SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

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A section in the Code of Civil Procedure may later be open to serious challenge."

31Copy pinpoint31. In H.H. Shri Swamiji Shri Admar Mutt Etc, vs. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Department (1979 (4) SCC 642] this Court was 8 called upon to consider the validity of the continued application of the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowment Act, 1951 in the area which had formerly been part of State of Madras and which had latter become part of the new State of Mysore (now Karnataka) as a result of the State Re-organisation C Act, 1956. While declining to strike down the legislation on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court observed: "An indefinite extension and application of unequal laws for all time to come will militate against their true character as temporary measures taken in order to serve a . temporary purpose. Thereby, the very foundation of their constitutionality shall have been destroyed the foundation being that Section 119 of the State Reorganisation Act serves the significant purpose of giving reasonable time to the new units to consider the special circumstances obtaining in respect of diverse units. The decision to withdraw·the application of unequal laws to equals cannot be delayed unreasonably because of the relevance of historical reasons which justify the application of unequal laws is bound to wear out with the passage of time. In Broom's Legal; Maxim (1939 Edition, page 97) can be found a useful principle "Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat lpsa Lex", that is to say, "Reason is the source of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself."

32Copy pinpoint32. In Motor General Traders vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), validity of Section 32(b) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control, Act, 1960 was considered. H By that Section it was declared that the provisions of the main

SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF 617 INDIAAND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

Act will not apply to the buildings constructed after 25th August, A

1957. The Court noted that exemption had continued for nearly a quarter century and struck down the same despite the fact that validity thereon had been upheld by the High Court in Chintapalli Achaiah vs. P. Gopala Krishna Reddy.[ AIR 1966 AP 51]. Some of the observations made in the judgment are s worth noticing. These are: "What may be unobjectionable as a transitional or temporary measure at an initial stage can still become discriminatory and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution if it is persisted in over a long period without any justification." "What was justifiable during a short period has turned out to be a case of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a quarter of century.... We are constrained to pronounce upon the validity of the impugned provision at this late stage because of grab of Constitution which it may have possessed earlier has become worn out and its unconstitutionality is now brought to a successful challenge". E "As already observed, the landlords of the buildings constructed subsequent to August 26, 1957 are given undue preference over the landlords of buildings constructed prior to that date in that the former are free from the shackles of the Act while the latter are subjected to the restrictions imposed by it. What should have been just an incentive has become a permanent bonanza in favour of those who constructed buildings subsequent to August 26, 1957. There being no justification for the continuance of the benefit to a class of persons without any rational basis whatsoever, the evil effects flowing from the impugned exemption have caused more harm to t~e society than one could anticipate. What was justifiable • during a short period has turned out to be a case of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a quarter of century. The H

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~ A second answer to the above contention is that mere lapse of time does not lend constitutionality to a provision which is otherwise bad. "Time does not run in favour of legislation. If it is ultra vires, it cannot gain legal strength from long failure on the part of lawyers to perceive and set up its B invalidity. Albeit, lateness in an attack upon the ~ constitutionality of a statute is but a reason for exercising special caution in examining the arguments by which the attack is supported."

33Copy pinpoint33. In Rattan Arya and Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu c and Anr. (supra) the Court relied on the ratio of Motor General Traders vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and struck down Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1960 by observing that there was no rational basis in picking out the class of tenants of residential buildings paying D a rent of more than Rs.400/- per month and to deny similar right to tenants of other buildings and residential or non-residential Jr

premises.

