KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v. .... BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. AND ORS .

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP (C) H No.13553/2007.

KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v. 655 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

- ''+ 2. In these appeals challenge is to. t~e judgment of the A Bombay High Court dismissing a batch of writ petitions filed by the appellants who are trade unioris in the writ petitions. The principal contention was that once Security Guard Board constituted under the Maharashtra Private Security Guards

\ . 1 (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1981 (in short the 'Act') allots guards to a principal employer, it looses the power to recall, re-allot or transfer such guard as the guard so allotted B

becomes an employee of the principal employer. By the impugned judgment the High Court held that the main contentions advanced by the Unions were covered by a series c of judgments of earlier Division Benches as well as of learned Single Judges of the High Court which were binding upon it. Nevertheless, the Division Bench also examined· the acceptability of contentions advanced and ultimately held that the contentions were without substance. D "( 3. Stand of the appellants in. short is as follows: Under the Act and the Scheme framed thereunder the ,) security guards, on allotment by the Board to an employer/ principal employer, become the employees of that Principal Employer. E

The exploltation of around 70,000 private security guards employed through agencies in Maharashtra was extreme and notorious. It has been set out in detail by His Lordship Justice P.B. Sawant, as His Lordship then was, in the case of Mis. F __.,, Tradesvel Security Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra ' (84 BLR 604). It was·to ensure that such exploitation could no . longer ta.ke place that the Board was set up by. the State .Government and given certain super-Visory powers. The Board is thus nothing but a statutory recruitment/allotment body-invested G with certain powers to oversee the master-servant relationship 1 which exi_sts between the ,guards and registered_ employers to whom they are allotted, in the context of the historical gross exploitation of this section of the workers in the state. The mere fact that such powers are given to a Board by statute does not H

p. 656 Copy page pinpoint

A mean that the master seNant relationship does not exist between the guards and registered employers to whom they are allotted. ¥ - ;

It is always open for this relationship to be regulated by statute. It is an anathema to Indian industrial law that a servant cannot have a master. Thus, an employer for the registered B guards has to be identified. The Board cannot be held to be their employer, and it is not its case that it is the employer. 1' •

4Copy pinpoint4. Strong reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in Vizagapatnam Dock Labour Board v. Stevedores Assn. c Vizagapatnam and Ors. (1970 (2) SCR 303). This Court held that the registered employer to whom the labour force is allotted by the board is the employer whose work of loading and unloading of ships is done by the dock workers allotted-to them;

5Copy pinpoint5. It is pointed out that this conclusion was arrived'at despite the circumstances that on recruitment and registration of the y dock labour force,_ fixation of wages and D.A., payment of workmen's compensation, taking of disciplinary actio_n, ...... prohibition of employment of workmen who were not registered E with the board, categorization and fixation including increa.se or decrease in the number of dock workers and transfer and , ~

promotion of dock workers were done by the .board. -Reliance has also been made on several judgments of learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. F · 6. It is pointed out by the respondents that the entire batch of writ petitions before the High Court to which these appeals ,._ • relate are concerned with Security Guards supplied by the statutory board to principal employers and have nothing to do . with private security agencies or agency guards. All the ·principal G .employers involved in these' appeals had at the concerned time been using Board guards i.e. those recruited and selected by ~ . ,.__ the Board post.1987 to various principal employers. I -

7Copy pinpoint7. Under Clause 3 of Section 2 of the original Act "employer" means the person who has ultimate control over the · H

KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v. 657 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ORS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.} ~

-1 4 affairs of the factory or establishment where the security guard is employed. Under the said Act, as amended, with effect .from 29th April, 1996:- (i) Clause 3 of section 2 provides that employer in relation to security guards in the direct employment • 1 of an agency or agent and deployed in a factory or establishment through such agency or agent means such agency or agent. ii) Clause 8 of section 2 states that 'Principal employer' c in relation to any security guard deployed in a factory or establishment by an agency or agent or board means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory or establishment. D

8Copy pinpoint8. Thus, under the original Act as well as under the i amended Act the person who has ultimate control over the - affairs of the factory or establishment where the security guard ) is deployed is his employer.

