OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

31Copy pinpoint31. Similarly, in Director of Settlements, A.P. and Others vs. MR. Apparao and Another, (2002) 4 SCC 638, this Court held thus: F "a judgment of the High court which refused to follow the decision and directions of the Supreme court or seeks to revive a decision of the High court which has been set aside by the Supreme court is a nullity." G In view of the peculiar controversy, we read the judgment in Audikesava Reddy's case carefully, partic4larly, paras 13 to 17 and we are satisfied that the decision of this Court has been correctly drafted by the Registry in th.e form of a decree and there is no ambiguity as claimed by learned senior counsel for H

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A the appellants.

32Copy pinpoint32. Learned Attorney General submitted that a judgment rendered by this Court cannot be collaterally challenged as is sought to be done by the appellants in these appeals. For the said proposition, he relied on the following: B In Hunter vs. Chief Constable [1982] 1 A.C, Diplock LJ delivering his speech in the House of Lords enunciated the doctrine of 'Collateral attack on a judgment and observed thus:

"The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies c is the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had D a full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court by which it was made."

Quoting Halsburys, the learned judge observed:

E "I think it would be a scandal to the administration of justice if the same question having been disposed by one case, the litigant were to be permitted by changing the form of the proceedings to set up the same case again."

33Copy pinpoint33. This Court has approved this well settled principle that F a judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be collaterally challenged on the ground that certain points had not been considered. This Court in Anil Kumar Neotia and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1988) 2 SCC 587 held that it is not open to contend that certain points had not been urged or G argued before the Supreme Court and thereby seek to reopen the issue. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:

" ... This Court further observed that to contend that the conclusion therein applied only to the parties before this H Court was to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the

OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF 355 ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 A illusory ..... It is no longer open to the Petitioners to contend that certain portions had not been urged and the effect of the judgment cannot be collaterally challenged."

34Copy pinpoint34. In Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and Another vs. State 8 of Gujarat and Others, (2004) 12 SCC 645, this Court reiterated the principle that a judgment of this Court is binding on all and it is not open to contend that the full facts had not been placed before the Court. In this regard, para 62 of the judgment reads as follows: c "62. It is well settled that the judgments of this Court are binding on all the authorities under Article 142 of the Constitution and it is not open to any authority to ignore a binding judgment of this Court on the ground that the full facts had not been placed before this Court and/or the D judgment of this Court in the earlier proceedings had only collaterally or incidentally decided the issues ...... "

35Copy pinpoint35. In A. V. Papayya Sastry and Others vs. Govt. of A.P. and Others, (2007) 4 SCC 221, this Court observed as under: E

"38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case F where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All G orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order." H

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20101 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

36Copy pinpoint36. Regarding the doctrine of merger, once the appeal of the State was allowed in Audikeshava Reddy's case the net res,ult was that the High Court judgment which held that the proceedings under the ULC Act were vitiated stood merged in the decision of this Court in Audikeshava Reddy. The B logical sequitor of this is that the writ petitions filed by the appellants are deemed to be dismissed. In Kunhayahmed (supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court while elucidating the doctrine of merger held that once 'leave' is granted while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of C India, the doors of the appellate jurisdiction are opened. It does not matter whether reasons are given or not. The doctrine of merger is attracted as soon as 'leave' has been granted in a special leave petition.

37Copy pinpoint37. As pointed out by learned Attorney General, the matter can be looked at from another angle. The proceedings in the instant case are barred by the principle of cons1ructive res judicata. The validity of the ULC Act were squarelv in issue. The effect of allowing the State appeals in Audikeshava Reddy's case is that all contentions which parties might and ought to have litigated in the previous litigation cannot be permitted to be raised in subsequent litigations.

38Copy pinpoint38. In Forward Construction Co. & Ors. vs. Prabhat Manda/ & Ors., (1986) 1 SCC 100, this Court held that an adjudication is conclusive and binding not only as to the actual matter determined but as to everi other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided. The following portion of the judgment is relevant which reads as under:

G "20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to Section H 11 CPC provides that any matter which might and ought

OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF 357 ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject- matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an c opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to 0 have been heard and decided. "

39Copy pinpoint39. In Hoystead vs. Commissioner of Taxation (1926) 1 Appeal Cases 155, the Privy Council observed:

"Parties are not permitted to bring fresh litigations because of new views that they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the Court of the legal result either of the construction of the documents or the weight of certain circumstances. If this were permitted, litigations would have no end except when legal ingenuity is exhausted. It is a principle of law that this cannot be permitted and there is abundant authority reiterating that principle."

