A. MANJULA BHASHINI & OTHERS v. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S COOPERATIVE FINANCE CORPORATION LTD. AND ANOTHER

A no basis for holding that fixation of the date can be held ,. ,. to be arbitrary in the facts and circumstances of the case."

(emphasis added)

27Copy pinpoint27. The distinction between legislative and judicial B functions is well known. Within the scope of its legislative competence and subject to other constitutional limitations. the power of legislature to enact laws is plenary. In exercise of that power, the legislature can enact law prospectively as well ._ retrospectively. The adjudication of the rights of the parties c according to law enacted by the legislature is a judicial function. In the performance of that function, the court interprets and gives effect to the intent and mandate of the legislature as embodied in the statute. If the court finds that the particular statute is ultra vires the power of legislature or any provision of the D Constitution, then the same can be struck down. It is also well ... ... settled that the legislature cannot by bare declaration, without anything more, directly overrule, reverse or override a judicial decision. However it can, in exercise of the plenary powers conferred upon it by Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution, E render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law fundamentally altering or changing the conditions on which such a decision is based. Such law can also be given retrospective effect with a deeming date or with effect from a particular date. )'

28Copy pinpoint28. The question whether the legislature possesses the power to enact law apparently affecting pre-existing judgment or amend the existing law which has already been interpreted by the Court in a particular manner, has been considered in several cases. In Government of A.P. v. H.M. T. Ltd. [1975 (2) sec 274), this Court considered whether the amendment made in definition of a 'house' contained in the Andhra Pradesh (Gram · Panchayat) Act. by amending Act No.16of1974 was intended to undo the judgment of the High Court which had interpreted "' the unamended definition and held that buildings other than factory premises were not a 'house'. After noticing the unamended and amended definitions of the term 'house', the

A. MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S 685 COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)

Court held as under:- A " "' - "The new definition· of "house" which is to be read retrospectively into the Act meets effectively both the objections by reason of which the High Court held that the buildings constructed by the respondent were not a B "house". By the amendment, the old clause: "having a separate principal entrance from the common way" is dropped and the definition of "house" is re-framed to - j- include a "factory". It is clear and is undisputed that the buildings constructed by the respondent - the colony buildings as well as the factory buildings - answer fully c the description of a "house" and are squarely within the new definition contained in Section 2(15).

We see no substance in the respondent's contention that by re-definin!l the term "house" with retrospective effect D -; and by validating the levies imposed under the unamended Act as if notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, that Act as amended was in force on the date when the tax was levied, the Legislature has encroached upon a judicial function. The power of the Legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively, the one no less than the other. Within the scope of its legislative competence and subject to other "' ~ constitutional limitations, the power of the Legislature to enact laws is plenary. In United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, Gwyer, C.J. while repelling the argument that Indian Legislatures had no power to alter the existing laws retrospectively observed that within the limits of their powers the Indian Legislatures were as supreme and sovereign as the British Parliament itself and that those powers were not subject to the "strange and unusual ~ ·- ~ prohibition against retrospective legislation". The power to validate a law retrospectively is, subject to the limitations aforesaid, an ancillary power to legislate on the particular H

A. MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, A.P. WOMEN'S 687 COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] '· --(

High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the State A ... cl. Government discontinued the levy of surcharge by issuing an

- ordinance. In Chako/as Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. K. S.E. Board [1988 (2) KLT 680], a Division Bench of the High Court ruled that levy of surcharge was beyond the competence of the State. Special leave petition filed against the order of B the High Court was dismissed. Thereafter, the Kerala Electricity Surcharge (levy and Collection) Ordinance, 1989 was promulgated, which later on became the 1989 Act. This Court - j. upheld the power of the State to enact law for levy of surcharge on the electricity supplied by the Electricity Board. The Court c \ referred to the earlier judgments in Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [1969 (2) SCC 283]. Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner [1964 (2) SCR 608], Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa [AIR 1961 SC 1438], Mis. Misri/al Jain v. State of Orissa [1977 (3) D -{ SCC 212), Tirath Ram Rajendra Nath v. State of U.P. [1973 (3) SCC 585], Government of A.P. v. H.M. T. Ltd. (supra), l.N. Saksena v. State of M.P. [1976 (4) sec 750] and some other judgments and Held :