9Copy pinpoint9. As per Clause 26(4) of the unamended Scheme (and E Clause 24(4) of the amended scheme), the security guard must work under the supervision, control and direction of the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory/ establishment where he is deployed. Therefore, under the tests laid down by this Court for establishing the master-servant F _..._ relationship as in the case of Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (1957 SCR 152), Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works etc. v. Union of India etc. (Al R 1974 SC 1832), Silver Jubilee Tailoring House and Ors. v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments and Anr. (1974 (3) SCC 498), G Hussainbhai, Calicut v. The Alath Factory Thez~ilali Union, -1 Kozhikode and Ors. (1978 (4) SCC 257) and Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Shramik Sena and Ors. (1999 (6) SCC 439) the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the facto;y or establishment where the H

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A security guard is deployed, is the employer of the guard. , -»

10Copy pinpoint10. Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Act, specifically state that for the purpose of the Act mentioned therein the employer is the person who has control over.the factory or establishment where the security guard is employed, since admittedly, wages B are paid by that person though it may be at times through the medium of the Board for convenience.

11Copy pinpoint11. With reference to Section 1(4) of the Act it is pointed out by the respondent that it applies to persons who worked as c security guards in any factory or establishment but who are not direct and regular employees of the factory or establishment as the case may be. Reference is also made to Section 2 (1) stating that in this Act unless the context otherwise requires 'agency' or 'agent' in relation to a Security Guard, means an individual or_ body of individuals or a body Corporate, who 0 undertakes to execute any security work or watch and ward work for any factory or establishment by engaging such Security GJard on hire or otherwise, or who supplies such Security Guards either in groups or as an individual, and includes a sub-_ .... agehcy or a sub-agent of the Board. E

12Copy pinpoint12. Section 2(10) defines a 'Security Guard'. It is pointed out that though there is no dispute that the respondent in each case is the principle employer but the prayer made in the writ petitions cannot be accepted in view of what is stated in Section F 1(4): Section 2(3) defines the 'employer'. It is also submitted that earlier also similar. petition had been. filed and notwithstanding adverse adjudication, the Unions ·are still persisting in pursuing the claims which had already been reject~d.

· G .- 13. Learned counsel for respondents in Civil Appeal No.4477 of 2002 has submitted as follows: · (a} the Maharashtra Private Security Guards Act and Scheme framed thereunder· constitute a comp1ete , and self-contained code; . H

KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v. 659 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. &ORS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] "' ~1 Security Guards· who seek registration with the A (b) statutory Board and are allotted to different principal employers by the Board continue to be members of the "Pool" as defined in Clauses 4(f) and 4(g) of the 1981 Scheme which is defined as the "Board Pool" in Clause 3(c) of the 2002 Scheme and consequently B continue to be subject to common seniority t maintained by the Board (Clause 16 of 1981 Scheme) and Clause 15 of 2002. Scheme transfers by the Board, disciplinary action including termination by the Board (Clause 31 of .1981 Scheme) and c Clause 32 of 2002 Scheme. (c) The power to recruit, select, appoint, allot, promote; transfer, take disciplinary action, and terminate employment of a registered security guard in the "Pool" or "Board Pool" is vested exclusively in the D "( statutory Board. (d) The principal employer has no power whatsoever ) except to issue routine directions in the course of day to day security work. Even Security Supervisors and Security Officers are supplied/allotted by the E Board, and these Supervisors and Officers function under the control of statutory Inspectors appointed by the Board; (e) The Appellant's argument that a security guard allotted to a principal employer becomes the employee of that principal employer, arid equally the argument that the Board's power to allot is a one- time power which gets exhausted once allotment is made, is completely misconceived and. ignores virtually all the provisions of the Act and Scheme; ' (f) Among other things~ ttiis argument ig-nores Section ·1(4) of the Act, which specifies thatthe Act applies only to those security guards "who are not direct and regular employees of the factory or establishment, H

