SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. ~ v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.} S.C.R. . A appellants cannot plead equity and seek court's intervention for ~' protection of the unauthorised constructions raised by them. It is trite to say that once the land is acquired by following due process of law, the same cannot be transferred by the land owner to another person and that any such transfer is void and B is not binding on the State. A transferee of the acquired land can, at best, step into the shoes of the land-owner and· 1odge claim for compensation - Gian Chand v. Gopala and others (1995) 2 SCC 528, Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, .> Jaipur v. Dau/at Mal Jain and others (1997) 1 SCC 37, Yadu c Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and others JT (1995) 8 S.C. 179 and Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society, Jaipur and others (1996) 11 SCC 229.

44Copy pinpoint44. The appellants have another unsurmountable hurdle in \-

D the form of Section 3 of the 1972 Act, which contains prohibition -r:- against transfer of the acquired land. That section reads as under:-

"Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by Central E Government.- No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union territory of Delhi, which has been acquired by the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 or under any other law providing for -+ F acquisition of land for a public purpose." /

Section 4 which contains provision for regulation of transfer of lands which are under acquisition also reads as under:- "Regulation on transfer of lands in relation to which G acquisition proceedings have been initiated. - No person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union territory of Delhi, which· is proposed H

SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 761 & ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] to be acquired in connection with the Scheme and in A

"" relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public purpose having been made by the Central Government under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (1 of 1894) the Central Government has not withdrawn form the acquisition under 8 section 48 of that Act."

45Copy pinpoint45. The distinction between the above reproduced two -f.-' provisions is that while Section 3 contains an absolute prohibition on transfer of the acquired land by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise, Section 4 declares that no person shall, c except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale etc. of any land or part thereof, which is proposed to be acquired in connection with the scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the r-' effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public D ~ urpose has been made by the Central Government and the Central Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under Section 48(1).

46Copy pinpoint46. The present case falls within the ambit of Section 3 of E the 1972 Act. The land owners and Shri Satish Khosla must have been aware of the prohibition on transfer of the acquired land, but by taking advantage of the stay order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.1753/1980, they appear to have entered into some clandestine transaction pursuant to which F Shri Satish Khosla acquired possession of the land and proceeded to build the sports complex and commercial facilities to which reference has been made in the order of the Division Bench. We have described the transaction as clandestine because the appellants are conspicuously silent as G to how Shri Satish Khosla came in possession of land in · question after 35 years of initiation of the acquisition proceedings and 1O years of finalization thereof. During the course of hearing, Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants did make a statement that his H

762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A client were put in possession in furtherance of an agreement of sale, but no document has been produced in support of this ...... statement. Therefore, it is not possible to take cognizance of the so-called agreement of sale. In any case, even if such a transaction did take place, the same will have to be treated as B void in view of the express prohibition contained in Section 3 . "' of the 1972 Act.

47Copy pinpoint47. Although, the then Minister for Urban Development, _.+.. who recorded note dated 8.6.1999, was extremely magnanimous to the appellants when he wrote that the c extensive construction must have been made with full cooperation of public servants concerned, but having carefully examined the entire record, we have no hesitation to observe that the construction of this magnitude could not have been possible, but for the active connivance of the concerned public '-{ D servants who turned blind eye to the huge structure being built . -:r:-- on the acquired land without any sanctioned plan. We are amazed to note that after having secured some sort of transfer of the acquired land in stark violation of the prohibition contained in Section 3 of the 1972 Act, the appellants could E raise massive structure comprising cricket ground, tennis stadium, badminton courts, swimming pool, table tennis room, squash court, etc. and cottages with modern facilities without even submitting building plans for sanction by any competent authority and without being noticed by any of the authorities i- F entrusted with the duty of checking illegal/unauthorised construction. This mystery may perhaps never be solved because the officers responsible for ignoring the blatant violation of Section 3 of the 1972 Act, Delhi Development Authority Act and Building Rules, Regulations and By.:taws must have either retired or moved to higher positions in the administration where they will be able to block any inquiry in the matter. Be that as it may, such illegal constructions cannot :)----.

be protected by the court by nullifying the decision taken by the Government not to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in question.

