulsion was not merely that of punishment but also to remove a member who was seen as unfit to continue as a member of the legislature.

38Copy pinpoint38. We are unable to agree with this line of reasoning presented on behalf of the respondents. Expressions such as 'lowering the dignity of the house', 'conduct unbecoming of a member ot thE3 House' and 'unfitness of a member' are openly- H worded and abstract grounds which if recognised, will trigger

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. C01'J1MITTEE, PUNJAB 1161 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]

the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of legislative privileges by incumbent majorities to target their political opponents as well as dissidents. The various grounds for ·disqualification of members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) have been enumerated in Articles 190 and 191 of the Constitution. For most circumstances, there is an elaborate machinery in place to decide questions pertaining to the disqualification of members and the vacancy of seats. However; it is for the purpose of tackling unforeseen and novel impediments to legislative fun_ctioning that the 'powe~s. privileges and immunities' contemplated by Article 194(3) ofthe c Constitution have not been codified. In Raja Ram Pal's case (supra.) the majoritY decision of this Court did recognise that the legislature's power to punish for its contempt could be exercised to expel: legislators for grounds other than those prescribed in the Constitution, but it was not the intention of this 0 Court to prescribe an untrammeled power. By laying down a clear set of guidelines for judicial review over the exercise of parliamentary privileges, this Court had made its intentions quite clear. Accordingly, we are of the view that the. power of a legislative chamber to punish for its own contempt should broadly coincide with the legislature's interest in protecting the integrity of its functions. There can of course be some exceptional circumstances where acts that take place outside the 'four walls of the house' could have the effect of distorting, obstructing or diluting the integrity of legislative functions. An obvious example is th.at of legislators accepting bribes in lieu of asking questions or voting on the floor of the House. However, with respect to the facts before us, the respondents have failed to demonstrate how the alleged misconduct on part of the appellant and the petitioners could have a comparable effect. Using the route of legislative privileges to recommend the appellant's expulsion in the present case is beyond the legitimate exercise of the privilege power of the House.

Re: Question II. H

1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.

39Copy pinpoint39. The next aspect that merits our attention is whether it was proper for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to consider the alleged misconduct as a breach of privilege in spite of the fact that it took place during the Vidhan Sabha's previous term. The allegedly improper exemption of a plot of land (measuring 32.10 B Acres) from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme had been notified on 13-1-2006, during the 12th term of the Punjab Vidhan I

Sabha. On 22-02-2006, a question pertaining to this allegedly improper exemption was raised in the House and the same 1

I I was discussed On 22-02-2006, 28-02-2006 and 1-3-2006 C respectively. At this juncture it must be clarified that there were separate allegations in the respondent's submissions which suggest that the appellant had played a part in suppressing I sdr;ne materials when questions had been asked about the allegedly improper exemption. However, the said suppression I

of ~pterials had been inquired into by another Committee and 0 ther~ w~re no findings against the appellant.

40Copy pinpoint40. \As mentioned earlier, the House was subsequently diss_olVed and a new regime was voted to power in the elections held in February 2007. It was during the present term of the E House. (i.e. the 13th term of th~ Punjab Vidhan Sabha) that the allegedly improper exemption wa~ made the subject-m<:tter of an inquiry by a Special Committee whic;h was constituted in pursuance of a.resolution passed by the House on 18-12-2007. The Special Committee presented it~ report on the floor of the F House on 3-9-2008, which in turn became the basis of the impugned resolution of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha that was passed on 10-9-2008. Before addressing the contentious issue, it is necessary to understand the implications of the d:ssolution of a legislative chamber, since the Punjab Vidhan G ~'abha had been dissolved andrn-¢onstituted during the period between the operative dates, i.e. the date of notification of the allegedly improper exemption of land from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme (13-1-2006) and the constitution of the Spe_cial Committee to inquire into the said allegations of misconduct ( 18-12-2007).

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1163 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.11.]

41Copy pinpoint41. The literal meaning of 'dissolution' is listed in Black's A Law Dictionary, 8th edn. [(West Group) at p. 506] as 'the act of bringing to an end; termination'. P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edn., Vol. 2D-I, (Wadhwa & Co., 2005) furnishes the following definition, at p. 1435: .

