. TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

36Copy pinpoint36. Learned Counsel pointed out that in the present case, c Section 6 declarations were made earlier to the publication of . notification under Section 4 of the Act. They further pointed out in proviso again the wording used is "declaration may be made." Learned Counsel, .therefore, argued that even reading Sections 2 and 3 of the Amending Act, the defect is not cured as the proviso empowers to "make a declaration" and does not D -;,!<.- refer to "notification of declaration" under Section 6(2). The Learned Counsel, therefore, intended that it is not permissible to supply .words (casus omissus) to the proviso and, therefore, if the proviso is read as it is, then it conflicts with the language of Section 3 which speaks not of declaration, but "publication E of Section 6 notification". We do not think that the contention is correct. In paragraph 16 of Meerut Development Authority's case (cited supra), this Court considered Section 3 and ~ observed that:- ... F "it is seen that Section 3 of the Amending Act No.5 of 1991 seeks - to validate the illegal declarations made simultaneously with the publication of Section 4 notification and in some cases even prior to the publication of Section 4 notification." G Thus, even a situation where Section 6 declaration was made prior to the publication of notification under +- Section 4, was held to be covered and cured under Section 3, the validity of which was confirmed by this Court. It would, therefore, be futile to argue that the Act did not H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 959 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

cure the defect and on that account, the provision is bad. A In our opinion, added proviso would have to be read along with and in the light of Section 3 of the amending Act which clearly envisages a situation of the declaration under· Section 6 being published in' the official Gazette on the same date on which notification under Section 4 sub- B section (1) of the principal Act was published in official Gazette or on any day prior to the date o(publication of ~· such notification as defined in Section 4 sub-section (1) of the principal Act (emphasis supplied). Therefore, what is contemplated in proviso is the "publication" of notification. Since this position was not happily obtained in the proviso, the Court in MDA's case (cited supra), in paragraph 14, commented that proviso was not happily worded.

37Copy pinpoint37. It must be noted here that in Somwanti's case (cited supra), as also in Mohd. Ali & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 1998 (9) SCC 480 decided by 3 Judge Bench, identical situation was obtained on the facts where there was a simultaneous publication of the Section 4 notification along with the publishing of Section 6 declaration. The Court E observed in Mohd. Ali's case (cited supra):

"And, therefore, in relation to the State of U.P., it is now settled law that when the State exercises power of imminent domain and in exercise of the power under F Section 17 (4) dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A to acquire the land under Section 4 (1 ), the State is entitled to have the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 simultaneously published so as to take further steps as required under Section 9 of the G Act.. ..... "

38Copy pinpoint38. In that case, the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 12.10.1974 whereas the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was dated 28.09.1974. However, it H

960 SUPREME COURT, REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A was published along with Section 4 notification simultaneously. y..._ ~

This being the factual situation the argument regarding the prior declaration under Section 6 of the Act must fall to the ground.

39Copy pinpoint39. We are also of the opinion that the word 'a declaration' in proviso to Section 17- (4) as inserted by the Validating Act B would mean published or a notified declaration under Section 6 (2) of the Act when it is read in the light of Section 3 which refers to and validates not merely "a declaration", but the .../. publication thereof in official Gazette. As such we do not find anything wrong even if the declaration is prior in time and its c notification is simultaneous with the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The two authorities cited above, namely, Ghaziabad Development Authority's case and Meerut Development Authority's case have taken the same view and we are in respectful agreement with the same. D ,t~.

40Copy pinpoint40. It was then argued that Section 17 (4) of the Act as amended by the Amending Act is ultra vires of the Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution as it nearly overrules the decision of this Court in State. of UP v. Radhey Shyam Nigam (cited supra). We have already dealt with this issue and pointed out that this question was specifically dealt with in the two judgments of Lucknow Development Authority and Meerut Development Authority (cited supra). A very strong reliance was placed on Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India F reported in 1978 (2) SCC 50 by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior 1 - Counsel for the appellants. In Meerut Development Authority's I

case (cited supra), the aforementioned decision in Madan F Mohan Pathak's case (cited supra) has already been considered in paragraph 11 of that judgment. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan G & Ors. reported in 2003 (5) SCC 298. Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on paragraphs 14 to 16. In our opinion, paragraph 14 was completely against the appellants wherein the State Legislature's power to make retrospective legislation and thereby validating the prior executive and legislative acts H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 961 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

- --1 retrospectively is recognized. Of course, the same has to be done only after curing the defects that led to the invalidation. We respectfully agree with the propositions laid down in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 thereof. In Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Broach Borough Municipality reported in 1969 (2) SCC 283, which is referred to in paragraph 16 of the decision, it is stated that:- ;,; "the Legislature may follow any one method or all of them ~

and while it does so, it may neutralize the effect of earlier decision of the Court which becomes ineffective after the change of law''. c It is further stated therein that the validity of the validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the Legislature possesses the competence which it claims over the subject -~, matter and whether in making the validation it removes the D defect which the Courts had found in the existing law. The

- Amending Act has clearly passed these tests. All the relevant cases on this subject have been considered in this judgment. Again in ITW Signode v. Collector of Central Excise reported in 2004 (3) sec 48 (cited supra), our attention was invited by E Shri Trivedi to paragraphs 44 to 46 of this decision which dealt with the question of validity of validating Act and reference is _, ·" made to Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Broach Borough Municipality reported in 1969 (2) SCC 283 and Mis. Ujagar Prints and Others (//) vs. Union of India and Others reported F in 1989 (3) SCC 488. There is nothing in these paragraphs which would go counter to the expressions made in MDA's case (cited supra) or the finding that the present Amending Act has removed the defects pointed out in Radhey Shyam's case (cited supra). Of course, this case pertains to the taxing -+ G statutes. We do not find anything contrary in the other decisions, namely, S.R. Bhagwat's and Indira Gandhi's case (both cited supra) to which we have already made reference. The other cases, namely, Virender Singh Hooda's case, J.M. Saxena's case, and Janpad Sabha's case (all cited supra) need not be H

962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

r-_ A considered in view of what we have _held above and further there is nothing in those cases which would make us take another view of the matter. We, therefore, do not agree with the contention raised by Shri Trivedi that amended Section 17 (4) is ultra vires as it does not remove the defects That question B is closed by MDA's case (cited supra). We also do not agree that it merely nullifies the judgment in Radhey Shyam's case (cited supra).