34Copy pinpoint34. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others vs. State of Maharashtra & Another (supra), the Court found that the E criteria for determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on 31.3.1998. F

35Copy pinpoint35. Before parting with this aspect of the case, we may "' refer to the judgment of Amarjit Singh vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the Full Bench of the High Court for negating the appellant's challenge to Section 14(1 )(e). In that case, the respondent sought G eviction of the tenant from the first floor of the premises situated at Maharani Bagh, New Delhi on the ground of personal and t . bona fide necessity. The suit filed by the landlady was decreed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court and a direction was issued for eviction of the tenant (appellant). This H

SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF 619 INDIAAND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

Court referred to the earlier judgments in Pasupuleti A Venkateswarlu vs. Motor & General Traders [1975 (1) SCC 770], Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad [1981 (3) SCC 103] and held that in view of the availability of alternative accommodation to-the landlady, the High Court was not justified in ordering eviction of the tenant. B ~

36Copy pinpoint36. A careful reading of the aforementioned judgment shows that the plea of unconstitutionality of Section 14(1 )(e) of the 1958 Act was neither raised nor debated with any seriousness and the observation made by the Court in that regard cannot be treated as the true ratio of the judgment, which c as mentioned above, mainly rested on the interpretation of the expression "reasonably suitable residential accommodation". The bedrock of the respondent's claim was that she had a right to comfortable living and availability of alternative accommodation, by itself not sufficient for declining eviction of the tenant. While rejecting this argument, the Court observed: "17 ....... The logic of the argument of Shri Kacker is attractive, but the legality of the said submission is unsustainable. Rent restriction laws are both beneficial and restrictive, beneficial for those who want protection from eviction and rack re_nting but restrictive so far as the landlord's right or claim for eviction is concerned. Rent restriction laws would provide a habitat for the landlord or landlady if need be, but not to seek comforts other than habitat - that right the landlord must seek elsewhere." F ");

37Copy pinpoint37. Another contention raised on behalf of the landlady was that Section 14(1 )(e) of the 1958Act should be read in a manner which will make it in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This is evinced from para 18 of the judgment which G is extracted below:-

. -t "18. Our attention was drawn to the decision in the case of Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P.[1882 (1) SCC 39] and our attention was drawn to the observations at p. 66 and 67 of the said case in aid of the H

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A submission that right to property is still a constitutional right and therefore in exercise of that right if a landlord or an owner of a house lets out a premises in question there was nothing wrong. Shri Kacker submitted that the second limb of Section 14(1 )(e) of the Act should be read in such B a way that it was in consonance with Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution. Otherwfse it would be void as being unconstitutional. As a general proposition of law this is acceptable."

The Court rejected the argument and observed: c "The Act in question has the authority of law. There is no denial of equality nor any arbitrariness in the second limb of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, read in the manner contended for by the appellant. Article 21 is not violated so far as the landlord is concerned. The rent restricting D Acts are beneficial legislations for the protection of the weaker party in the bargains of letting very often. These must be so read that these balance harmoniously the rights of the landlords and the obligations of the tenants. The Rent Restriction Acts deal with the problem of rack renting and shortage of accommodation. It is in consonance with the recognition of the right of both the landlord and the tenant that a harmony is sought to be struck whereby the bona fide requirements of the landlords and the tenants in the expanding explosion of need and population and shortage of accommodation are sought to be harmonised and the conditions imposed to evict a tenant are that the landlord must have bona fide need. That is satisfied in this case. That position is not disputed. The second condition is that landlord should not have in his or her possession any other reasonably suitable accommodation. This does not violate either Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution."

38Copy pinpoint38. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section i · 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it H

SATYAWATI SHARMA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. UNION OF 621 INDIAAND ANR. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]

discriminates between the premises let for residential and non- A residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family depen9ent on him and restricts the latter's right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only. 8 ~

39Copy pinpoint39. However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section. 14(1 )(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1 )(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety and we feel that ends of justice c will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1 )(e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as under:-

"that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose .,. benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation." While adopting this course, we have kept in view well recognized rule that if the offendi11g portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible- R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla vs. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 628) and Bhawani Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1996 (3) SCC 105]. As a sequel to the above, the explanation appearing below F Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act will have to be treated as redundant.

40Copy pinpoint40. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and Section 14(1){e) of the 1958 Act is G partly struck down. Section 14(1 )(e) shall now read as indicated in para 39 above. Consequently, the writ petitions filed by the - t appellants shall stand allowed and the orders impugned therein shall stand quashed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. D.G. Appeals allowed. H