"Dissolution and prorogation.- Constitution of India, B Art.107 (3), 174(2) (a) & (b), 196. Dissolution of Parliament is invariably proceeded by prorogation, and what is true about the result of prorogation, is, it is said a fortiori true about the result of dissolution. Dissolution of Parliament is sometimes described as "a civil death of Parliament". llbert in his work on 'Parliament' has observed that 'prorogation' means the end of a Session (not of parliament)'; and adds that "like dissolution it kills all bills which have not yet been passed". He also describes dissolution as "an end of Parliament (not merely of a session) by royal proclamation", and observes that "it wipes the slate clean of uncompleted bills or other proceedings".

The effects of dissolution have also been discussed in the following manner [Cited from: Kaul and Shakdher, Practice and E Procedure of Parliament, 5th edn. (New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2001) at pp. 191-193):

EFFECTS OF DISSOLUTION

"Dissolution, as already stated, marks the end of the life of a House and is followed by the constitution of a new House. One the Hou.se has been dissolved, the dissolution is irrevocable. There is no power vested in the president to cancel his order of dissolution and revive the previous House. The consequences of dissolution are absolute and irrevocable. In Lok Sabha, which alone is subject to dissolution under the Constitution, dissolution "passes a sponge over the Parliamentary slate''. All business pending ,bdfore it or any of its committees lapses on dissolution. No part of the records of the dissolved House can be H

1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A carried over and transcribed into the records and registers of the new House. In short, dissolution draws the final curtain upon the existing House.

Business before a Committee: Ail business pending before Parliamentary Committees of Lok Sabha lapse on 8 dissolution of Lok Sabha. Committees themselves stand dissolved on dissolution of a Lok Sabha. However, a Committee which is unable to complete its work before the dissolution of a House may report to the house to that effect, in which case any preliminary memorandum or note c that the committee may have prepared or any evidence that it may have taken is made available to the new Committee when appointed."

42Copy pinpoint42. Coming to judicial observations, the effect of dissolution of a House were discussed by this Court in the Gujarat Assembly Election case, (2002) 8 SCC 237. V.N. Khare, J. (as His Lordship then was) had made the following observations:

"40 ... Dissolution ends the life of the legislature and brings an end to all business. The entire chain of sittings and sessions gets broken and there is no next session or the first sitting of the next session after the House itself has ceased to exist. Dissolution of Legislative Assembly ends the representative capacity of legislators and terminates the responsibility of the Cabinet to the Members of the Lok Sabha or the Legislative Assembly, as the case may be."

Furthermore, Pasayat, J. had explained:

"135. Dissolution brings a legislative body to an end. It G essentially terrrinates the life of such body and is followed by constitution of a new body (a Legislative Assembly or a House of People, as the case may be). Prorogation on the other hand relates to termination of a session and thus precludes another session, unless it coincides with the end of the legislative term. The basic difference is that

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1165 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]

prorogation unlike dissolution does not affect a legislative body's life which may constitute from session to session, until brought to an end by dissolution. Dissolution draws the final curtain upon the House. Once the House is dissolved it becomes irrevocable. There is no power to recall the order of dissolution and/ or revive the previous B House. Consequently effect of dissolution is absolute and irrevocable. It has been described by some learned authors that dissolution "passes a sponge over the parliamentary slate". The effect of dissolution is in essence termination of current business of the legislative body, its c sittings and sessions. There is a cessation of chain of sessions, sittings for a dissolved legislative body and there cannot be· any next session or its first sitting. With the election of a legislative body a new chapter comes into . operation. Till that is done the sine qua non of responsible 0 government i.e. accountability is non-existent. Consequentially, the time stipulation is non-existent. Any other interpretation would render use. of word "its"- iii relation to "last sitting in one session" and "first sitting in the next session" without significance." E

43Copy pinpoint43. In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kera/a. AIR 1962 SC 694, Gajendragadkar J. (as His Lordship then was) had reflected on the effects of the dissolution of the House. The context in that case was· that a Legislative Assembly had passed a bill and later the President had sent the bill back for reconsideration by the successor assembly. The question of whether the successor assembly needed to consider the bill afresh and pass it again was answered in the affirmative:

"6 . ... The duration of the Legislative Assembly is prescribed by Article 172 (1 ), and normally at the end of five years the !ife of the Assembly would come to an end. Its life could come to an encl before the expiration of the said period of the five years if during the said five years the President acts under Article 356. In any case there is no continuity in the personality of the Assembly where the H