SHANTI SPORTS CLUB ~ ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 763 & ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

..,... 48. At this stage, we may also take cognizance of the commercial activities being undertaken in what has been described by the appellants as sports complex simpliciter. The nature and magnitude of the commercial activities may never have been revealed but for the fact that the officer representing the respondents could bring to the High Court's notice the written statement filed by Shri Satish Khosla in Suit No. 3064/ 1996- M/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. and others v. Satish Khosla. In that suit, the plaintiff had sought a decree of permanent .... injunction restraining the defendant from. letting out the garden for parties and functions during the currency of lease agreement c in respect of cottage no. 6. The contents of paras 4, 6 and 11 of the written statement, which have been extracted in the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court, read as under:-

"4. Para no. 4 is denied. It is pertinent to note that the D -~ Cottage in question is situated in the Sha'nti Sports Club and is one of the 7 cottages in the said Sports Club. Shanti Sports Club, of which the defendant is the Chairman, came into existence in 1989 and the sports facilities of the said Club are being utilized by its members as well as E others. The said Club has amongst others a cricket ground, six tennis courts, swimming pool, squash courts, billiards rooms and a host of other facilities for use for its ...,.. members. The Club has large beautifully manicured lawn appealing to the eye. Since the very inception of the Club, F its beautiful lawns are hired for wedding parties, birth-day parties and for other festive occasions. These wedding parties have been held on the lawns of the Club since 1991, and are the very life and soul of the Club apart from its sports activities. In fact, the aforementioned wedding G parties and other functions which are held on the lawns are the major source of revenue for the Club. The club has more than 1500 members and about 200-300 frequent the club every day. H

' 764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. r

A 6. Para 6 is denied. The contents of this para are ......-;· absolutely false to the knowledge of the plaintiffs inasmuch as the plaintiffs all along knew that the garden in between the two Cottages was let out on hire for marriage and other private parties. The defendant denies any verbal B assurance was given to the plaintiffs that the garden was to be used for the families residing in two cottages and r not for any other purpose. The lawn/garden in question in between the two cottages is of more than 3000 sq. yards ..... in size and it was not hired out to the plaintiff. c 11. The averments made in para 11 are denied. It is submitted that the plaintiffs have filed the present suit only to harass the defendant. It is pertinent to note that in the other Cottages in the Club several Diplomats including r Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan, Ambassador of ...__,. D Kazakastan and other dignitaries are staying for several ~ \.years without any complaint. It is denied that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from hiring out the garden for functions and parties during the tenure of the alleged lease agreement. E The r~venue generated from hiring out the garden for functions and parties is significant revenue and is necessary for the proper and efficient running of the Club and these functions and parties are the very life and soul of the Club. -1- F Ti 1e aforesaid avennents made in the written statement filed by Shri Satish Khosla in the above noted suit clearly reveal that the cottages at the club and its lawn~ are being used for commercial and rental purposes. In respect of cottage No. 6 alone the club was charging large amounts as per G below under various agreements. These details are as follows:- +-·

1. According to the lease agreement by and between the club and Mis.Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. the latter was required H

SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 765 & ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

to pay a rental of Rs.60,0001- p.m. to the former during the A first year of the lease.

2. The rent was liable to be increased by 5% after the first years, 10% over the last rent paid after second year and every year thereafter. B

3. Agreement stipulated payment of advance rent in the sum of Rs.4,50,0001- by Mis. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. to the .... Club .

4. Under maintenance and service agreement in respect c of the said premises Mis. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. were required to pay Rs.40,0001- p.m. to the Club.

5. The maintenance charges of the premises were liable

- ~~ to be increased by 5% over the last charge paid after the first year, and increase of 10% over the last charge paid after the second year and every year thereafter. D

6. Under an agreement for security services, for the same cottage, the aforesaid lessee was required to pay Rs.30,0001- to the club and these charges were liable to E be increased by 5% after first year and 10% after the second year and every year thereafter.

7. Under an agreement styled ~s 'hire agreement', the ~ lessee was required to pay to the club a sum of Rs. 70,0001 F - p.m. for the use of the fittings and fixtures installed in the cottage.

8. The lessee was also liable to pay to the club hire charges of Rs.7,50,0001- as advance for the fittings and fixtures installed in the cottage." G

-+ 49. From what we have noted above, it is crystal clear that the appellants have been undertaking large scale commercial activities in the complex and their so-called love for sports has substantial flavor of commerce. H

766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 50. The plea of discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution put forward by the appellants is totally devoid ~

of substance because they did not produce any evidence before the High Court and none has been produced before this Court to show that their land is identically placed qua the lands B on which Hamdard Public School, St. Xavier Schoo.I, Scindia Potteries, etc. exist. In the representations made to different functionaries of the Government and DOA, the appellants did claim that other parcels of the land have been de-notified and before the High Court a copy of notification dated 6.9.1996 -+- c issued under Section 48(1) was produced, but the said assertion and notification were not sufficient for recording a finding that their case is identical to those whose land had been denotified. The burden to prove the charge of discrimination and violation of Article 14 was on the appellants. It was for them to produce concrete evidence before the court to show that their case was identical to other persons whose land had been ... -y-;. released from acquisition and the reasons given by the .Government for refusing to release their land are irrelevant or extraneous. Vague and bald assertions made in the writ :..