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...- ~"· . A as the case may be". If the Appellant's argument is accepted, the guards upon allotment ·will become di"rect and regular· employees of the. principal' employer, and thereby will go out of the purview· of the Act and Scheme, thus losing the entire protection B of the statutory provisions. It also ignores the provisions of the Scheriie, which apply only to guards who are in the "Pool" or are "P9ol Security Guards" -t (under the 1981 Scheme) and are in the "Board Pool" (under the 2002 Sch~me). If guards were to become c employees of the principal employer upon allotment, the entire Scheme would cease to apply to them instantly upon being allotted to a particular employer; (g) If the Appellant's arguments are accepted, it would mean that the entire Scheme would become nugatory [j and redundant. It is important to note that the 1981 . Scheme applied only to guards recruited, appointed y and allotted by the Board (the 2002 Scheme also applies in addition to guards employed by private . J

security agencies, with which these appeals are not E concerned. Insofar as the Board's guards are concerned, the entire provisions of the Scheme are dependent upon their continuing to be controlled by the Board after allotment. The Appellants' argument would completely defeat these provisions and ren_der F the entire Scheme into a dead letter.. )- (h) In any event, all these arguments have time and again been considered and rejected by the Bombay High Court, and applying _the· principle of stare decisis, the Judgments of the High Court which have held the G field for the past 25 years ought to be upheld and affirmed. -t- (i) Without prejudice to the. above, in any case the present appellants are· barred by' res judicata, or principles analogo·us thereto, from raising such H

KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v. 661 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] ' lj arguments, as the very same submissions have time A and again been rejected by the Bombay High Court in proceedings filed by the appellant Union, and the said Judgments having gone unchallenged by the present appellant, they have become final and binding against the Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sanghathan. B - f

14Copy pinpoint14. It is pointed out that only four grounds were urged by the High Court and each one of them has been dealt with. It is also pointed out that Sections 19, 20 and 21 specifically provide for application of certain Act to the Security Guards. These are Workmen's Compensation Act, Payment of Wages Act and c Maternity Benefits Act which shows what for these specific statutes are. No further Statute dealing with employer and employee relationship and their rights thereunder is made applicable or available to the Security Guards. In other words, the provisions of the Act make it clear that it is only these statutes D "( which have be~n specifically made applicable to the Security Guard and accordingly, other statutes are clearly excluded . .,}

15Copy pinpoint15. Reference is also made to Schemes of 1981and2002.

16Copy pinpoint16. On consideration of rival submissions one thing is E crystal clear that the appellants based their case on the decision in Vizagapatnam Dock Labour's case (supra). The respondents on the other hand relied on several earlier judgments of the Bombay High Court, a few of which were deciding petitions filed by some of the appellant's Union, and in Writ Petition F -\ No.2671 of 1992 the claim of direct employment with the· principal employer by allotment by the Boardwas agitated and was rejected by a Division Ben.ch consisting of Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Sujata Manohar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia. The Bench inter-alia observed as follows: G "7. The petitioners had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dock Labour Board v. Stevactoras Assoco reported in Al R 1970 SC page 1826 at page 1632. Tbe Supreme Court while considering the Scheme framed under the Dock Workers (Regulation of H

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A Employment) Act; 1948 had discussed the position of the ¥ - Dock Labour Board under the Scheme. The Supreme Court observed tn this connection that the purport of the Scheme was that the entire body of workers should be under the control and the entire body of workers should be B under the control and supervision of the Board. But the ,Board cannot be consid~red to be the employer of the ...._-v . ( Dock Labour Workmen. After discussing the various provisions of that Scheme, the Supreme Court said that the registered employer to whom the labour force is allotted · c by the board is the employer whose work of loading or unloading of ships is done by the workers allotted to them. The Supreme Court was not concerned in that case with the question whether the Board had the power to allot labourers to another registered employer or not. The mere fact, therefore, that the certain purposes the_employees is D considered as an employees of the registered employer 'r under the Dock Labour Scheme is not of any assistant to the petitioners in the present petition. In fact, it was pointed ~. out by.Mr. Devitre, Ld. Counsel for the 151 respondents that under sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Maharashtra E Private Sequrity Guards (Regulation· of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1951 .• the Board shall be deemed to be the employer of registered sec_urity guards for certain purposes as set out in these sections. Therefore, the above decision of the Supreme Court does not assist the petitioners in the present· case. _)-