41Copy pinpoint41. It was further argued by Shri Trivedi that the Amending Act is ultra vires the Article 300 A of the Constitution inasmuch c as it deprives the petitioner of higher compensation as may be admissible pursuant to the fresh acquisition proceedings after

1987. Three cases have been relied upon, namely, State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni & Ors. reported in 1983 (2) SCC 33, T.R. Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Haryana D-' & Ors. reported in 1986 Suppl. SCC 584 and Union of India v. Tushar Rajan Mohanty reported in 1994 (5) SCC 450, wherein it is held that the Legislature cannot create prospective or retrospective law so as to contravene the fundamental rights and that the law must satisfy the requirements of the - E Constitution. We have absolutely no quarrel with that, however, we fail to understand as to how it applies here. For establishing their rights, the appellants would have to establish that the State Government was required, in law, to make a fresh acquisition and could not continue with the old one. We have already held F that we are not convinced by the argument that there was anything wrong with the old proceedings which came to be validated by the Amending Act. We have also found that the Amending Act was a perfectly valid legislation. In that view, the challenge must fail. G

42Copy pinpoint42. The second decision relied upon is T.R. Kapoor & Ors. + v. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in 1986 Suppl. SCC 584. This case has been relied upon for the contents in paragraphs 5 and 16 wherein it has been held that benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 963

... « ' "( [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

retrospective effect. The present case is not such a case. No benefits could be said to have been accrued in favour of the A

.... appellants herein which have been taken away.

43Copy pinpoint43. To the same effect, is the third decision reported as Union of India v. Tushar Rajan Mohanty reported in 1994 (5) B SCC 450. We do not think that the case is relevant to the present issue. /~

.... 44. The further argument by the Shri R.N. Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants herein was about the validity of Section 3 of the Validating Act, c providing that a notification would not be invalid on a ground that a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on the same date, on which the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published or any other day prior to the date of -.~ publication of the notification under Sedion 4 of the Act. The D contentions made in this behalf have already been considered by us in the earlier part of the judgment, where we held that the .... relevant date would be that of notification under Section 4 of the Act or the notification of declaration under Section 6 of the Act and not the mere declaration under Section 6 of the Act. E We have already held with reference to the earlier decisions in this behalf that this is not res integra and is partly covered in ). Mohd. Ali's case (cited supra). In Mohd. Ali's case (cited -I supra), a reference was made to Khadim Hussain's case (cited supra), where it has been held that a notification under Section F 6(2) amounts to the evidence of declaration, which is in the form of an order. The notification is the publication of such declaration and the proof of its existence. Our attention was invited to another reported decision of this Court in Sriniwas Ramnath Khatod vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in G -~ 2002(1) SCC 689 to the effect that publication under Section 6(2) is a ministerial act. What is tried be impressed is that the relevant date should only be the declaration and not its publication. We have already dealt with this subject earlier, particularly relying on Mohd. Ali's case (cited supra) and the H

964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. )

A MDA 's case (cited supra). In view of the subsequent decisions, r--_ we are not in a position to accept the argument that Section 3 ~

itself, providing for the eventuality contained therein, is in any "" way invalid. We, therefore, reject the argument. The Learned Senior Counsel also referred to the decision in the case of B Eugenio Misquita & Ors. vs. State of Goa & Ors. reported in 1997(8) sec 47, in which reference was made to the decision in the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti vs. Makrand .;., Singh & Ors. reported. in 1995(2) SCC 497. It must be ~ immediately pointed out that both these decisions would not be c relevant to the present controversy, as in these decisions, what was being considered was as to which would be the last date under Section 6(2) of the Act for the purposes of Section 11A. The controversy involved in the case of Eugenio Misquita & Ors. vs. State of Goa & Ors. (cited supra), as well as in the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti vs. Makrand Singh & D ~- Ors. (cited supra) is entirely different than the one involved in this matter. Those two cases in Eugenio Misquita & Ors. vs. State of Goa & Ors. (cited supra) and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti vs. Makrand Singh & Ors. (cited supra) would not be apposite. E

45Copy pinpoint45. A further reference was made by the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants to the decision in the case of Mohan J. Singh & Ors. vs. International Airport Authority of India & Ors. .... reported in 1997(9) SCC 132 and S.H. Rangappa vs. State F of Karnataka & Anr. reported in 2002(1) SCC 538. In the second matter, a reference was made to the larger Bench, as the Court was of the opinion that the view taken in two decisions in Eugenio Misquita & Ors. vs. State of Goa & Ors. (cited supra) and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti vs. Makrand Singh G & Ors. (cited supra) was contrary to the decision in Khadim -+- Hussain's case (cited supra). As regards the case of Mohan Singh & Ors. vs. International Airport Authority of India & Ors. (cited supra), the Learned Senior Counsel relied on the observations made in paragraphs 13 and 16. In paragraph 13, it is stated there that:- H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 965 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

/-... "What is needed is that there should be a gap of time of A at least a day between the p blication of the notification under Section 4(1) and of th declaration under Section 6(1)."

Further in paragraph 16, it is observed that:- B "What is material is that the declaration under Section 6 should be published in the Gazette after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, i.e., after a gap of at least one day." c It will be seen that a reference is made to the decision in the case of Radhey Shyam Nigam (cited supra) in this paragraph, as also to the simultaneous publication of notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. -x A reference was also made to Section 17(4), as also Section 0 17(1) A. It is significant to note that later on when the question of validity of the Validating Act came before this Court [which validating provision and proviso to Section 17 (4) were not available in Mohan Singh's case (cited supra), this Court upheld the validity of the Validating Act, refuting the argument E that the Validating Act was only for the purpose of invalidating the decision in Radhey Shyam Nigam's case (cited supra). In our opinion, once this Court upheld the validity and once we have also approved of the Constitutional validity of Validating Act, all these questions must lose their relevance. We do not think that decision in the case of Mohan Singh & Ors. vs. F' International Airport Authority of India & Ors. (cited supra) can be of any help to the appellants in the light of the facts of the present case. Decision in S.H. Rangappa vs. State of Karnataka & Anr. reported in 2002(1) SCC 538, which is a decision after the reference was made to the larger Bench was G also referred before us by the Learned Senior Counsel. The question, which fell for consideration in that-decision was whether the notification under Section 6(2) of the Act should be published within the period prescribed by the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. The Court ultimately upheld the decision H