petition cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the appellants have been subjected to invidious or hostile discrimination. That apart, we are prima facie of the view that the Government's decision to withdraw from the acquisition of some parcels of land in favour of some individuals was not in public interest. Such decisions had, to some extent, resulted ~ F in defeating the object of planned development of Delhi on which considerable emphasis has been laid by the Full Bench of the High Court and this Court. This being the position, Article 14 cannot be invoked by the appellants for seeking a direction to the respondents to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in question. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The concept of equality enshrined in that Article is a positive con_cept. The Court can command the State to give equal treatment to similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the

SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 767 & ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in A ""'- ... another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong order has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this :• Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality B be committed in their favour by the State or its agencies/ instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities. In Chandigarh -+ Administration v. Jagjit Singh (1995) 1 SCC 745, this Court made a lucid exposition of law on this subject. The facts of that c case were that the respondents, who had given the highest bid for 338 sq. yds. Plot in Section 31A, Chandigarh defaulted in paying the price in accordance with the terms and conditions

-· ~·~ of allotment. After giving him opportunity of showing cause, the Estate Officer cancelled the lease df the plot. The appeal and the revision filed by him were dismissed by the Chief D Administrator an~ Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh

- respectively. Thereafter, the respondent applied for refund of the amount deposited by him. His request was accepted and the entire amount paid by him was refunded. He then filed a petition for review of the order passed by the Chief E Commissioner, which was dismissed. However, the officer concerned entertained the second review and directed that the plot be restored to the respondent. The latter did not avail ~ benefit of this unusual order ~nd started litigation by filing writ ... petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on March 18, F

1991. Thereafter, the respondent again approached the Estate Officer with the request to settle his case in accordance with the policy of the Government to restore the plots to the defaulters by charging forfeiture amount of 5%. His request was rejected by the Estate Officer. He then filed another writ petition before G the High Court, which was allowed only on the ground that in ..... another case pertaining to Smt. Prakash Rani, the Administrator had restored the plot despite dismissal of the writ petition filed by her. While reversing the order of the High Court, H

768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A this Court observed as under:- "We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, ifit can be called one, on which the writ petition has been ·~ .. allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law· and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across B )>., many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with I

such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can + never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the c petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it

-- can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be D contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal ....,..-. or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the ~

illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The E extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one i/legall unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be + corrected, if it can be done according to law - indeed, ...... wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law- but even if it cannoTbe corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to dirE;!ct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier +- illegal acUorder nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving H

SHANTI SPORTS ctLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 769 & ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] ,)i.,_ effect to such pleas would be prejudicial tr the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it \can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is similar to the other persons' case. But then why examine-another person's case in his absence rather than-examining the case of the petitioner · who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the c entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctnes~ of the order made or action ,.....- \ taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, D ,-,,.- such a course - barring exceptional situations - would ~ neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High ....... Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular E action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided -}- on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the • authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the F Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world." [emphasis added] G -t 51. Similar is the ratio of the judgments in Narain Das v. Improvement Trust, Amritsar (1973) 2 SCC 265, Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (1996) 2 SCC 459, Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Dau/at Mal Jain H

770 SUPREME COtJRT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A (supra), Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and others )(,..._ (supra), State Qf Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann [(1997) 3 SCC 321, Faridabad CT. Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services [(1997) 7 SCC 752), Style (Dress land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh [(1999) 7 SCC 89), State of Bihar v. Kameshwar B Prasad Singh (2000) 9 SCC 94, Union of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437, Ekta Sakthi Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 10 SCC 337, Sanjay Kumar Munja/ v. Chairman, UPSC (2006) 8 SCC 42, K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and others (2006) 3 SCC 581, Nation~/ Institute c of Technology v. Chandra Sekhar Chaudhary (2007) 1 SCC * 93, Vice Chancellor, M.D. University, Rohtak v. Jahan Singh (2007) 5 SCC 77, -State of Kera/a and others v. K. Prasad and another (2007) 7 SCC 140, Punjab State Electricity Board and others v. Gurmail Singh (2008) 7 SCC 245 and Panchi Devi D v. State of Rajasthan and others (2009) 2 SCC 589. -y-, --

52. Before concluding, we consid~r it necessary to enter a caveat. In all developed countries, great emphasis has been laid on the planned development of cities and urban areas. The object of planned development has ,been achieved by rigorous E enforcement of master plans prepared after careful study . of I - complex issues, scientifici,research and rationalisation of laws. The people of those countries have greatly contributed to the concepf of planned develbpment of cities by strictly adhering to the plarining laws, -the master plan etc. They respect the laws ~- , / -