'The validity of the Validating Act is to be judged by the E following tests: (i) whether the legislature enacting the Validating Act has competence over the subject-matter; (ii) whether by validation, the legislature has removed the ~ ~-1( defect which the court had found in the previous law; (iii) whether the validating law is consistent with the provisions · F of Chapter Ill of the Constitution. If these tests are satisfied, the Act can validate the past transactions which were declared by the court to be unconstitutional. The legislature cannot assume power of adjudicating a case by virtue of its enactment of the law without leaving it to the judiciary G to decide it with reference to the Jaw in force. The ~'··_k' legislature also is incompetent to overrule the decision of a court without properly removing the base on which the judgment is founded. H

688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A The court does not have the power to validate an invalid law or to legalise impost of tax illegally made and ,1c r

collected or to remove the norm of invalidation or provide a remedy. These are not judicial functions but the exclusive - province of the legislature. Therefore, they are not B encroachment on judicial power.

In exercising legislative power, the legislature by mere declaration, without anything more, cannot directly overrule, revise or override a judicial decision. It can render •- judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law on the c topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively. The changed or altered conditions should be such that the previous decision would not have been rendered by the court, if those conditions had existed at the time of declaring the law as invalid. It is also empowered to give effect to ~ retrospective legislation with a deeming date or with effect from a particular date .............

The vice pointed out in Chakolas case has been removed under the Kerala Electricity Surcharge (Levy and Collection) Act, 1989. Consequently, Section 11 of this Act validated the invalidity pointed out in Chakolas case removing the base. In the altered situation, the High Court would not have rendered Chakolas case under the Act. It has made the writ issued in Chakolas case ineffective. ~ -- ,

F Instead of refunding the duty illegally collected under invalid law, Section 11 validated the illegal collections and directed the liability of the past transactions as valid under the Act and also fastened liability on the consumers. In other words, the effect of Section 11 is that the illegal G collection made under invalid law is to be retained and the same shall now stand validated under the Act. Thus considered, Section 11 is not an incursion on judicial ~ . power of the court and is a valid piece of legislation as part of the Act." H

A MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S 689 COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

... <!" " 30. The judgment in S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sardana (supra) A calls for a detailed reference because the main issue considered in that case is similar to the one raised in these appeals. The facts of that case show that in A. N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran [1992 Supp (1) SCC 304] and S.L. Chopra v. State of Haryana [1992 Supp (1) SCC 391], this Court B interpreted the rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the .J ~ Constitution and gave certain directions for fixation of seniority of the members of engineering services. After about three years, the State legislature enacted the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Buildings and c Roads Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) Act, 1995 and repeal the existing rules. The Act was given retrospective effect from 1.11.1966 that is the date on which

- ..j the State of Haryana was formed. The Punjab and Haryana High Court struck down various provisions of the Act on the groufld that the same were enacted with the sole object of D

nullifying the earlier judgments of this Court in A.N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoran (supra) and S.L. Chopra v. State of Haryana (supra). By majority of 2:1, this Court held that the 1995 Act is a valid piece of legislation and set aside the order of E the High Court. G.B. Pattanaik, J. (as he then was), who ,,. rendered leading judgment of the majority noted that in Sehgal's case and Chopra's case, the Court had not invalidated the _/ ""' ....... recruitment rules but merely interpreted some provisions relating to determination of the inter se seniority of the direct recruits and promotees and held that the Act cannot be F • invalidated on the ground that it was an encroachment on judicial function. Pattanaik, J. then referred to the statement of objects and reasons contained in the Bill introduced in Haryana Vidhan Sabha, various judgments of this Court including in State y. __ r' of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (supra) and Held : G

" .......... In view of the aforesaid legal position when the impugned Act is examined the conclusion is irresistible that the said Act cannot be said to be an Act of usurpation of the judicial power by the Haryana Legislature, but on the H

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

l .. A other hand it is a valid piece of legislation enacted by the State Legislature over which they had legislative competence under Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh - .......