966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A in Khadim Hussain's case (cited supra) and observed that in '•><- ..... the decisions in Eugenio Misquita & Ors. vs. State of Goa & Ors. (cited supra) and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti vs. Makrand Singh & Ors. (cited supra), the binding decision of Khadim Hussain's case (cited supra) was not referred. It was B also observed that even otherwise in both these cases, declaration under Section 6 of the Act had been published within one year of the notification under Section 4 of the Act and the question in form; in which it has arisen in S.H. -i.. _., Rangappa's case (cited supra), did not arise there. We would c like to say the same thing in respect of the decision in the case of S.H. Rangappa's case (cited supra) that the question which we have to consider in the present case, as also the facts, are entirely different than· the ones in that case. Once Section 3 of the Validating Act came validly on the statute book, there will be no question of any further consideration. The decision in the D ~-- case of S.H. Rangappa's case (cited supra) turns essentially on the question of limitation. In the decision in S.H. Rangappa's case (cited supra), the law laid down in Khadim Hussain's case (cited supra) has been approved. Once we give the interpretation that we have given to Section 3 and the proviso supplied by Section 2, the things become clear. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that decision in S.H. Rangappa's case (cited supra) also does not help the appellants herein in .~ view of the different factual scenario, as also because the ... question of validity of the Validating Act is entirely different from the question of limitation.

46Copy pinpoint46. The Learned Senior Counsel further argued that we should make a reference to the farger Bench and has formulated the questions as under:- G Whether the proviso to Section 17(4) inserted by "1. the Amending Act cures the defect pointed out in + Radhey Shyam only for the period between ~ 24.9.1984 and 11.1.1989?

H 2. Whether "declaration" mentioned in the aforesaid

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 967 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

proviso refers to it as understood by Section 6(1) A or Section 6(2)?

3. Whether the validation provision in Section 3 of the Amending Act goes beyond the newly inserted proviso inasmuch as:- B (h) it cures the defect of "publication" of the )r declaration and not making of the declaration.

(i) it validates publication of the dec;Laration c under Section 6 prior and subsequent to the date of the publication under Section 4(1) of the principal Act.

4. Whether the distinction between declaration simpliciter in Section 6(1) and a published declaration under Section 6(2), pointed out in Khadim Hussain (4 Judges' decision) and followed by 3 Judges' decision in Rangappa's Case was ignored in Meerut Development Authority's case? E

5. It would appear that what is cured is not validated and what it validates is not cured.

6. Whether in view of the admitted incapacity to offer, tender and pay the compensation under sub- F Section (3) and (3A) of Section 17, the notification under Section 17(4) becomes void?

47Copy pinpoint47. We do not think that there is any need to refer any of the questions raised above in view of our observations in the earlier paragraphs, as the schemes of Ghaziabad G --r- Development Authority and Meerut Development Authority have already been upheld by this Court in the earlier decisions. Secondly, the basic objective of the Validating Act was to protect the scheme during the period 1984-89 only and subsequently, there has been no such case of simultaneous H

968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A notification in the State of Uttar Pradesh for the last two )<---...._ decades, as stated by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the LOA. Even in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-Ill, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act is published much after the publication of notification under B Section 4 of the Act. Thirdly, as has been done in MDA's case (cited supra) we have held that Section 17 (4) proviso has to be read together with and in the light of Section 3 of the ~ I, amending Act and not de hors of each other in view of the statement of objects and reasons of that Act. It must be realized that this Court ironed the creases in the proviso added to c Section ~ 17(4) in MDA's case (cited supra). Fourthly, in one of the appeals before us in Civil Appeal Nos. 2116-2118 (Tika Ram & Ors. vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.) represented by Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel, the land owners have already accepted the compensation, while in the matter of Civil Appeal D -i,-- No. 3415 of 1998 (Pratap Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.), the title of Society itself has been found to be infirm and not established as per the findings --.,_ of the High Court. It is obvious that registration of the Sale Deed in respect of the Soeiety is subsequent to the notification under Section 4 of the Act and, therefore, inconsequential. The agreements in favour of that Society do not show that there was any consideration passed. Again, the possession of the land _,4 has already been taken, as claimed by the LOA, way back in ~-

the year 1985 for which there are documents like Panchanama F and the whole township has now come up, persons have built their houses. As far as the sixth point of reference is concerned, we would deal with the same separately in this judgment as we do not agree with the proposition made in that point. Lastly, as held in the cases of Mishri Lal (Dead) by L. Rs. vs. Dhirendra G Nath (Dead) by L.Rs. reported in 1999 (4) SCC 11 and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of --1--- Maharashtra reported in 2005(2) SCC 673, the principle of Stare Decisis would apply. In this case, their Lordships referred to observations by Lord Reid and quoted seven principles H regiarding the binding precedent. They are: I

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 969 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, ,J.]

_. -~ "(1) The freedom granted by the 1966 Practice A Statement ought to be exercised sparingly (the 'use sparingly'. criterion) (Jones vs. Secretary of State for Social Services, 1972 AC 944, 966).

(2) A decision ought not to be overruled if to do so 8 would upset the legitimate expectations of people who have entered into contracts or settlements or x otherwise regulated their affairs in reliance on the ~ validity of that decision (the 'legitimate expectations' criterion) (Ross Smith vs. Ross- C Smith, 1963 AC 280, 303 and lndyka vs. lndyka, (1969) AC 33, 69).

(3) A decision concerning questions of construction of ', statutes or other documents ought not to be -x overruled except in rare and exceptional cases (the D 'construction' criterion) (Jones case (supra))

(4) (a) A decision ought not to be overruled if it would be impracticable for the Lords to foresee the consequence of departing from it (the E 'unforeseeable consequences' criterion) (Steadman vs. Steadman, 1976 AC 536, 542C). (b) A decision ought not to be overruled if to do so would involve a change that ought to be part of a comprehensive reform of the law. Such changes F are best done 'by legislation following on a wide survey of the whole field' (the 'need for comprehensive reform' criterion) (Myers vs. OPP, 1965 AC 1001, 1022; Cassell & Cb. Ltd. VS. Broome, 1972 AC 1027, 1086; Haughton vs. Smith, 1975 AC 476, 500). G

(5) In the interest of certainty, a decision ought not to be overruled merely because the Law Lords consider that it was wrongly decided. There must be some additional reasons to justify such a step H

970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. i' 'I ~ A (the 'precedent merely wrong' criterion) (Knufler vs. ~-~ OPP, 1973 AC 435, 455).