8. The Secretary of the 2nd respondent's Board has set out in his affidavit that the security guards who were working with the 1st .respondents at Sewri and Wadala Units had beqome, by reason of their length of posting familiar with the employees and outside parties like suppliers and .transporters. It was, therefore, felt necessary for betteF security, that the security guards should be rotated by the Board sending a fresh allotment. The 2nd respondent Board ·· therefore agreed to rotate the security guards batchwise. H

KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v. 663 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ORS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] / lf It accordingly transferred five security guards working in A the Wadala Unit to other establishments in the year 1992. No dispute was raised at that stage. The petitioners have filed this petition now on an apprehension that they may all be allotted to other employers. No orders, however, of a fresh allotment have been issued as far as the petitioners B1 y are concerned, except for the five employees who were sent to other establishments in 1992.

9. It is also necessary to note that the service conditions of the petitioners are not going to be adversely affected even if they are allotted to other registered employers. c The 2nd respondent has stated that if the petitioners or any of them are withdrawn from the 1st respondent such a withdrawal will be concomitant with their allotment to another registered employer. In these circumstances we also do not see any prejudice to the petitioners who also D 'f do not see any prejudice to the 4th petitioner who are fully protected under the said Scheme." ,)

17Copy pinpoint17. It is clear that virtually all the arguments which are now being advanced were also advanced earlier and each one was specifically dealt with and rejected. It was held that E Vizagapatnam Dock Labour's case (supra) was clearly distinguished and had no application. Earlier to that Justice P.B. Sawant (as he then was) by judgment dated 2.11.1982 dealt with the matter at great length. By the said judgm~nt, the Hon'ble Judge .upheld the constitutional validity of the Act and F the Scheme and it was held that (a) the Act was a complete and self contained code; (b) the Board had all necessary powers under the Act to regulate all aspects of employment and all '. service conditions of private Security Guards; (c) there was no need under the Act and the Scheme to identify the employer of G Security Guards as all conditions of their employment were governed by the Act; and (d) if at all there was any conditions of service which are not regulated or covered by the Act and the Scheme then for such conditions only the principal employer would be treated as the employer of the Security Guard. H

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18Copy pinpoint18. The judgment in Vizagapatnam Dock Labour's case (supra) was d(stinguished and it was held that the Dock Labour · Act and the scheme thereunder were different from the Act and Scheme. It appears that the appellant- Krantikari $uraksha Rakshak Sanghatana made another attempt to raise the same B issues. They were negatived by Justice B.N. Srikrishna as he then was. The learned Judge expressly followed the judgment 1 of Justice P.B. Sawant holding that there was no need to identify the employer as it was complete and self-contained code. It was however held that if there were any aspects not covered by c the Act, such as 'unfair labour practice"- which was nqt involved the principal empioyer would be treated for the limited purpose be identified as the employer. It was inter alia observed as follows:

22. "Mr. Singhvi submitted that he was really not interested D in urging that the Security Guards Board was the employer 'r of the Security Guards under the Security Guards Act and the Security Guards Scheme. He was at pains to contend that under the terms of the Security Guards Scheme, a ---. registered ·employer would become the employer of the .,. E Security Guard from the moment the Security Guard was allotted to the registered employer. Before dealing with this contention, I might dispose of the subsidiary contention of Mr. Singhvi which appears to be no longer tenable. Mr. Singhvi contended that though Clause 16 of the Security F Guards Scheme bears the heading "Promotion and -~ transfer of Security Guards", there is no provision whatsoever contained in the entire Clause 16 with regard to transfer of Security Guards. Hence, the Security Guards Board has no power to transfer a Secu.rity Guard from one establishment to another, in the submission of Mr. Singhvi. G He contends that the power of allotment of Security Guards to the industrial establishment of the registered employer possessed by the Security Guards Board is exhausted upon one time exercise thereof. Once the Security Guard is ailotted to a registered employer, the power is.exhausted H

KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v. 665 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

and there is no further power _in the Board directly or by A implication.; under the Security Guards Scheme, to withdraw the Security Guard and to re-allot him to another registered establishment. Though prima facie attractive - this contention is not sound in my view, apart from being r:fo longer res integra. B ,\. .. , 23. The Division Bench ~ . of this .. Court in Suraksha . Rakshak . and General Kamgar Union v. M.S.S.l.D.C. and Ors. (Writ Petition No.2671 of 1992 dated 23rd March, 1993 per Smt. Sujarat Manohar and S.H. Kapadia, JJ) has .~ considered and rejected this contention. The Division C - Bench pointed out that direct employment and coverage un,~er the Act are anathema to each other. In view. of the specific provisions in the Security Guards Act under Section 1(4), the Act would apply to persons who work as · · Security Guards engaged in any factory or establishment, D ·but are not direct and regular employees of the industrial

... ..,. . ·establishment. Secondly upon examination of the provisions of the Scheme the Division -Bench took the view that the Security Guards Board has the additional p6wer to allot registered Security Guards to any registered employer and also terminate the employment and these powers would include the power to withdraw allotment to · ·a given registered employer and re-allot the guard to another registered employer. The requirement of a registered employer may vary from time to time and commensurately the Board is entitled to adjust the allotment from time to time. The Division Bench also pointed out · that both the power of allotment as well as the power of termination are with the Board and a proper implementation of the scheme requires that the Board to possess. the power to allot Security Guards to such registered employer a~ it think~ fit and there is nothing in the scheme to indicate that the allotment once made is irrevocable or cannot be changed. The fact that when a Security Guard is on leave the Board has the power to H j

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A allot another Security Guard, also indicates that the +> ·~

allotment of Security Guards is entirely under the control of the Board and .the Security Guard cannot claim a right of permanent allotment to any particular registered employer. In my view looking to the observations and the B findings made by the :rnvision Bench (supra) the contention of Mr. Singhvi cannot .be accepted. Under Claus~ 26(8) of '-f , the Security Guards Scheme where an employer makes persistent default of payments of wages and allowances and levy to the Soard, the Board has the right to suspend c supply of the Security Guards~ The existence of such a power of suspension of supply of registered S.ecurity Guards is a registered employer spells out the existence of the power of withdrawal of the Security Guards. ' '

24. Mr. Singhvi :then.· contended that the historical background of the legislation shows that the Se.curity y Guards Act .was ·intended to abolish the agents or middlemen; to abolish the practice of hire and fire and to ,,.... .....,___ provide better and more secure employment to Security Guards. According to him, this can only be ensured if the principal employer is held to be the employer of the Security Guards. It is diffiqult to accept the contention as urged by · the learned counsel. It may be possible upon analysis of the detailed provisions of the Security Guards Scheme, to . postulate that t6rcertain purposes the registered employer may be held to be the employer of the registered Security F Guards, but it is not possible to accept the contention that . upon allotment of a Security Guard to a registered I ,;.._.: ,.. emplC?yer, the registered employer should be held to be the employer of the Security Guard for all purposes. G In para 55 it was inter..:afia observed as follows: ~ "(a) Writ Petition No.45 of 1991 The findings of the Third Labour Court, Thane, dated 13th July, 1990 and of the lndustriai Court in its order dated 4th H December, 1990 taking the view that a complaint under

KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v. 667 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] 1-1- the Maharashtra Recognition of trade unions and A Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 against the registered employer under the provisions of the Security Guards Act, 1981 and the Security Guards Scheme, 1981 is not maintainable is hereby quashed and set aside. It is held that such a complaint on behalf of the Security Guards B ' ~ would be maintainable against the registered employer ) under the Security Guards Scheme, 1981. On the merits of the complaint, however, it appears that the only grievance made was that the Board had no power to redeploy a Security Guard from the establishment of c the Second respondent Employer's establishment to any establishment. The act of the Board in withdrawing the Security Guards from the establishment of the Second Respondent Employer and posting them elsewhere was alleged to be an unfair labour practice and relief was D "'( claimed there against. On merits, I do not see how any relief could have been granted. Following the Division Bench judgment of our High Court, I am of the view that the Board has full power to withdraw a Security Guard from the establishment and post him to any establishment of E another registered employer. Since there was no other relief prayed for in the complaint the finding of the Courts below that the complaint was liable to be dismissed even on merits is correct and liable to be upheld. Hence, there is no need to remand the complaint for retrial. In the result, F - -~---' Writ Petition No.45 of 1991 is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. (b) Writ Petition No.1409 of 1993. The order of the Industrial Court dated 15th December, G 1992 in Complaint (OLP) No.342 of ~1.992 holding that the complaint was not maintainable and that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, is hereby quashed and set aside. It is held that the complaint is maintainable and that the Industrial Court has jurisdiction to try the H