Schedule and by giving the enactment retrospective effect the earlier judgments of this Court in Sehgal and Chopra B have become ineffective. But since this does not tantamount to a mere declaration of invalidity of an earlier judgment nor does it amount to an encroachment by the legislature into the judicial sphere the Court will not be justified in holding the same to be invalid. Needless to . - c mention that the impugned Act has neither been challenged on the ground of lack of legislative competence nor has it been established to have contravened any provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution. Consequently Mr Sachar's contention has to be rejected and the Act has to be declared intra vires. Necessarily, therefore the seniority list drawn up on different dates in accordance with the earlier Rules of 1961 will have to be annulled and fresh seniority list has to be drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the Act since the Act has been given retrospective effect with effect from 1-11-1966. It may, however, be reiterated that any promotion already made on the basis of the seniority list drawn up in accordance -, with the Recruitment Rules of 1961 will not be altered in ,.. any manner."

F Pattanaik, J. then referred to the judgment in Zohrabi v. Arjuna [1980 (2) SCC 203], wherein it was held that a mere right to take advantage of the provisions of an Act is not an accrued right and proceeded to observe:

"In the aforesaid premises, it must be held that the direct G recruits did not have a vested right nor had any right "' , accrued in their favour in the matter of getting a particular position in the seniority list of Executive Engineers under the pre-amended Rules which is said to have been taken away by the Act since such a right is neither a vested right H

A MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S 691. COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

.. -~ of an employee nor can it be said to be an accrued right. · Thus there is no bar for the legislature to arilend the law in consequence of which the inter se position in the rank of Executive Engineer might get altered. Consequently, we A

see no invalidity in the enactment of the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Buildings B and Roads Branch), (Public Health Branch) and (Irrigation Branch) Respectively Act, 1995." - fr S. Saghir Ahmad, J. who agreed with Pattanaik, J expressed his views in the following words: · c "It would be within the exclusive domain of the judiciary to expound the law as it is and not to speculate what it should be as it is the function of the legislature. It is also within the exclusive power of the judiciary to hold that a statute 4 passed by the legislature is ultra vires. The legislature in that situation does not become a helpless creature as it continues to remain a living pillar of a living Constitution. Though it cannot directly override the judicial decision, it retains the plenary powers under Articles 245, 246 and 248 to after the law as settled or declared by judicial decisions. This is what was observed by this Court in .~ Anwar Khan Mehboob Co. v. State of M.P which had the ,.. . .( effect of indirectly overruling its previous decision in Firm Chhotabhai Jethabai Patel & Co. v. State of M.P. The legislature can also validate an Act which was declared invalid by the Court or amend it with retrospective effect so as to remove the grounds of its invalidity. (See: Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar and Jadao Bahuji v. Municipal Committee.)

The power to make a law includes the power to give it G • ._._A' retrospective effect subject to the restriction imposed by Article 20(1) that a legislature cannot make retrospective penal laws. It would be valid for the legislature to make any other enactment with retrospective effect provided no- fundamental right is infringed by reasons of its taking away H

692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

- the vested right. Under the scheme of the Constitution, it ~ ~ A is competent for the legislature to put an end to the finality of a judicial decision and, therefore, it would be competent for the legislature to render ineffective the judgment of a court by changing the basis of the Act upon which that 8 judgment was founded.

Where, however, the statutory provision is interpreted by the Court in a particular manner and directions are issued for implementing the judgment in the light of the interpretation placed on the statutory provisions, the c legislature need not pass a validating Act. In this situation, the legislature, in exercise of its plenary powers under Articles 245, 246 and 248 can make a new Act altering fundamentally the provisions which were the basis of the judgment passed by the Court. This can be done with t D retrospective effect. So far as service conditions are concerned, they can be altered with retrospective effect by making service rules under Article 309 or by an Act of the legislature."