F enacted by the legislature for regulating planned development of the cities and seldom there is a complaint of violation of master plan etc. in the construction of buildings, residential, institutional or con;imercial. In contrast, scenario in the developing countries-like ours is substantially different. Though, G the competent legislatures have, from time to time, enacted laws for ensuring planned development of the cities and urban areas, enforcement thereof has been extremely poor ana the people have violated the master plans, zoning plans and building regulations and bye-laws with impunity. In last four H decades, almost all cities, big or small, have seen unplanned

SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 771 & ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.) _;.)'._ growth. In the 21st century, the menace of illegal and A " unauthorized constructions and encroachments has acquired monstrous proportions and everyone has been paying heavy price for the same. Economically affluent 'people and those having support of the political and executive apparatus of the State have constructed buildings, commercial complexes, B multiplexes, malls etc. in blatant violation of the municipal and town planning laws, master plans, zonal development plans and 4- even the sanctioned building plans. In most of the cases of illegal or unauthorized constructions, the officers of the municipal and other regulatory bodies turn blind eye either due to the influence c of higher functionaries of the State or other extraneous reasons. Those who construct buildings in violation of the relevant statutory provisions, master plan etc. and those who directly or ...... indirectly abet such violations are totally unmindful of the grave consequences of their actio.ns and/or omissions on the present D I "lf' as well as future generations of the country which will be forced to live in unplanned cities and urban areas. The people 4 belonging to this class do not realize that the constructions made in violation of the relevant laws, master plan or zonal development plan or sanctioned building plan or the building is used for a purpose other than the one specified in the relevant statute or the master plan etc., such constructions put unbearable burden on the public facilities I amenities like water, ->- electricity, sewerage etc. apart from creating chaos on the roads. The pollution caused due to traffic congestion affects the health of the road users. The pedestrians and people belonging to weaker sections of the society, who cannot afford the luxury of air-conditioned cars, are the worst victims of pollution. They suffer from skin diseases of different types, asthma, allergies and even more dreaded diseases like cancer. It can only be a matter of imagination how much the government has to spend G ~--i on the treatment of such persons and also for controlling pollution and adverse impact on the environment due to traffic congestion on the roads and chaotic conditions created due to illegal and unauthorized constructions. This Court has, from time to time, taken cognizance of buildings constructed in H

772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A violation of municipal and other laws and emphasized that no Ji.,,.._

compromise should be made with the town planning scheme and no relief should be given to the violator of the town planning scheme etc. on the ground that he has spent substantial amount on construction of the buildings etc. - K. Ramdas Shenoy v. B Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi 1974.(2) SCC 506, Dr. G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority 1995 (5) SCC 762, M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu 1999 (6) SCC 464, Friends Colony Development Committee ~ v. State of Orissa 2004 (8) SCC 733, M. C. Mehta v. Union of c India 2006 (3) SCC 399 and S.N. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kamataka 2006 (3) SCC 208.

53. Unfortunately, despite repeated judgments by the this Court and High Courts, the builders and other affluent people

D engaged in the construction activities, who have, over the years shown scant respect for regulatory mechanism envisaged in the ~ - municipal and other similar laws, as also the master plans, zonal development plans, sanctioned plans etc., have received· encouragement and support from the State apparatus. As and when the courts have passed orders or the officers of local and other bodies have taken action for ensuring rigorous compliance of laws relating to planned development of the cities and urban areas and issued directions for demolition of the illegal/unauthorized constructions, those in power have come ~' forward to protect the wrong doers either by issuing administrative orders or enacting laws for regularization of illegal and unauthorized constructions in the name of compassion and hardship. Such actions have done irreparable harm to the concept of planned development of the cities and urban areas. It is high time that the executive and political apparatus of the State take serious view of the menace of illegal and unauthorized constructions and stop their support to the lobbies of affluent class of builders and others, else even the rural areas of the country will soon witness similar chaotic conditions. H .. . ~~ ~

SHANTI SPORTS CLUB & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 773 & ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] _. 54. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. However, by taking note of the submission made by Shri Mukul Rohtagi that some time may be given to his clients to vacate the land, we deem it proper to grant thee months' time to the appellants to handover possession of the land to the concerned authority of DDA. This will be subject to the condition that within two weeks from today an affidavit is filed on behalf of the appellants by an authorised person that possession of the land will be handed over to DDA by 30th November, 2009 and during this period no encumbrances whatsoever will be created by the appellants or their agents and that no compensation will be claimed for c the construction already made. Needless to say that if the required undertaking is not filed, the concerned authorities of DDA shall be entitled to take possession of the land and, if ~ necessary, take police help for that purpose. ,~ Contempt Petition Nos. 252-253 of 2001 D

..... ~5. We have dismissed the civil appeals by the above order. Hence, the contempt petitions are dismissed. R.P. Appeals dismissed. E