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A life of one Assembly comes to an end and another Assembly is in due course elected. If that be so, a bill passed by one Assembly cannot, on well recognized principles of democratic government be brought back to the successor Assembly as though a change in the B personality of the Assembly had not taken place. The scheme of the Constitution in regard to the duration of the life of State Legislative Assembly, it is urged, supports the argument that with the dissolution of the Assembly all business pending before the Assembly at the date of c dissolution must lapse. This position would be consonant with the well recognized princip' •s of democratic rule. The Assembly derives its sovereign power to legislate essentially because it represents the will of the citizens of the State, and when one Assembly has been dissolved and another has been elected in its place, the successor D Assembly cannot be required to carry on with the business pending before its predecessor, because that would assume continuity of personality which in the eyes of the Constitution does not exist. Therefore, sending the bill back to the successor Assembly with the message of the E President would be inconsistent with the basic principles of democracy."

In Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699, G.N. Ray, J. had discussed the effect F of dissolution of the Lok Sabha:

"51. Adverting to the effect of dissolution on other business such as motions, resolutions etc. the learned authors say:

"All other business pending in Lok Sabha e.g. G rr )tions, amendments, supplementary demands for grants etc., at whatever stage, lapses upon dissolution, as also the petitions presented to the House which stand referred to the Committee on Petitions." H

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1167 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]

44Copy pinpoint44. On the basis of the authorities cited above, it is evident that nrdinarily legislative business does not survive the dissolution of the House. The exception to this norm is covered by the 'doctrine of lapse' wherein the successor House can· choose to take up a pending motion or any order of business after the re-constitution of the House. However, this exception is not applicable in the facts of the present cas~. At the time of the re constitution of the Punjab Vidhan Sabb~ folllowing the 1

State elections in February 2007, there was no pendihg motion, report or any other order of business which had a connection with the allegedly improper exemption of land. It was much later, c i.e. on 18-12-2007 that a Special Committee was constituted to inquire into the same. Hence, in this case the Special Committee proceeded to enquire into the execµtive acts of the appellants and petitioners which had taken place during the previous term of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. It is quite untenable 0 to allow the exercise of legislative privileges to punish past executive acts especially when there was no pending motion, report or any other order of business that was relatable to the said executive acts at the time of the re-constitution of the House. E

45Copy pinpoint45. While the legislature is free to inquire into acts and events that have taken place in the past, the same is ordinarily done in the nature of fact-finding to improve the quality of law- making. Legislative oversight over executive actions is an important facet of parliamentary democracy and such oversight can extend to executive decisions taken in the past However, · it is altogether another matter if privileges are purportedly exercised to punish those who have held executive office in the past. It is quite inconceivable as to how the allegedly improper exemption of land (notified on 13-1-2006) had the effect of obstructing the legislative business in the 13th term of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. Hence, it is our considered view 1n respect of the facts in the present case, that it was improper for the 13th Punjab Vidhan Sabha to claim a breach of privileges on account of the alleged misconduct which actually H

1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A took p1ace during the 12th term of the Vidhan Sabha. However, :' our view should not be mistaken for a general proposition since ~ it is within our imagination that in some circumstances the acts " that have taken place during the previous terms of a Legislature could actually have the effect of distorting, obstructing or diluting B the integrity of legislative business in the present term. Evidently, no such consequence or tendency has been demonstrated in the present case.

Re: Question Ill.

46Copy pinpoint46. As noted in the survey of facts at the beginning of this opinion, the allegedly improper exemption of land from the Amritsar !mprovement Scheme is the subject-matter of disputes that are pending before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Admittedly, these proceedings had been instituted soon after D the notification of the said exemption (dated 13-1-2006) and the fact of their pendency was well known at the time of the constitution of the Special Committee by the Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 18-12-2007. This begs the question as to whether it was proper for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to inquire into subject- E matter which was already in question before a judicial forum.

47Copy pinpoint47. The norms to be followed by a legislature in respect of sub judice matters have been discussed in the following words [Cited from: Griffith and Ryle, Parliament, Functions and Procedure (2003), Chapter 6 at Para 6-075): F "A more significant reason for not allowing a notice of motion is if the matter is sub judice (awaiting decision in the courts); the same rule applies to de~ate and questions. The sub judice rule does not, however, apply to legislative G- business or where a ministerial decision is in question (e.g. in an application for judicial review). It applies only to cases in UK courts, not ones in courts elsewhere, even if they concern UK matters (e.g. the European Court of Human Rights). The Speaker has discretion to waive the rule and would normally do so when the case in question concerned

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITIEE, PUNJAB 1169 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]

issues of national importance such as the economy, public order or essential services.