E 31. In Mylapore Club v. State of T.N. [2005 (12) SCC 752], a three-Judge Bench examined the validity of Sections 2 and 3 of the Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, . 1994 (Act No. 2 of 1996). By Section 2 of the 1996 Act, Section • 1 of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 was amended and clause (f) was added providing for exemptions for tenancies of land owned by religious institutions and religious charities belonging to Hindu, Muslim, Christian or other religions. By Section 3, it was declared that any proceeding instituted by a tenant in respect of any land owned by such a religious institution or religious charity, which was being exempted from the operation of the Act pending before ,__ i. • any court or other authority, would stand abated and all rights and privileges conferred by the extension of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 would cease and would become unenforceable. However, a proviso was added to the effect that H

A MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S 693 COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.] ~~ t nothing contained in Section 3 shall be deemed to render invalid, any suit or proceeding in which a decree or order passed had been executed or satisfied in full before the date of the coming into force of the amending Act. It was argued on behalf of the tenant Club that the amendment made by Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2 of 1996, whereby exemption was granted to certain tenancies was not in consonance with the object of _. ;.... the parent Act. It was further contented that Section 3 of the amending Ac.t which provided for certain pending proceedings to abate was a legislative act to put an end to a judicial proceedings and the same was clearly unconstitutional. While c rejecting the first argument, the Court observed:

"The power to legislate is a plenary power vested in the legislature and unless those who challenge the legislation clearly establish that their fundamental rights under the Constitution are affected or that the legislature lacked D legislative competence, they would not succeed in their challenge to the enactment brought forward in the wisdom of the legislature. Conferment of a right to claim the benefit of a statute, being not a vested right, the same could be withdrawn by the legislature which made the enactment. It E is open to the legislature to bring in a law that has .... retrospective operation. That position is not disputed . When it affects vested rights or accrued rights, that """ question will have to be considered in that context. But the right to take advantage of a statute has been held to be F not an accrued right. It could not be said that Amendment Act 2 of 1996 lacked either legislative competence or that it is unconstitutional. It is a matter for the legislature to balance the object of the Parent Act with the object of protecting the rights of religious institutions and religious G ~-~ .-4 charities and on the basis of the material available to the legislature, the decision to exempt the buildings of such religious institutions and religious charities has been taken." H

694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A While rejecting the second argument, the Court obseNed: t ··-

"By Section 3 of amending Act 2of1996 impugned herein, which is in pari materia with Section 9 of the amending Act of 1960, the legislature had intended that pending proceedings should be affected. Even otherwise, once the B applicability of the Act itself is withdrawn, no relief can be granted to a person who could have been or who was -l\ ~

earlier a beneficiary under that enactment, after such withdrawal. Here, the section provides that even if some steps have been taken pursuant to the claim by the tenant c under Section 9 of the Parent Act, the proceeding cannot be continued in view of the exemption enacted in favour of the institutions. Reading Section 3 of amending Act 2 of 1996, it could not be said that it is a legislative inteNention with a judicial decision. The proviso to Section D 3 of amending Act 2 of 1996 has saved concluded transactions based on judicial adjudications. All that the said Section 3 does is to make it explicit that the amendment is intended to apply to pending proceedings. In the context of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, E unless it is shown that any right has accrued to the claimant under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, such a provision making it clear that the Act could not be applied ... any more to pending proceedings is not in any way invalid ~

or incompetent. l.Jnless the proceedings have concluded and the rights of the landlord have passed to the tenant, no right accrues to the tenant. He is only in the process of acquiring a right, the process having been set in motion at his instance. When pending proceedings are affected by an amendment, it is open to the legislature to provide th,.at the said process cannot continue. That alone has been dooe by Section 3 of amending Act 2 of 1996. Therefore ~ . there is no merit in challenge to Section 3 of the amending Act."

32. Before parting with this aspect of the case, we consider H

A MANjLJLA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S 695 COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

.~ t it proper to notice the ratio of the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the employees. In Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (supra), a seven- Judge Bench considered the constitutional validity of the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 by which an attempt was made to nullify the mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court for payment of bonus to the employees in terms of the settlements. This Court declared that - * the 1976 Act is violative of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution and also held that by simply bringing new legislation, the Parliament could not nullify the mandamus issued by the High Court for c payment of cash bonus to the employees in terms of the settlement.