As rightly observed by the High Court, what is utmost relevant is the final judgment of the superior Court and not the reasons in support of that decision. Apart from the legal position and the effect of allowing of the appeals and dismissing the writ petitions by this Court, the contention with regard to the land being agricultural land was raised in the writ petitions which H

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R

A were the subject matter of the appeals filed in this Court. In these proceedings, the State categorically took the stand that the lands are not agricultural. It was brought to our notice that the present app6::dnts as respondents in the earlier round did not urge this plea before this Court and no such arguments were B advanced before this Court. In view of the same, the appellants are not entitled to raise any such contention now. The effect of allowing the said appeals is that W.P.Nos. 18385of1993 and 238 of 1994 stood dismissed. Inasmuch as the writ petitions having been dismissed, the orders passed under the ULC Act c have attained finality. The declarations which had been made and statements filed on 06.09.1976 and 25.07.1977 stand till today and these declarations are not even sought to be withdrawn. In those circumstances, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, the prayer on the part of the owners in W.P. No. 4141 of 2006 0 made for the first time in 2006 after 32 years of filing of the statements under Section 6 and after 26 years of the conclusion of ULC proceedings was completely misconceived and was rightly rejected.

40Copy pinpoint40. Before the High Court, the purchasers had contended that the original owners had filed the declarations under misconception and confusion. Even before this Court, the purchasers had raised a similar plea when they found that the observations in Atia Begum's case was overruled. The F observations in paragraph 15 of the judgment in Audikesava Reddy's case are in the context of the plea of the purchasers. It was not the case of the State that the original owners filed any statement or declaration under the ULC Act under a wrong· impression. On the other hand, this was a contention of the G purchasers. However, in paragraph 15 of Audikeshava Reddy's case, this Court did not even go into the question because the owners were not before it and perhaps the purchasers could not raise that plea. This Court said, "this question is left open to be decided in an appropriate case." H This means that this was not a fit case for going into this issue

OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF 359 ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] and when a proper case filed by owner comes with such a plea then the Court would consider the same. It follows that the appeals were allowed "for the aforesaid reasons" and this means on account of two reasons. The first reason is the overruling of Atia Begum's case and the second reason is that the Court was not prepared to examine the declaration filed by the owners at the behest of the purchasers. In 'those circumstances, there was no necessity to remand, hence there is no order for remand. Therefore, the expression "appeals are allowed" can have only one meaning and that is the judgment of the High Court is set aside and writ petitions are dismissed c and the determination of ceiling already made remains intact and undisturbed.

41Copy pinpoint41. The appellants contended that the High Court had recorded a finding that the land is agricultural and the State had taken up a ground saying that the land was not agricultural land and was a vacant land but that point was not pressed before this Court in Audikesava Reddy's case,Jlence to that extent the High Court judgment would operate with binding effect in view of principles of constructive res judicata. We accept ttiat principle of res judicata/constructive res judicata is applicable to the writ proceedings. However, in the present case, the Division Bench finding with respect to nature of land in a writ petition filed by purchasers does not survive after appeals of the State were allowed and after this Court refused to go into the question of filing of statements by owners under a wrong impression. If this Court wanted the nature of land to be separately considered then it would have done so or remanded the matter. However, paragraph 15 of Audikesava Reddy's case shows a clear intent to leave the declaration of the owner filed under the ULC Act intact. In the case on hand, as observed earlier, no part of the judgment of the High Court would survive after the appeal is allowed unless and until it is expressly and specifically preserved. In view of the same, the contrary contention of the appellants in this context is unacceptable and unsustainable. In any case, the owners are H

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A bound by the determination of surplus land by the Competent Authority on the basis of their own declaration and the various orders passed under the ULC Act. They cannot be permitted to re-open the chapter after about 25 years.

42Copy pinpoint42. Mr. Chowdhary, learned senior counsel contended that 8 when a doubt arises about what the Court intended then the same must be resolved by construing the expressions inconsistent with the law. He placed reliance on the following judgment of this Court:

C 1. Gajraj Singh & Ors. vs. State of UP. & Ors (2001) 5 sec 762

2. Saraf Chandra Mishra & Ors. vs. State of Orissa & Ors. (2006) 1 sec 638, 643 and

D 3. State of Haryana & Ors. vs. M.P. Moh/a, (2007) 1 SCC 457, 464

On going through those decisions.,.we·l'l~ve no quarrel over the ratio laid down, however, there is' nd sc0pe of applying them E to the present case. As pointed out earlieF, ·tbe expression 'civil appeals are allowed' carry only one meaning; L~;, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petitioris are d~smissed. Moreover, the determination of surplus li:tDd based on the declaration of owners has becom.e final long back. The F notifications issued under Section·· 1O of. the Act and tbe panchanama taken possession· are also final. On behalf.Of the State, it was asserted thatthe possession of surph.is land was taken on 20.07.1993 and the Panchanama was executed showing that the possession has been;t~ken. It is signed by witnesses ..We-have perused the'details which are available G in the paper b<;>ok. It is settled law that where possession is to be taken of a large tract of land then it is permissible to.take possession by a properly executed Panchanama. [vide Sita· Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi vs. Lieutenant ~overnor, H Govt. of NCT, Delhi, (2009) 10 SCC 501]

OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF 361 ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

43Copy pinpoint43. It is not in dispute that the Panchnama has not been A questioned in any proceedings by any of the appellants. Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society is in possession at one stage and Shri Venkateshawar Enterprises was given possession by f~e owners and possessi.on was also given to Golden Hill Construction B Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are not in possession. In view of the same, the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken by the State legally and validly through a Panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld. c

44Copy pinpoint44. It is relevant to point out the conduct of the appellants in the previous proceedings which were highlighted by learned senior counsel for the State as well as APllC. They are:

(a) The appellants themselves described the land in Survey D No. 83 as "grazing land" in their declarations filed under Section 6(1 );

(b) The appellants filed declarations under the Land Reforms Act subjecting the land to the jurisdiction of the E Tribunal;

(c) filing declarations under the ULC Act treating the land in Survey No. 83 as vacant land;

(d) the transaction of agreement of sale entered into F between GPA and Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing Society;

(e) Owners and Society filed applications for exemptions which were rejected; G (f) Chanakyapuri Society pursued its remedies against such rejection of exemption up to this Court in which the owners through their Power of Attorney were sailing with the Society. H

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A In fact these instances were projected in their counter affidavit before the High Court by the State and APllC to non-suit the appellants. Though learned senior counsel for the appellants pointed out that these aspects were not highlighted before the High Court. the conduct of the appellants as regards the above B aspects cannot be ignored.

45Copy pinpoint45. It is pointed out that the owners themselves have described the land in Survey No. 83 as "grazing lands" and "vacant land" in the relevant columns of their declaration under C Section 6(1) and, therefore, the proceedings of the competent authority under Sections 8, 9 and 10 are valid. Though the said aspect had not been disputed by the appellants, however, it is pointed out that the mentioning of "grazing lands" in the said declaration is not conclusive. However. as observed earlier, their statements in the form of declarations before the D authorities concerned cannot be denied. In fact, we were taken through those entries which are available in the paper-book in the form of annexures.

46Copy pinpoint46. About the sales under G.O.Ms. No. 733 dated E 31.10.1988 and G.O.Ms. No. 289 dated 01.06.1989, it is the stand of the appellants that those government orders were passed on the basis of a policy to encourage building activity and in public interest under Section 20(1 )(a) of the ULC Act. According to the appellants, they are entitled to the benefits of F G.O.Ms.No. 733 dated 31.10.1988 and they are entitled to the same benefits as any other holder of excess vacant lands is entitled to as they are in actual physical possession even as on date irrespective of whether the Act became applicable on 17.02.1976 or 29.09.1980. It is brought to our notice that the G amendment made in G.O.Ms. No. 217 vide G.O.Ms. No. 733 dated 31.10.1988 is applicable only in the cases in which the possession of land had been taken over by the Government under Section 10(5) and 10(6) and according to the State Government, in this case, possession was taken after 31.10.1988 as pointed out by learned senior counsel for the -H

OMPRAKASH VERMA & ORS. v. STATE OF 363 ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

respondents, the declarants cannot avail the said benefit since even, according to them, they were .not in possession as on 31.10.1988. The benefit of G.O.Ms. No. 733 may be available ifthe declarants were in possession and up to 31.10.1988 and possession was taken by the Government subsequent thereto. As rightly observed by the High Court, G.O.Ms. No. 217 cannot be interpreted as entitling the declarants to claim benefit of exemption even in cases where they were not in possession as on 31.10.1988. The same was handed over to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Sherlingampally, even prior to that, the said land was allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development Authority c vide G.O.Ms. No. 5013 dated 19.12.1980. Admittedly, the said Government Order was not challenged by the appellants. In those circumstances, the appellants cannot be allowed to take the benefit of G.O.Ms. No. 733 since this is not merely a case where the appellants were dispossessed but the property was transferred initially in favour of Hyderabad Urban Dev~lopment Authority and later to APllC for utilizing the same to set up IT Park Project. We are satisfied that the appellants are not entitled to claim benefits under G.O.Ms. No.733. It is also clear from G.O.Ms. No. 455 and 456 dated 29.07.2002 that occupation/possession is sine qua non for the allotment of surplus lands.

47Copy pinpoint47. Various third parties have filed separate applications by way of I.As in these appeals praying for certain reliefs. In view of the disposal of the appeals, they are free to approach the appropriate authority/court to vindicate their grievance if the same is permissible under law.

48Copy pinpoint48. In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeals filed by the appellants. Consequently, they are dismissed. No order as to costs.

R.P. Appeal dismissed.