This long standing practice has been confirmed by resolutions of the House. Cases which are active in a criminal court in the United Kingdom must not be referred to; this applies from the moment charges are made until the verdict is given. The same applies to civil actions once arrangements are made for a hearing. Cases which have been decided can become sub judice again if one party applies for leave to appeal. Under this rule, which comes into operation in relation to some half-dozen cases a C session, motions (or questions) may not be tabled until the case is decided. If a motion has been tabled before the matter became sub judice it is taken off the Order Paper until the case ceases to be sub judice." D

48Copy pinpoint48. In fact, the relevant rules of the Rules of Business and Conduct of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha themselves incorporate these norms. Reference may be made to the language of Rule 39(10), 50, 93(2)(iv) and 150(d) which lay down the following:

"39. In order that a question may be admissible it shall satisfy the following conditions, namely-:

(10) It shall not ask for information on any matter which . is under adjudication by a court of law having jurisdiction in any part of India;

... 50. The right to move-the adjournment of the business of the Vidhan Sabha (Assembly) for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance shall be subject to the following restrictions, namely -:

(ix) the motion shall not deal with a matter on which a

1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 4 S.C.R.

A resolution could not be moved;

(xi) the motion shall not deal with any matter which is under adjudication by a Court of law; B ... 93. ( 1) The matter of every speech shall be strictly relP.vant to the matter before the House.

(2) A member while speaking shall not-

(iv) refer to a matter of fact on which a judicial decision is pending;

.. 150. In order that a resolution may be admissible, it shall satisfy the following conditions, namely-

(d) it shall not relate to any matter whi{;h is under adjudication by a Court of law having jurisdiction in any part of India."

49Copy pinpoint49. The above-mentioned rules which govern the business and conduct of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha are quite categorical in laying down a prohibition on the taking up of any matter which is pending adjudication before a court of law. Analogues provisions control the business and conduct of the Lok Sabha [See Rules 173, 188 and 352 of the Rules of Business and Conduct of the Lok Sabha]. While Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution prohibit judicial scrutiny over questions relating to compliance with these rules, our attention has been drawn to the fact that the Punjab Vidhan Sabha proceeded to inquire into the allegedly improper exemption of land from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme, even though the same had been questioned before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

50Copy pinpoint50. Subhash C. Kashyap [in Parliamentary Procedure-

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1171 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]

Law Privileges, Practice & .·Precedents Vol. 1, (New Delhi: A Universal Law Publishing Cb. Pvt. Ltd., 2000)] has described a prominent example where the Speaker of the Lok Sabha had disallowed discussion on subject-matter that WiiS pending ' ' I befoie the courts. The following extract also touches on arguments for allowing the legislature to discuss tfUb judice B matters in exceptional cases (at pp. 1225- 1226):

When Limaye was called to move his motion. a point of order was raised by a member (Narayant E Rao) and Law Minister (P. Govinda Menon) that discussion on affidavit would mean discussing a sub judice matter. The Speaker reserved his ruling. On 9 May 1968, the Speaker ruled inter alia as follows: F

The rule on whether a motion which relate\s to a matter which is under adjudication by a court of law should be admitted or discussep in the House has to be interpreted strict!~. G While on the one hand the Chair has t~ ensure that no discussion in the House should prejudice the course of justice, th~ Chair has also to see that the House is no( debarred from discussing an urgent matter: H

1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A of public importance on the ground that a similar, allied or linked matter is before a court of law. The test of sub judice in .my opinion should be that the matter sought to be raised in the House is substantially B identical with the one which a court of law has to adjudicate. Further, in case the Chair holds that a matter is sub judice the effect of this ruling is that the discussion on the matter is postponed till the judgment of the c court is delivered. The bar of sub judice will not apply thereafter, unless the matter becomes sub judice again on an appeal to a higher court. Applying these two tests to the present notice of motion by Shri Limaye, I consider that in view of the statement by the D Law Minister, that 'the question that the affidavit filed by the Under Secretary is slightly at variance with what the Home Minister has stated has been raised in the court and is under adjudication by the court' E the very matter which is sought to be raised by the member is awaiting adjudication by the court of law.

Hence I consider that discussion on the notice of motion should be postponed until the court has delivered its judgment. I am however, clear that the matter is of public importance which should be discussed in the House and its importance will not be lost if the House awaits until the Court has adjudicated in the matter. [LS Deb. 6.5.1968, cc 2198- 2203; 7.5.1968, cc. 2649-65; 9.5.1968, cc. 3149- 56]"

51Copy pinpoint51. It is a settled principle that ordinarily the content of legislative proceedings should not touch on sub judice matters.