33. In State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni

.. (supra), this Court considered the question whether the State legislature could retrospectively amend the Gujarat Panchayats D Act, 1961 and deprive the employees of the Panchayats of their status as government servants. The High Court allowed the writ · petition filed by the members of the Panchayat service belonging to the local cadre and declared that they have , acquired the status of government servants. The High Court also E issued consequential directions for equation of posts, revision of pay scales and payment of salaries. During the pendency of -~--4/ the appeals, the 1961 Act was amended with retrospective effect from 1978 and members of Panchayat service were sought to be deprived of their status as government servants. F This Court struck down the amendment on the ground that the same violated fundamental right acquired by the employees of the panchayats and observed:

"Now, in .1978 before the Amending Act was passed, G thanks to the provisiol)~ of the principal Act of 1961, the J I .... ex-municipal employees who had been allocated to the panchayat service as.Secretaries, Officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats, had achieved the status of government servants. Their' status as government H

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A servants could not be extinguished, so long as the posts t - were not abolished and their services were not terminated in accordance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Nor was it permissible to single them out for differential treatment. That would offend Article 14 of the B Constitution. An attempt was made to justify the purported differentiation on the basis of history and ancestry, as it were. It was said that Talatis and Kotwals who became ~ecretaries, Officers and servants of Gram and Nagar ... - Panchayats were government servants, even to start with, c while municipal employees who became such Secretaries, Officers and servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayats were not. Each carried the mark of the 'brand' of his origin and a classification on the basis of the source from which they came into the service, it was claimed, was permissible. We are clear that it is not. Once they had joined the common stream of service to perform the same duties, it is clearly not permissible to make any classification on the basis of their origin. Such a classification would be unreasonable and entirely irrelevant to the object sought to be achieved. It is to navigate around these two obstacles of Article 311 and Article 14 that the Amending Act is sought to be made retrospective, to bring about an artificial situation as if the erstwhile municipal employees /- ~ never became members of a service under the State. Can a law be made to destroy today's accrued constitutional rights by artificially reverting to a situation which existed 17 years ago? No.

The legislation is pure and simple, self-deceptive, if we may use such an expression with reference to a G legislature-made law. The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take ~ . away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution, and have to conform to the dos and don'ts of the Constitution, neither prospective nor retrospective H

A. MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, A.P. WOMEN'S 697 COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)

t laws can be made so as to contravene fundamental rights. A , The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of the parties today. The law cannot say, 20 years ago the parties had no rights, therefore, the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by B 20 years. We are concerned with today's rights and not yesterday's. A legislature cannot legislate today with .... _.. reference to a situation that obtained 20 years ago and ignore the. march of events and the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the 20 years. That would be most c arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation of history."

34. In Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah (supra), the Constitution Bench considered the question whether the Railway Administration could amend the rules with retrospective effect and reduce the pension payable to the D employees and held that such an amendment violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, inasmuch as it affected vested right of the employees.

35. In Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. G. V.K. Girls High E School (supra), this Court answered in negative the question whether the Government could issue a G.O. and deny benefit ,.._ of grant-in-aid to the school and amend the Andhra Pradesh ..; Education Act, 1982 for denying the benefit of the judgment rendered by the High Court in favour of the respondent. F

36. In none of the above noted cases, this Court considered an issue akin to the one examined by us. Therefore, the proposition of law laid down in those cases cannot be relied upon for entertaining the claim of daily wage employees for regularisation irrespective of the fact that they may not have G completed 5 years continuous service on or before 25.11.1993. " _)

37. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the amendments made in the 1994 Act by Act Nos.3of1998 and 27 of 1998 do not have the effect of nullifying or overriding the H

698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A judgment in District Collector v. M.L. Singh (supra). We further t hold that the policy of regularisation contained in first proviso to Section 7 of Act No.27 of 1998 is one time measure intended to benefit only those daily wage employees, etc. who completed 5 years continuous service on or before 25.11.1993 and the B employees who completed 5 years service after 25.11.1993 cannot claim regularisation.

38. The question whether Section 7A of Act No. 27 of 1998 amounts to an encroachment on the court's power on judicial review is answered in negative in view.of the three-Judge Bench C judgment in Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) and we respectfully follow the ratio of that judgment. Even otherwise, in view of the interpretation placed by us on the policy of regularisation contained in first proviso to Section 7 of the 1994 Act, the question of abatement of claims etc. has become purely academic.