(6) A decision ought to be overruled if it causes such great uncertainty in practice that the parties' B advisers are unable to give any clear indication as to what the courts will hold the law to be (the 'rectification of uncertainty' criterion), (Jones case -j._ (supra)); Oldendorff (E.L.) & Co. GamBH vs. Tradax Export SA, 1974 AC 479, 533, 535: (1972) ., 3 All ER 420) c (7) A decision ought to be overruled if in relation to some broad issue or principle it is not considered just or in keeping with contemporary social conditions or modern conceptions of public policy .. D (the 'unjust or outmoded' criterion) (Jones case ~- (supra)); Conway vs. Rimmer, (1968) AC 910, 938)." ~

48Copy pinpoint48. We would immediately point out that principles at serial Nos. 2, 3, 4 (a) above as also principle No. 5 would apply to E the present situation, where, by upsetting the whole acquisition tremendous upheaval is likely to follow. In that view we do not see any reason for making the reference as argued by the ,.\ Learned Counsel. ~

F II Effect of alleged non-Qay_ment of 80% comQensation under Section 17 of the PrinciQal Act

49Copy pinpoint49. As has been observed in Para 47, we would not take up the above topic. It was urged by the Learned Counsel that G the State Government, though it acquired the possession under Section 17 of the Act, did not pay the 80% of compensation, -+-- as required under Section 17 of the Act and on that account, - the whole exercise was bad. We do not think that the proposition is correct. It was tried to be established that the sufficient funds were not available with the Government. We H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 971 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.] _,, .-"* would prefer not to go into the factual questions as the High A Court has commented upon the same in great details. The tenor of the argument is that Sections 17(3) and 17(3A) of the Act are mandatory and the compensation ought to have been offered, tendered and paid to the land owners before taking the possession. Some documents were referred to in I.A. Nos. 4 B and 5 of 2006 to show that LOA did not have the funds and it >< failed to provide sufficient funds even as late as upto 2004. The ·~ further argument was that even if it was assumed that the possession was taken on 21.5.1985, yet the compensation was paid to the concerned persons much later and in some cases, c it was never paid.

50Copy pinpoint50. Heavy reliance was placed on the documents which were filed alongwith I.A Nos. 4 and 5. This question in the -~- precise form, was not raised before the High Court. These documents were not the part of the High Court record. Shri 0 Owivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for LOA further argued that these documents could not be accepted at this late stage and that the LOA did not have any opportunity to meet those documents, since on I.A. Nos. 4 and 5, no notice has been issued by this Court. Since the source, authentication and E verification of those documents was not clear, these documents )._ were not liable to be considered. The Learned Senior Counsel, •-' however, submitted that the land acquisition proceedings on that account cannot be faulted with and cannot be set at naught. ...... F 50A. The Learned Senior Counsel argued that in case where the accelerated possession is required to be taken, Section 17(1) of the Act, as also Section 17(2) of the Act would ---Ii be attracted and such possession can be taken immediately after the publication of Section 9(1 ). Section 17(3) of the Act t -r- provides that in every case under Section 17(1) and Section G 17(2) of the Act, the Collector shall offer compensation for standing crops and trees or other damage at the time of taking possession. The Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the expression - "under either of the Sub-Sections" shows that Sub- H

972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Section (3) is attracted only when the possession is taken under ~~ Sub-Section (1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act. He, therefore, contended that where Section 5-A is dispensed with under Section 17(4) of the Act, two Sub-Sections, i.e., (3) and (3A) of Section 17 of the Act would not apply. The argument is clearly incorrect. By this, the attempt is to dissect Sub-Section (4) in. B two parts, firstly, where Sub-Section (1) and (2) are applicable and secondly, where the enquiry under Section 5-A is -A dispensed with. That is not the import of the language. Section 17 has to be read in full. It plainly reads that where the • possession is taken with the aid of Section 17(2), the c compensation must fall in advance as per the provisions of Section 3A. In fact, Section 3A has been brought on the legislature with the sole purpose of providing a compensation for the possession taken. That is why 80% of the estimated compensation is to be paid because even thereafter, the award -'}l_- D proceedings would go on and the total compensation would be decided upon. The attempt on the part of the Learned Senior Counsel to read that the payment of compensation is not .,, "' required where Section 5-A enquiry is dispensed with, would be doing violence to the language, firstly, of Section 3A and E secondly, of Sub-Section (4) itself. The clear legal position is that the dispensation of Section 5-A enquiry is only and only to l enable the State Government to take possession under Sub- ~ Section (1) and (2) of Section 17. A third category cannot be '-• created so as to avoid the payment of compensation. The F contention is, therefore, clearly wrong.

51Copy pinpoint51. However, the question is as to what happens when such payment is not made and the possession is taken. Can the whole acquisition be set at naught? In our opinion, this I contention on the part of the appellants is also incorrect. If we G -f-- find fault with the whole acquisition process on account of the non-payment of the 80% of the compensation, then the further question would be as to whether the estimation of 80% of compensation is correct or not. A further controversy can then be raised by the landlords that what was paid was not 80% and H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 973 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.] ___ ,/+ A was short of 80% and, therefore, the acquisition should be set at naught. Such extreme interpretation cannot be afforded because indeed under Section 17 itself, the basic idea of avoiding the enquiry under Section 5-A is in view of the urgent need on the part of the State Government for the land to be acquired for any eventuality discovered by either Sub~Section B ( 1) or Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the Act. )..

52Copy pinpoint52. The only question that would remain is that of the '¥ estimation of the compensation. In our considered view, even if the compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the acquisition would not suffer. One could imagine the c unreasonableness of the situation. Now suppose, there is state of emergency as contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the compensation is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It would entail serious consequences. This -~ situation was considered, firstly, in Satendra Prasad Jain & D Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 1993 (4) SCC 369. It was held therein that once the possession is taken as a matter of fact, then the owner is divested of the title to the land. The Court held that there was then no question of application of even Section 11-A. Commenting upon Section 11-A, it was E held that that Section could not be so construed as to leave the Government holding title of the land without an obligation to ).,_ -I determine the compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of the 80% of the estimated compensation. The three F Judges' Bench of the Court took the view that even where 80% of the estimated compensation was not paid to the land owners, it did not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the land did not vest in the Government. In short, this Court held that the proceedings of acquisition are not affected G ' -1 by the non-payment of compensation. In that case, the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, for which the possession was made, sought to escape from the liability to make the payment. That was not allowed. The Court, in para 17, held as under:- H

974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A "17. In the instant case, even that 80% of the estimated ..+-·"--·- compensation was not paid to the appellants although Section 17(3-A) required that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession B was taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent. It is, at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as the ..... letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated June 27, 1990 shows, failed to make the necessary • c monies available and who has been in occupation of the said land ever since its possession. was taken, to urge that the/possession was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is under no obligation to make an D ~- award."