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1173 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]

As indicated in the extracf quoted above, the rationale for this norm is that legislative debate or scrutiny over matters pending for adjudication could unduly prejudice the rights of the litigants. In the case at hand, the allegedly improper exemption of land (measuring 32.10 acres) from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme had already been questioned before the High Court B of Punjab and Haryana. Thus, the Punjab Vidhan Sabha ought not to have constituted a committee to inquire into the same.

CONCERNS ABOUT INTRUSION INTO THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL DOMAIN c

52Copy pinpoint52. The doctrine of separation of powers is an inseparable part of the evolution of parliamentary democracy itself. Renowned French philosopher Montesquieu had drawn the attention of political theorists to the dangers inherent in the concentration of legislative, executive and judicial powers in one authority and· stressed on the necessity of checks and balances in constitutional governance. Our institutions of governance have been intentionally founded on the principle of separation of powers and the Constitution does not give unfettered power to any organ. All the three principal organs are expected to work in harmony and in consonance with the spirit and essence of the Constitution. It is clear that a legislative body is not entrusted with the power of adjudicating a case once an appropriate forum is in existence under the constitutional scheme. It would be pertinent to cite the following observations made by M.H. F Beg J. (as His Lordship then was) in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Supp SCC 1:

"392 ... 0ne of these basic principles seems to me to be that, just as courts are not constitutionally competent to legislate under the guise of interpretation, so also neither G our Parliament nor any State Legislature, in the purported exercise of any kind of law- making power, perform an essentially judicial function by virtually withdrawing a particular case, pending in any court, and taking upon itself the duty to decide it by an application of law or its own H

1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A standards to the facts of that case. Thi~ power must at least be first constitutionally taken away from the court concerned and vested in another authority before it can be lawfully exercised by that other authority. It is not a necessary or even a natural incident of a "constituent B power". As Hans Kelsen points out. in his "General Theory of Law and the State" (see p.143), while creation and annulment of all general norms, whether basic or not so basic, is essentially a legislative function their interpretation and application to findings reached, after a correct c ascertainment of facts involved in an individual case, by employing the judicial technique, is really a judicial function. Neither of the three constitutionally separate organs of State can, according to the basic scheme of our Constitution today, leap outside the boundaries of its own constitutionally assigned sphere or orbit of authority into that of the other. This is the logical meaning of the principle of supremacy of the Constitution."

53Copy pinpoint53. The impugned resolution (dated 10-9-2008) passed by the Punjab Vidhan Sabha contains directions as to how the investigation into the appellant's and petitioners' alleged wrongdoing should be conducted. The resolution directs the filing of First Information Reports (FIRs) and custodial interrogation in addition to directing the Vigilance Department, Punjab to find out where the appellant and the others have stored their 'ill gotten wealth' and further directs the Vigilance Department to report back to the Speaker of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. These functions are within the domain of the executive. It is up to the investigating agencies themselves to decide how to proceed with the investigation in a particular case. The role of the legislature in this regard can at best be recommendatory and the Speaker of a Legislature may not assume the responsibility of monitoring an ongoing investigation. A determination of guilt or innocence by way of fact-finding is a role properly reserved for the trial judge. The only exception to this principle is when the impugned acts have the effect of

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1175 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.] distorting, obstructing or threatening the integrity of legislative proceedings or are likely to do the same, thereby warranting the exercise of privileges. As we have already noted above, there was an obvious jurisdictional error on part of the Punjab . Vidhan Sabha in the present case. · B

54Copy pinpoint54. A decision of the United States Supreme Court which raised similar concerns was that of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 US 168 (1881 ). In that case, the House of Representatives of the United States Congress had appointed a Special Committee to investigate into activities related to a 'real estate pool', since it had attracted investments from one Jay Cook & C Co. who was a debtor-in-bankruptcy to the Government of the United States. The Special Committee was set up and it had served a subpoena to Kilbourn, requiring the latter to present himself before the_Special Committee and to answer questions and produce documents. Kilbourn appeared but he refused to D cooperate with the Committee's proceedings. The House of Representatives passed a resolution directing that Kilbourn be arrested and placed under custody until such time as he purged himself of the contempt and communicated to the House his willingness to submit to the jurisdiction of the Special E Committee. The matter reached the Supreme Court of the United States by way of a writ of habeas corpus filed by Kileourn. The relevant observations by Miller, J. are produced as follows: F "In looking to the preamble and resolution under which the committee acted, pefore wliich Kilbourne refused to testify, we are of the opinion that the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government, G because it was, in its nature, clearly judicial.