39. We shall now consider whether the cut off date, i.e., 25.11.1993 specified in the first proviso to Section 7 of the 1994 Act (as amended by Act No. 27 of 1998) for determination of the eligibility of daily wage employees to be considered for regularisation is arbitrary, irrational and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Undisputedly, the Ordinance issued in 1993 was the first exercise of legislative power by the State to prohibit employment on daily wages and to restrict ,. F appointments on temporary basis and, at the same time, streamline the recruitment in public services by adopting a procedure consistent with the doctrine of equality embodied in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The 1994 Act was enforced with effect from 25.11.1993, i.e., the date on which the Ordinance was published in the official Gazette. Therefore, that G date had direct bearing on the policy of regularisation circulated vide G.O. dated 22.4.1994, which was issued by the State Government in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution. When that policy was engrafted in the 1994 Act in the form of proviso to Section 7, the legislature could not H

A MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S 699 COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)

- t· have fixed any date other than 25.11.1993 for determining the eligibility of daily wage employees who fulfilled the requirement of 5 years continuous service. If any other date had b.een fixed A

for counting 5 years service of daily wage employees for the purpose of proviso to Section 7, the object sought to be achieved by enacting the 1994 Act would have beeri defeated, B inasmuch as the regular recruitment could not have been made for appointment against the sanctioned posts and back door ., .. entrants would have occupied all the posts. Therefore, the cut off date i.e. 25.11.1993 prescribed by the legislature for determining the eligibility of daily wage employees and others c covered by Section 7 of the 1994 Act cannot be dubbed as arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational or discriminatory. This view of ours is in tune with judicial precedents on the subject. In Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works [(1975) 1 SCC 305], a three-Judge Bench was called upon to decide whether the date for making the declaration, i.e., September 4, 1967 fixed for grant of the benefit of concessional rate of duty was irrational and arbitrary. The High Court declared that the cut off date fixed for grant of the concessional rate of duty violated Article 14 of the Constitution. This·Court disapproved the view taken by the High Court and held that the choice of a date as the basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the .... same, unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical. It was ~ further held that there is no mathematical or logical way for fixing a particular date and the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless the fixation of date is found to be very wide off the reasonable mark.

40. In Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan [(1985) Supp. SCC 45]. fixation of 25th June, 1975 as the cut off date G . ./ for the determination of eligibility of temporary teachers for the purpose of absorption in terms of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1973 was challenged on the ground of discrimination and violation of Articles 14 and 16. A learned Single Judge of the High Court H

700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 10 S.C.R.

A declared that the cut off date was arbitrary and violative of the equality clause enshrined in the Constitution. The Division t -

Bench reversed the order of the learned Single Judge and held that the cut off date did not offend the doctrine of equality. This Court approved the view taken by the Division Bench and B observed: 'The object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing. So therefore experience and continuous employment were necessary . ~

ingredients. The Hindi version of the Ordinance used the c expression "ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein" is capable of meaning "and are continuing" to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. Keeping the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper construction which is in consonance with the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well • as with the object of the Act then in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should be construed to mean that only those would be eligible for screening who were appointed prior to June 25, 1975 and were continuing at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. June 12, 1978 i:e. approximately about three years. If that is the correct reading, then we are unable to accept the criticism that those who were for a short period appointed ,. -- F prior to June 25, 1975 then again with interruption were working only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. Ji.me 12, 1978 would also be eligible. In other words people with vety short experience would be eligible for absorption. That cannot be the purpose of the G Act. It cannot be so read reasonably. Therefore on a proper construction it means that all temporal}' lecturers who were appointed as such on or before June 25, 1975 and were continuing as such at the commencement of •• the Ordinance shall be considered by the University for screening for absorption. The expression "were H

A. MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S 701 , . COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

continuing" is significant. This is in consonance with the A ..,

- t object cf the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. If a Legislature B considers a particular period of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such a decision is not subject . .A: to judicial review. Keeping the aforesaid reasonable meaning of clause 3 of the Ordinance and Section 3 of the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed c for screening for absorption was not an irrational criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the criticism that a teacher who was working even for two or three months only before June 25, 1975 and then with long interruptions was in employment of the D University at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance would be eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from June 26, _1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e ..June 25, 1975 for three years would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against long experiehce, cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language used in the provisions concerned. It is we/I-settled that if a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or ,... for absorption, it is within the wisdom of the Legislaturr;-, and what period should be suffici~nt for a particular job or a particular employment is not subject to judicial review."