53Copy pinpoint53. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. etc. etc. reported in 1996 (3) sec 1, similar view was reported. That was a case under the E Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987, under which the acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act. The Court tOok the view that once the possession was taken under Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdrew from that '""- ...,_. position under Section 18 and even the provisions of Section F 11-A were not attracted. That was of course a case where the award was not passed under Section 11-A after taking of the possession. A clear cut observation came to be made in that behalf in Para 12, to the effect that the non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is I

G concerned, did not result in lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings. The law laid down by this Court in Satendra -..----- Prasad Jain & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (cited supra) was approved. The Court also .relied on the decision in P. Chirinanna vs. State of A.P. reported in 1994 (5) SCC 486 H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 975 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

' ft and Awadh Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in 1995 A (6)sec 31, where similar view was taken regarding the land acquisition proceedings not getting lapsed. The only result that may follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest, as contemplated in Section 34 and the proviso added thereto by 1984 Act. In that view, we do not wish to further refer the B matter, as suggested by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel and Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel for the appellants. ),- Therefore, even on the sixth question, there is no necessity of ~ any reference.

Ill.Challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution of India c

54Copy pinpoint54. Learned Senior Counsel then urged that the provisions of the amending Act and also the provisions of Land Acquisition Act like Section 17 (4) are invalid on the test of Article 14 of -.¥ the Constitution. It is pointed out by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior D Counsel that in GDA's case (cited supra) the impugned notification was held to be valid in view of the amendment made to Section 17 (4) of the Act. However, there was no challenge to the validity of Section 17 (4) of the Act in the said case. Similarly, it was argued that in MDA v. Satbir Singh [1996 (11) E SCC 462], the Court had made observation in paragraph 8 that the validity of Section 17 (4) was upheld in GDA's case (cited supra), whereas in fact it was not tested in GDA's case (cited ',-/ supra) at all. It was further urged that the validity of the Act was not tested with respect to its inconsistency with Article 14 and F Article 300A of the Constitution of India. In this behalf it was argued by the Learned Counsel that there was an observation to the effect in paragraph 14 that the proviso was not happily worded. But a reading of it would clearly give us an indication that the proviso to sub-section (4) introduced by Section 2 of -., the Amendment Act 5 of 1991 would deal with both the situations ,namely, the notification published on or after G

September -24, 1984 but before January 11, 1989 as also the declaration to be simultaneously published subsequent thereto. It was further argued that if we read the proviso in the manner H

976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A that we have already done then it would be a case of casus ~., omissus being supplied by the Court. We have already taken all these arguments into consideration. In view of the interpretation given by us to Section 3 and the proviso and the necessity of reading the two provisions in the light of each other, there would be no occasion of supplying casus omissus and the argument in that behalf must fail.

55Copy pinpoint55. Insofar as the validity on the backdrop of Article 14 is --1', .,, concerned, it is true that in paragraph,.8 there has been an observation that the validity of the proviso added by the State c Legislature by way of an amendment to Section 17 (4) of the Act has been upheld by the two Judge Bench decision in GDA's case (cited supra). However, when we see the rest of the judgment it can be said that no such question was considered. However, the fact remains that in GDA's case D (cited supra), the validity was not questioned or doubted and ~c-

the challenged Section was interpreted and treated to be valid by the Court. When we see the further judgment in MDA 's case (cited supra) in the further paragraphs, this Court has approved of the whole amending Act reiterating on the decision in Indian E Aluminium Co. (cited supra). The Court has taken a full review of the then existing law by way of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa vs. Gopal Chandrarath reported in 1995 (6) ~ SCC 243, Bhubaneswar Singh and Anr. vs. Union of India and \-{ Ors. reported in 1994 (6) SCC 77 and Comorin Match F Industries P. Ltd, vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1996 (4) SCC 281. Thereafter, referring to Gouri Shankar Gauri and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in 1994 (1) SCC 92, the Court also referred to the provisions of Article 254 (2) and (3) and approved of the whole Amending Act as such. In our G opinion, reading-paragraph 14 of this judgment in its correct perspective would repel the argument of the appellants that the provision is arbitrary in any manner or has the effect of creating impermissible classification. In our opinion, the language of paragraph 14 does not help the petitioners. If the petitioners in H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 977 , [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.] -__,, ...-.,. MDA's case (cited supra) did not specifically address the Court A on the question of Constitutional validity of the Amending Act (as is being claimed by the appellants), we do not think it will be permissible for the petitioners to raise this point which was admittedly not raised either in GDA's case (cited supra) or MDA's case (cited supra). Petitioners would not be permitted B to take such a course [see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. > Ltd. vs. Shambhu Nath Mukherji & Ors. reported in AIR 1978 ., SC 8]. We need not go in that question since MDA's case (cited • supra) is a Larger Bench decision.

56Copy pinpoint56. However, this is apart from the fact that in our opinion c there can be no question of Section 17 (4) proviso or the provisions of the Amending Act being invalid in any way. We, therefore, do not feel necessary to refer this case on this issue

-· to a Larger Bench, particularly, in respect of the validity of the provisions vis-a-vis Article 14 of the Constitution. We do not find D the provisions in any manner arbitrary or making impermissible classifications or suggesting invidious discrimination nor can the provisions in the amending Act can be termed as "arbitrary" providing no guiding principles. E

57Copy pinpoint57. The Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the ,.__ appellants had heavily relied on paragraph 14 of the judgment in Meerut Development Authority vs. Satvir Singh & Ors. (cited supra). Basically we do not accept the contention raised that the contents in paragraph 14 holding that the provisions of the amending Act are not limited to the two dates mentioned and can be applicable even subsequently, results in creation of two classes and the possible discrimination. In our opinion, it will not be necessary to go into that question as the present appeals pertaining to Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II are relating only to the period between 24.9.1984 and 11.1.1989. It is stated by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the LOA that only two appeals pertain to Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-Ill and even in that case, the notifications were published in the year 1991 and the issue of simultaneous publication of H

978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.} S.C.R. ' \.,~

A notification does not arise, as Section 6 declaration was signed .... and published in 1992. Therefore, there will be no need to go into the academic question whether Amending Act applies only to the period between 24.9.1984 and 11.1.1989 or even the subsequent period. Further, even if, as held in MDA's Case B (cited supra), it applied to the subsequent period, it does not infringe Article 14 for the reasons given by us earlier.