The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to H · time ordain and establish If what we have said of the

1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A division of the P<''vers of the government among the three departments be sound, this is equivalent to a declaration that no judicial power is vested in the Congress or either branch of it, save in cases specifically enumerated to which we have referred. If the investigation which the B committee was directed to make was judicial in ~ts character, and could only be properly and successfully made by a court of justice, and if it related to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial proceeding, we do not, after what has been said, deem it c necessary to discuss the proposition that the power attempted to be exercised was one confided by the Constitution to the judicial, and not to the legislative, department of the government. We think it equally clear that the power asserted is judicial, and not legislative. (103 D us 168, 192-193) ***

How could the House of Representatives know, until it had been fairly tried, that the courts were powerless to redress the creditors of Jay Cook & Co.? The matter was still pending in a court, and what right had the Congress of the United States to interfere with a suit pending in a court of competent jurisdiction? Again, what inadequacy of power existed in the court, or, as the preamble assumes, in all courts, to give redress which could lawfully be supplied by an investigatio:i by a committee of one House of Congress, or by any act or resolution of Congress on the subject? The case being one of a judicial nature, for which the power of the courts usually afford the only remedy, it may well be supposed that those powers were more appropriate and more efficient in said of such relief than the powers which belong to a body whose function is exclusively legislative. If the settlement to which the preamble refers as the principal reason why the courts are rendered powerless was obtained by fraud, or was without authority, or for any conceivable reason could be set aside

AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITIEE, PUNJAB 1177 VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.)

or avoided, it should be done by some appropriate proceeding in the court which had the whole matter before it, and which had all the power in that case proper to be entrusted to any body, and not by Congress or by any power to be conferred on a committee of one of the two Houses." (103 US 168, 194) B The observations cited above are self-explanatory and,we echo the concerns about the overreach into the judicial domain in the fact-situation before us.

CONCLUSION c

55Copy pinpoint55. In the light of the preceding discussion we have arrived · at the following conclusions:

(i) If there were any irregularities committed by the appellant and the petitioners in relation to the exemption of land (notified on 13-1-2006) from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme, the proper course of action on part of the State Government should have been to move the criminal law machinery with the filing of a complaint followed by investigation as contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is our considered view that the Punjab Vidhan Sabha exceeded its powers by expellinQ, the appellant on the ground of a breach of privilege when there existed none. The allegedly improper exemption of land was an executive act attributable . to the appellant and it did not distort, obstruct or threaten the integrity of legislative proceedings in any manner. Hence, the exercise of legislative privileges under Article 194(3) of the Constitution G was not proper in the present case. I /

(ii) Furthermore, the allegedly improper exemption of land took place during the 12th term of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha, whereas the constitution of the Special Committee to inquire into the same took H

1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A place during the 13th term. It was not proper for the Assembly to inquire into actions that took place during its previous term, especially when there was no relatable business that had lapsed from the previous term. If we were to permit the legislature B to exercise privileges for acting against members for their executive ·acts during previous terms, the Courts are likely to be flooded with c es involving political rivalries. One can conceive mat whenever there is a change of regime, the fresh incumbents c would readily fall back on the device of legislative privileges to expel their political opponents as well as dissidents. Such a scenario would frustrate some of the basic objectives of a parliamentary democracy. D (iii) When it was well known that the allegedly improper exemption of land from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme was the subject-matter of proceedings instituted before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the Punjab Vidhan Sabha should have E refrained from dealing with the same subject- matter.

56Copy pinpoint56. We accordingly declare that the resolution passed by the Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 10-9-2008, directing the expulsion of the appellant for the remainder of the 13th term of the Vidhan F Sabha is constitutionally invalid. Hence, we direct the restoration of the appellant's membership in the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. However, nothing in this judgment should act as a hurdle against the investigation, if any, into the alleged role of the appellant and the petitioners in the improper exemption of land G from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme that was notified on 13-1-2006. To repeat a cliche, the law will take its own course.

57Copy pinpoint57. This appeal and the connected petitions are disposed off accordingly, however with no order as to costs.

H R.P. Appeal and connected matters, disposed of