(emphasis added) G

41. In Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswa/ [(1994) 4 ~ ~ sec 212], it was held that fixing of 1st August as the cut off date for determining the eligibility in the matter of age of the candidates appearing in the examination held for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Foreign Service etc. H

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 10 S.C.R.

A cannot be termed as arbitrary merely because the preliminary ~

' - examination was held prior to that date. The court accepted the explanation given by the Union of India that 1st of August of the year is normally fixed for determination of the eligibility of the candidates and the same was not modified before holding the B preliminary examination because it was only a screening test and marks obtained at such examination were not taken into consideration at the time of preparing the final result. In Union of India v. K.G. Radhakrishana Panickar [(1998) 5 SCC 111], ' . it was held that the decision of the railway administration to fix c 1.1.1961 as the cut off date for the purpose of counting of past service of Project Casual Labourers for the purpose of retrial benefits was not arbitrary or unreasonable because two separate schemes were framed for regularisation of casual labourers. -

D 42. The question which remains to be considered is whether the Division Bench was justified in holding that all daily wage employees who completed 5 years service on the date of enforcement of Act No. 27of1998, i.e., 19.8.1998 would be entitled to be considered for regularisation of their services. A E reading of paragraphs 54, 67, 68 and 72 of the impugned judgment shows that even though the Division Bench did not find the cut off date i.e. 25.11.1993 specified in first proviso to Section 7 for determining the eligibility of daily wage employees for regularisation to be arbitrary, irrational or discriminatory, yet ,. F it changed the said date from 25.11.1993 to 19.8.1998 solely on the premise that Act No. 27 of 1998 was enforced with effect from that date. In our view, once the Division Bench negatived the challenge to the validity of Act Nos.3 of 1998 and 27 of 1998, there was no warrant for altering the date of eligibility specified in first proviso to Section 7 of the 1994 Act and thereby extend the zone of eligibility of daily wage employees who could be-considered for regularisation. A% a corollary, we •• hold that the declaration made by the Division Bench that all persons who completed 5 years service as on the date of coming into force of Act No.27 of 1998 would be entitled to be

A MANJULA BHASHINI v. MANAGING DIRECTOR, AP. WOMEN'S 703 COOPERATIVE FINANCE COPRN. LTD. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.)

.... ,_ considered for regularisation of their services is legally unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. - 43. In the result, the appeals filed by the employees (C.A. Nos.3702, 3703, 3704, 3705, 3706, 3707, 3709, 3710, 3721, 3733, 3734, 3737, 3742, 3744, 3748, 3749 and 3751 of 2006) 8 are dismissed and those filed by the State Government and agencies/instrumentalities of the State (C.A. Nos.368~. 3712, 3713,3714,3715,3716,3717,3718,3723,3724, 3726,3727, - A 3728, 3729, 3730, 3731, 3732, 3750, 3752, 3753, 3754 and

3755. of 2006) are allowed. The declaration made by the Division Bench that the ban on regularisation will be effective c from 19.8.1998 i.e. the date on which Act No.27of1998 came into force and that all persons who have completed 5 years "'.. service as on that date would be entitled to be considered for regularisation of service is set aside. It is, however, made clear that the daily wage employees and others who are covered by D Section 7 of the 1994 Act (amended) and whose services have not been regularised so far, shall be entitled to be considered for regularisation and their services shall be regularised subject to fulfillment of the conditions enumerated in G.O. dated 22.4.1994. With a view to obviate further litigation on this issue, we direct the Government of Andhra· Pradesh, its officers and agencies/instrumentalities of the State to complete the exercise

- ... for regularisation of the services of eligible employees within four months of the receipt/production of copy of this order, without being influenced by the fact that the application, writ petition or appeal filed by any such employee may have been dismissed by the Tribunal or High Court or this Court. Since some of the appeals decided by this order relate to part time employees, we direct that similar exercise be undertaken in their cases and completed within four months keeping in view the conditions enumerated in G.O.(P). No.112 dated 23.7.1997. _,,.,. _J._

G.N. Appeals disposed of.