58Copy pinpoint58. Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants further argued that there was invidious discrimination between the Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II and Ujariyaon Housing c Scheme Part-Ill, inasmuch as while the notification published on 8.12.1984 under Section 4 read with Section 17(4) of the Act was allowed to proceed with the help of the Validating Act, in case of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-Ill, however, a fresh notification was issued on 30.12.1991 and Section 6 D declaration came to be issued on 30.12.1992. Thus, while the ~

notification in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II was validated, the notification in respect of the Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-Ill was allowed to lapse and a fresh notification was published, meaning thereby that persons coming under E Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-Ill, got the better deal (if they really did) and higher compensation. This argument of Shri Trivedi was adopted by Shri Qamar Ahmad. Though we have considered this argument in the earlier part of the judgment we again reiterate that the argument is clearly incorrect. The F Validation Act did not confer any discretion on the State Government to apply its provisions to a particular scheme and then issue notifications. It was a one time exercise for validating a particular scheme by amending the Act which has already been found to be valid in MDA's case (cited supra). Again G Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-Ill did not lapse because of the decision of the Government. Since the award was not made l within the time prescribed by the Section 11 A of the Act, it had the effect of lapsing the notifications. Therefore, the State Government was left with no other way and had to issue a fresh H

..... TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 979 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

~·~ notification. In Ujariyaon Housing Scheme Part-II, the award was A made by the Collector within the time and, therefore, those notifications were not affected. Therefore, the argument that there was invidious discrimination in between the two schemes has to fail. 8

59Copy pinpoint59. It was reiterated by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel, as also, Shri Qamar Ahmed, Learned Counsel that ,).. the question of constitutional validity of the Act was not .,, considered by the High Court as the Act was held to be valid in GDA's case (cited supra) and in MDA's case (cited supra). c It was, however, urged tflat the question of Constitutional validity was never considered in these cases. Reliance was placed 9n judgments reported as Amit Das v. State of Bihar reported in 2000 (5) SCC 488, State of UP & Anr. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. reported in 1991 (4) SCC 139, Nirmal -Y Jeet Kaur v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2004 D (7) SCC 558, /CIC/ Bank & Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of

... Greater Bombay & Ors. reported in 2005 (6) SCC 404, A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Naik & Ors. reported in 1988 (2) Sec 602, Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2005 (4) sec 649, P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of E Karnataka reported in 2002 (4) SCC 578, Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab reported in 1995 (6) sec 614, Isabella >- Johnson v. M.A. Susai reported in 1991 (1) SCC 494. We do not think that the law laid down in these cases would apply to the present situation. In all these cases, it has been basically F held that a Supreme Court decision does not become a precedent unless a question is directly raised and considered therein, so also it does not become a law declared unless the question is actually decided upon. We need not take stock of all these cases and we indeed have no quarrel with the G ---., propositions settled therein. However, we may point out that, firstly, the question of validity is settled in MDA's case (cited supra). This is apart from the fact that we are of the opinion that there is nothing wrong with the Amending Act insofar as its Constitutional validity is concerned. We have already H

980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A rejected the argument that there was any discrimination {.-

between Ujariyaon Part II and Ujariyaon Part Ill schemes. We are convinced with the explanation given by the State Government as to why Ujariyaon Part Ill scheme was left out of the consideration of validation. Indeed the acquisition therein B could not have been validated on account of the time having lapsed for doing so. Once Sections 2 and 3 and the proviso are read in the manner indicated in MDA's case (cited supra) ~.. as also in the light of observations made by us, no question remains of any Constitutional invalidity. We are not at all • c impressed by the contention raised tnat the Amending Act cannot pass the test of Article 14. We hold accordingly.

60Copy pinpoint60. Our attention was invited to R.K. Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar (cited supra). In fact, according to us this judgment does not help the appellants for assailing the Constitutional D validity of the statute. In so far as the Executive action is --f- - concerned, we do not think that there is any scope to interfere in this matter. Shri Qamar Ahmed in his written arguments has adopted the arguments of Shri Trivedi. In his written submissions he has challenged the provisions of Sections 17 E (1), 17 (1A), 17 (3A) and 17 (4A) and proviso to Section 17 (4) as ultra vires to the Constitution. He has also challenged the provisions of Section 2 of the UP Act No. 8 of 1974 as violative and ultra vires to Section 3A, 38, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 of Land ..... Acquisition Act No.1 of 1894 as amended from time to time. F In support of his argument, Learned Counsel has relied on the law laid down in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (cited supra). According to him, Sections 17(1), 17(1A), 17(3A) and 17(4) of the Act and Section 2 of the UP Act No. VIII ..... of 1974, as also the UP Act No. 5 of 1991 are violative of Articles 14, 19, 21, G 39, 48, 48A and 300A for invidious discrimination. Learned Counsel also submits that there are no guidelines for the Y-

exercise of power under Sections 17(1), 17(1A) and Section 17 (4), as the word "urgency" is too vague, uncertain and elusive criteria to form the basis of a valid and reasonable H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 981 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.] I -~ A classification. Learned Counsel also referred to the case of Lachman Das v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1952 SC

235. A reference was also made to Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of/ndia & Ors. reported in AIR 1951 SC 41. Learned Counsel has traced the whole case law following Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (cited supra) and has quoted extensively from that case as also from Kathi Ranning Rawat v. State of }- Saurashtra reported in AIR 1952 SC 123. We have already pointed out that this group of cases would be of no help to the • appellants, particularly, because the fact situation and the controversy involved in the present matter is entirely different. c I We do not agree with the Learned Counsel that there is any classification, much less any impermissible classification and any group has been treated favourably as against another group or that the law has treated a group more favourably than the -~ other, refusing equal protection to such group. As regards the general principles from Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (cited supra) as also from State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh reported in AIR 1980 SC 319, we must point out that ultimately this Court culled out the principle that if the Legislature indicates a policy which inspires it and the object which it seeks to attain, then the selective application of the law can be left to the discretion of the Executive authority [see Kedar Nath Bajoria's case reported in 1953 SCR 30]. Such law has been approved in R.K. Dalmia's case (cited supra) as also in In Re: Special Courts Bill (cited supra). F

