MIS. DHAMPUR SUGAR (KASHIPUR) LTD. v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND ORS.

69Copy pinpoint69. Allegations of ma/a.fide are serious in nature and they essentially raise a question of fact. It is, therefore, necessary for the person making such allegations to supply full particulars in the petition. If sufficient averments and requisite materials are not on record, the court would not G make 'fishing' or roving inquiry. Mere assertion, vague averment or bald statement is not enough to hold the action to be ma/a.fide. It must be demonstrated by facts. Moreover, the burden of proving mala fide is on the person levelling such allegations and the burden is 'very heavy' [vide E.P. Royappa v. State o/Tamil Nadu, [1974] 4 SCC 4: [1974] H

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A 2 SCR 348]. The charge of mala fide is more easily made than made out. As stated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, [1976] 1 SCC 800: AIR (1977) SC 448], it is the last refuge of a losing litigant [see also Ajit Kumar v. Indian Oil Corporation, [2005] 7 sec 764]. In the case on hand, except alleging that the policy B was altered by the Government, to extend the benefit to respondent No. 4, no material whatsoever has been placed on record by the appellant. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the learned counsel that the impugned action is mala fide or malicious.

70Copy pinpoint70. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in observing that the change of policy was not limited to the case of respondent No. 4 but it was uniformly applied to one and all. To us, therefore, it cannot be contended that the High Court committed an error in arriving at the said conclusion which requires interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. We, therefore, see no substance in this argument as well. D

71Copy pinpoint71. Keeping in view statutory provisions, the policy decision taken by the respondent-authorities and interest of all parties including existing sugar factories, a decision has been taken by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 granting licence in favour of respondent No. 4. The said decision was E confirmed by the State in exercise of appellate power and the High Court was not convinced that the decision was illegal, arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable. We are unable to persuade ourselves to hold that all. the decisions suffer from any error of law or of jurisdiction and they should be set aside. We, therefore, express our inability to grant relief to the . ' F appellant.

72Copy pinpoint72. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the decisions taken by the respondent-authorities and confirmed by the High Court suffer from no illegality or infirmity. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, however, without any order as to costs. G S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.