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"A complaint. On merits, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court has held that no unfair labour practice under Item No.1 (a) of Schedule II of item Nos. 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the ULP Act had been proved and dismissed the complaint. Even the findings appear to be correct. The petitioner Union had taken the stand that it did not desire B to lead any evidence in the complaint, though the allegations had been denied by the employers. Consequently, even though I have held that the complaint is maintainable there being no evidence of unfair labour - practice, the complaint must fail on merits. Though Mr. c Singhvi vehemently argued that I may consider remanding the complaint for re-trial after giving opportunity to the petition,er Union to lead evide·nce on merits, I decline to . do so. In the circumstances, it is not possible to accede to the request of the learned Advocate. This petition also fails on merits. Hence, this writ petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged with no order as to costs. (C) Writ Petition No.3862 of 1993- ln this case also the Security Guards were withdrawn from one establishment of the second respondent Employer and re-allotted to another establishment. This act of the Board was alleged to be an unfair labour practice on the part of the registered employer and the ~oard. It was also contended in the complaint that tile Board had no power whatsoever to withdraw the Security Guards once allotted. F Following the view of the Division Bench of our High Court, I am of the view that the Board has such power. The complaint in this writ petition must therefore fail on merits and remand would serve no purpose. Consequently, this petition is also dismissed and the rule is discharged with G no order as to costs."

19Copy pinpoint19. In this case also Vizagapatnam Dock Labour's case +-- " (supra) was relied upon by the Union. But the High Court held that it was rendered in respect cif a clifferent Act and Scheme. This judgment was also not challenged by the appellant-Union. H

· KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v 669 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] '--+· • ~··

20Copy pinpoint20. It is interesting to note that another· Writ Petition No.3887/1988 was filed before the Division Bench which was A

decided on 6.5.1997 and the judgment in W. P. 2671 of 1992 was followed and it was held that the power of allotment included within it the power to recall, re-allot and transfer and that under ..._, the entire Act and Scheme would be defeated if the argument B of direct employment was to be accepted. The conclusions } arrived at are as follows: "16. The second argument that the Board has no power of withdrawing a Security Guard once allotted is also devoid of any merit. If the power to withdraw and re-allot is not c with the Board then formation of pool for the Security Guards would be rendered meaningless. Taking into consideration the provisions of the Act and the entire Scheme as framed under the Act, it indicates .that if the Board has power to allot a Security Guard available in a D '( pool, it will have to be held that the Board has a power to withdraw a Security Guard from one establishment and ~ > allot him to another establishment. We are of the opinion that considering the Act and the Scheme and to proper and smooth functioning of the said scheme, it will have to E be held that the Board has power to wifhdraw a Security Guard from one establishment and to re-allot him to another establishment and we must mention at this stage that Shri Mahanty who was withdrawn on 4th of July 1988 was immediately re-allotted on 5th of July, 1988. Thus we F -A conclude that the power of allotment as available with the Board, carries with it the necessary incidence of power of withdrawal and re-allotment from the pool.

17. In fact, the same issue was agitated before the Division Bench of this Gourt in Suraksha Rakshak and General G Kamgar Union (supra) and the Division Bench while -J dealing with the argument that under the Scheme once the Security Guard is allotted by the Board to a registered employer, the Security Guard becomes permanent allottee and the Board has no power to withdraw an allotment or H

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A give a fresh allotment with any other registered employer, -\-' /