61Copy pinpoint61. There can be no dispute that the law must indicate the policy and the object clearly while acquiring. Discretion upon the application of law and the power under Section 17 of the Act of doing away with Section SA inquiry has to be exercised in a proper manner. There are cases where this Court has not G brooked any breach of provision under Section 17 of the Act However, we must say that there are clear guidelines provided under Section 17(1) read with Section 4 for understanding the concepts of urgency and emergency. In this behalf, we must hold that the criteria of emergency as provided under Sub-Section H

982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. /

A (2) of Section 17 is separate and distinct from the criteria of {.- ·,,,.,.....-- urgency. In our opinion; these two criteria provide clear r- guidelines and cannot be held as arbitrary. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti's case and Pista Devi's case (cited supra), this Court has laid down that mere existence of urgency is not B enough and the Government must further consider the matters objectively as to the dispensation with Section SA permissible under that particular situation. Section 17 of the Act has existed -', on the statute book for a long time and on a number of occasions the applicable criteria of urgency and emergency .. c have been tested by the Courts on account of the Government actions in that behalf being challenged. Wherever the Courts have found that urgency did not exist in realit~ or the dispensation of Section SA was not considered separately such notifications have been struck down on a number of occasions. > However, we do not see any reasonable argument having been D made against the Constitutional validity. The validity of this "- Section 17 of the Act has been upheld by the Allahabad High Court as also the Gujarat High Court in Sarju Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. reported in AIR 1962 ALL 221 and Ram Sevak v. State of UP Ors. reported in AIR 1963 All

E 24. The second judgment of Allahabad High Court has been approved by the court in lshwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in AIR 1968 SC 870. We, therefore, -"" do not accept the contention raised by Shri Qamar Ahmad, '-·

Learned Counsel for the appellants that the power under F Section 17(4) of the Act of dispensing with the enquiry under Section S-A is in the nature of unbridled and uncanalised power in the hands of Executive to take possession, invoking urgency clause. As discussed in the earlier cases by this Court (cited .,..... above), it cannot be said that the Section suffers from any G constitutional invalidity on account of being arbitrary in the y· nature.

62Copy pinpoint62. In fact, the reliance was placed on the decision in Suraj Mall Mohta and Company vs. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and Anr. H reported in AIR 19S4 SC S4S. That was a case under the tax

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 983 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

jurisprudence, dealing with certain Sections of the Taxation on A Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947. It was found to be invalid as it had provided different procedure for the tax abettors. This Court had found that the procedure was more drastic for a certain group. The provisions of Sub-Section (4) of Section 5 were found to be discriminatory. The High Court B has also dealt with this case. Though there can be no dispute on the principles, we do not think that the principle are applicable to the present controversy. We have already given a reference of the case of lshwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. vs. State of Gujarat (cited supra). The Learned Counsel appearing c on behalf of the respondents invited our attention to the findings recorded by the High Court, with which we are satisfied. We must observe that merely because the decision of the Government on question of urgency is not justiciable, it does not mean that Section 17(4) of the Act is discriminatory. The 0 High Court has made a reference to the observation by this Court in Matajog Dubey vs. H.C. Bhari reported in AIR 1956 SC 44, holding that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of such power is not to be easily assumed. Even at the cost of repetition, we may mention the case of R.K. Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar (cited supra) as a complete answer to the argument of Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel for the appellants. lshwarlal's case (cited supra) is also a total answer to the argument that Sub- - Section (1) and (4) of Section 17 of the Act are unconstitutional. The High Court has correctly held that Sub-Sections (1 }, (3A) F and (4) of Section 17 of the Act do not suffer from any unconstitutionality on account of the alleged breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel for the appellants also argued that before deciding to take the possession under the various provisions of Section 17 G of the Act, a person is entitled to a notice. The High Court has correctly dealt with this question. It firstly considered the law laid down in the cases of Kraipak vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 150, Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India reported H

984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

, A in AIR 1978 SC 597 and Olga Tellis vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation reported in Al R 1986 SC 180 as also in Union of ~- --- .-

India vs. Tutsi Ram reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 which were relied upon by the High Court. The High Court was, undoubtedly, correct in holding that there was no necessity of a notice since I- B the satisfaction required on the part of the Executive is a subject of satisfaction, which can only be assailed on the ground that i:= there was no sufficient material to dispense with the enquiry or the order suffers from malice. We will deal with the question ~ ~· I as to whether there was an urgency and what is the nature of c urgency required. We, therefore, do not think that Sub-Sections I \. (1) (3A) and (4) of Section 17 of the Act suffer, as there is no notice provided in those Sub-Sections before the possession is taken.

IV. Issue of urgencl£ and a12plication of Section 17 of the D Principal Act "*-

63Copy pinpoint63. At this juncture itself, we must also consider the argument that there was no real urgency in this matter. It can not be ignored that this land was urgently needed for housing. t-- I

E Large-scale development and utilization of acquired land after the acquisition is apparent on the face of the record. A number \.-

of houses have been constructed, third party interests were created in whose favour the plots were allotted and the High Court has also commented while disposing of the writ petitions that the quashing of the notification at this stage will prejudice ·-" -.... the interests of the people for whom the schemes were evolved. •'

While considering as to whether the Government was justified in doing away with the inquiry under Section 5A, it must be noted that there are no allegations of ma/a tides against the .j,.... authority. No evidence has been brought before the judgment and the High Court has also commented on this. The housing Y" development and the planned developments have been held to be the matters of great urgency by the court in Pista Devi's case (cited supra). In the present case we have seen the judgment of the High Court which has gone into the records and H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 985 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.] ----!,- ... + has recorded categorical finding that there was sufficient A _. material before the State Government and the State Government has objectively considered the issue of urgency. Even before this Court, there were no allegations of ma/a tides. A notice can be taken of the fact that all the lands which were acquired ultimately came to be utilized for the scheme. We, B ..... therefore, reject the argument that there was no urgency to >- justify dispensation of Section 5A inquiry by applying the .. urgency clause. In a reported decision Kishan Das & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. reported in 1995 (6) SCC 240, this Court has taken a view that where the acquisition has been c completed by taking the possession of the land under acquisition and the constructions have been made and completed, the question of urgency and the exercise of power under Section 17(4) would not arise. We must notice that -~ acquisitions in this case are of 1984-1985 and two decades have passed thereafter. The whole township has come up, the houses and the lands have been allotted, sold and re-sold, awards have been passed and overwhelming majority of land owners have also accepted the compensation, this includes even some of the appellants. In such circumstances we do not think that the High Court was in any way wrong in not interfering with the exercise of power under Section 17 (4) of the Act. At J... ... any rate, after the considered findings on the factual questions recorded by the High Court, we would not go into that question.

64Copy pinpoint64. The High Court has taken a stock of the argument on behalf of the respondents herein that there was material available in support of the _satisfaction on the part of the Executive to take possession under Section 17 of the Act. The High Court has relied on the decisions in Raja Anand Braha --y Shah vs. State of U.P. reported in Al R 1967 SC 1081, in G Narayan vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1977 SC 183, in Kailashwati vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1978 All. 181, in Deepak Pahwa vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi reported in AIR 1984 SC 1721, as also in Pista Devi's case (cited supra) and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti's case (cited supra). The H

986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A High Court has correctly come to the conclusion that there was + ..,, {-

all the justification for invoking the urgency clause and taking the possession for the lands in question. We endorse the said finding of the High Court. -- ,,, Other contentions on merits B

65Copy pinpoint65. Apart from these contentions, both Shri Trivedi, _--( Learned Senior Counsel, as also Shri Qamar Ahmed, Learned ~ Counsel again raised the same questions of facts like the non- '

publication of Sections 4 and 6 notifications. Insofar as that is c concerned, we have mentioned it only for rejecting the contention. After the judgment of the High Court we will not go into that question again being a pure question of fact. Similar is the question raised about the land belonging to the cooperative society and the release of the same. We do not think that that question needs to be answered in the wake of -...; - the High Coui:t's judgment. The High Court judgment is ·- ~

absolutely correct in that behalf. In our considered opinion, even ..' if the Government had taken a decision not to acquire the land belonging to the cooperative society as far as possible, there is nothing wrong if such lands were acquired. What is to be seen is the bona tides of the Government behind the decision to acquire the lands. On that account no fault can be found with , -". the concerned notifications under Sections 4 and 6.

66Copy pinpoint66. Similar contentions were raised regarding the - F possession. We do not propose to go into the question of facts and questions relating to the individual claims. We have noted that the respondents herein having specifically claimed that the possession of the lands has already been taken. Therefore, accepting that claim, as has been done by the High Court, we G would not go into those questions of fact. y-

67Copy pinpoint67. To put the record straight, there is enough evidence in shape of the stand taken by the LOA in its counter affidavit before the High Court, where it was asserted that the H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 987 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.] . . . -+ possession was already taken. Even in the present Civil A Appeal, the same stand is reported with reference to a particular date, i.e., 21.5.1985 that the possession was taken and there is also a true copy of the Panchanama on record. Insofar as the Civil Appeal Nos. 2116-2118 (Tika Ram & Ors. vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.) are concerned, it was urged by B the appellants that in the affidavit of State of U. P. before the ). High Court, the date of taking possession was mentioned as .. 30.3.1986 and, therefore, it was urged that the possession could not have been taken on 21.5.1985 as per record. The Learned Senior Counsel for the LOA pointed out that this was c incorrect and the correct date of taking possession was only 21.5.1985, while the possession of some plots was handed over to the LOA on 30.3.1986. This is apart from the fact that in today's context, when the whole township is standing, this question goes to the backdrop. In the face of Panchanama, - \- D which is on record, we would endorse the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken on 21.5.1985.

68Copy pinpoint68. Shri Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the LOA also found fault with the Sale Deed in favour of Pratap Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd., which is being E· represented by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel. It was urged that its claim was based on the Sale agreement, which ... « was executed one day before the publication of Section 4 Notification in the Gazette, i.e., 8.12.1984. It is admitted case that the Sale Deed was registered on 22.1.1986, which is F clearly a date beyond the date of Section 4 notification. It is already held by this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam vs. Kalra Properties Ltd. reported in 1996 (3) SCC 124 and Star Wire (India) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in 1996 (11) sec 698 that if any purchases of the land are made after the G -~ publication of Section 4(1) notification, landlords in this case would not get any right or entitlement to question the validity of the title of the State based on the acquisition. Obviously, the claim of this society is on the basis of the Agreement of Sale·. dated 7.4.1983. It was reported by the Learned Senior Counsel H

988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

+~ A that Shri Hukum Chand Gupta also expired on 27.7.1983 and ultimately, the Sale Deed was executed on 7.12.1984. We do not want to go into this question of fact, but we will certainly go ··~. with and endorse the finding of the High Court in this behalf that the society had purchased the land after the issuance of B notification.

69Copy pinpoint69. It was urged by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel . ...( for the appellants that there was a policy to give back 25% of If the acquired land to the cooperative societies. This was. suggested on the basis of various letters on record, suggesting c that LOA was considering the revision. Shri Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for LOA pointed out that once the land was acquired and the possession had been taken, Section 48 did not apply. Besides, according to the Learned Senior Counsel, the policy applied to the cooperative societies, who had land -;- D before the acquisition process begins. This was obviously with the object to safeguard the interests of the members of the society. The Learned Senior Counsel was at pains to point out that there is no such disclosure as to who were the members of the society. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the E society was nothing, but a front piece set up for obtaining 25% of the land. Therefore, the rent of the 25% of the land was not acceptable. It was also pointed out that the Sale Agreement J. was also entered into a day before the publication of the ~

notification in the Gazette and the registration of the Sale Deed F was also done much after the notification was published and, therefore, this policy, even if there is one, would not be applicable to the society in question. We would not, therefore, accept that claim that Pratap Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. should be given back 25% of the land acquired, which is again G not possible in view of the township having come up in Gomti y- Nagar.

70Copy pinpoint70. In view of what we have held above, we confirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss all the appeals being H

TIKA RAM & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 989 [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

.. ~ + Civil Appeal Nos. 2650-2652 of 1998, 3162 of 1998, 3176 of A 1998, 3415 of 1998, 3561 of 1998, 3597 of 1998, 3923 of 1998, 3939 of 1998, 3645 of 1998, 3691 of 1998, 5346 of 1998, 2116-2118 of 1999, ..2139 of 1999, 2121 of 1999, 2113 of 1999 and 4995-4996 of 1998. B SLP (CIVIL) No ....... (CC 1540/1999)

71Copy pinpoint71. Delay condoned in SLP (Civil) No. 23551 of 2009 (CC 1540/1999). The Special Leave Petition is dismissed in view " of the above order. c

72Copy pinpoint72. In the circumstances, there would be no orders as to the costs.

K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.