• ~ and after considering the Act and the Scheme, has held ;

that the Board has power to withdraw an allotment of a Security Guard given to a registered employer and re- allot the Guard to another registered employer. The B requirements of a registered employer may vary from time ,,,,. to time and the Board is entitled to adjust the allotment from time to time. The Division Benc_h in paragraph 6 of 'f · its judgment has also observed as follows: 1- "The Scheme, therefore, must be looked at as a whole ' c and proper implementation of the Scheme requires that the Board has the power to allot security guards to such registered employer as it thinks suitable. There is ,nothing in the Scheme to indicate that the allotment ·once made is irrevocable or cannot be D changed". 'y Thus, in our opinion, the issue has been conclusively answered by the Division Bench in the case of Suraksha {t Rakshak and General Kamgar Union (supra) and needs no further elaboration." f- E ~

21Copy pinpoint21. Here again, reference was made to Vizagapatnam Dock Labour's case (supra) and held that there was conceptual difference between the Act and the Scheme involved in that case and the case at hand.

22Copy pinpoint22. As noted above, four Writ Petitions had been filed primarily on four grounds. The High Court by the judgment after ~ referring to the earlier judgments held that the power of allotment ,• clearly included within Jts power to recall, re-a!lot and transfer of . f . Security Guards. In.this context, reference was made to Section G 1(4) of the Act to which earlier also reference had been made by the Division Bench in noting that its application wa,:, excluded ~ in respect of direct employees and therefore the argument of direct employment if accepted would depri\1e t;1e Security Guards of the protection under the Act. Second ground related H to the stand that on allotment Security Guard becomes a direct

KRANTIKARI SURAKSHA RAKSHAK SANGHATANA v 671 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. & ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] - ·~

• employee of the principal employer. Here again, after referring to the judgment of Justice P.B. Sawant and a decision of this A • Court in Security Guards Board v. State of Maharashtra (1987 (3) sec 413) it was held that the provisions for seniority, promotion and transfer in Clause 16of1981 Scheme would be rendered ineffective and would cause great harm to guards if 8 ~

r they vyere denied the benefits of common pool seniority and promotion merely because of a fortuitous allotment in the particular principal employer. The other two grounds related to Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (in short 'Contract Labour Act') and the rules framed thereunder. c

23Copy pinpoint23. The High Court referred to an earlier petition filed by the same appellant namely, Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana v. S. V Naik (1993 (1) CLR 1003) and held that the Act was a self contained and complete code and unreported judgment of Justice P.B. Sawant as he then was and Justice D "( M.P. Kania dated 15.1.1988 in Writ Petition No.1172 of 1987

.. " held that the Act is a special statute which not only prevails over the Contract Labour Act but further that the Act also prevails because of Article 254 (2) ~of the Constitution.

24Copy pinpoint24. Apart from the fact that in several earlier petitions the E appellant- Union had unsuccessfully come up with very same pleas and the orders had attained finality. Issue cannot be permitted to be indirectly raised in the manner done. The Act and the schemes make it clear that they apply only to security -A guards who are "Pool Security Guards". As stated earlier the F Act and the Scheme clearly constitute a complete and self contained code which covers private Security Guards. Section 1(4) of the Act and various provisions of 1981 and 2002 Schemes make it clear that the arguments that the guard once allotted with the principal employer he becomes the direct and G -1 regular employee of the principal employer is without any substance. As rightly noted by the High Court the provisions of the Act and the statute make it clear that the Board's power of allotment carries with it the implicit and inherent power to recall, re-allot and transfer a guard from one principal employer to H

672 SUPREME COURT HEPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A another. It needs no emphasis that the power to appoint carried with it the inherent power to terminate. Therefore, the power to allot necessarily carrieswith it the inherent power to re-allot or cancel the allotmenC It is also seen that both under the 1981 and 2002 Schemes certain clauses provide for transfer of B guards. It is also significant that under both the Schemes there is provision for continued supervision, control, disciplinary powers and powers of termination vested in the Board.

25Copy pinpoint25. As has been rightly contended by learned counsel for the respondents, Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Act specifically · C provide for application of certain Act to Security Guards. In other words, these specific statutes have application. Other statutes are dealing with employer and employee· relationship and the rights thereunder w~ich are made applicable to Security Guards. To put it differently, only the statutes clearly indicated_ D are applicable to Security Guards. Other statutes are clearly excluded.

26Copy pinpoint26. Looked at from any angle, the appeals are without merit, deserve dismissal which we direct. No costs. E S.K.S. Appeals dismissed.