BHURI NATH AND ORS. v. STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND ORS.

vidhipandit.com/case/sc-1997-1-138-178

Judgment · Supreme Court of India · decided (year only) · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY and G.B. PATTANAIK

[1997] 1 S.C.R. 138

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p. 176

A appoint persons possessed of prescribed qualifications vests in the institu- tion. The education authorities did not accept suitability of persons selected by the management on the specified grounds and reasons therefor. It is only an exercise of the control envisaged by the amendment of Section 160(3) of the Ad with a view to prevent appointment of unqualified B persons. The power under Section 16D(4) entrusted to the authorised controller was merely of management. Management of institution in respect of which Authorised Controller had been appointed had to be conducted and carried out in accordance with the directions given by the Authorised Controller. It was held that the property did not vest in the State but continued to remain the property of the institution as Article C 31(2A) saves such control and Section 31(2) has no application.

In Constitutional Law of India by H.M. Seervai (Third Edn.) Volume II at page 1109 in para 30 it is stated that distinction between ordinary acquisitions where law provides full compensation and large schemes of social engineering or reform which would have to be located at from the point of view of justice to the individual as well as to the community, is harmonised by the legal view. In the afterlight of Bela Baneljee's case (supra), it is clear that the eminent lawyers (founding fathers of the Constitution) committed a grave error in leaving to implication what they could have clearly expressed in Article 31(2). Bela Ba;,eljee's case showed that the intention of the framers failed because it was not expressly em- bodied in Article 31(2). IJbviously, an amendment of the Constitution is meant to change the existing law, and the 4th Amendment by excluding the challenge on the ground of adequacy of compensation was meant to change the law laid down in Bela Baneljee's case that compensation under Article F 31(2) meant a full and fair money equivalent. After the 4th Amendment, the word "compensation", could not mean a full and fair money equivalent, for if it did, the law would have remained unchanged and the 4th Amend- ment would have failed in its purpose. By excluding a challenge on the ground that the compensation provided by the law was not adequate, the 4th Amendment removed the restriction on legislative power in the sense G that for the law to be valid it was no longer obligatory to provide for the payment of full and fair money equivalent. After the 4th Amendment a law which fixed compensation which amounted to 80 per cent of full and fair money equivalent would not violate Article 31(2) .and was a valid law. The 4th Amendment achieved this result by introducing the concept of inade- H quate compensation. On consideration of above provisions, we have, there-

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fore, no hesitation to hold that the Board is not a controlled Corporation A within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. By operation of clause (2A) of Article 31 of the Constitution the Board or the properties of the Shrine did not vest in the State. The right to collection of the offerings or the divestment of the properties, if any, of the Baridars or the right to collection or a share in the offerings do not vest in the State. Consequently, B Section 19(1) of the Art is not ultra vires of Article 19(1)(t) or Article 31(2) of the Constitution.

It is seen that the proviso to Section 19 provides that the Governor may appoint a Tribunal which, after giving personal hearing to the Baridars and the representatives of the Board, "shall recommend compensation to be paid by the Board in lieu of extinction of their right". While making its recommendations to the Board, the Tribunal "shall have due regard to the income which the. Baridars had been driving as Baridars". The Board shall examine the recommendations forwarded to it by the Tribunal and take such decision as it may deem app~opriate. The decision of the Board shall be final. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the Governor made guidelines which were .duly notified in the Gazette. Another notification inviting claims from Baridars was published and time was extended from time to time informing them to lay claims for compensation. It would _ appear that while the matter remained pending, the Baridars do not seem to have laid their claims. The guidelines framed by the Governor are by exercising the rule-making power under Section 24 of the Act. So they acquired the status as subordinate: legislation and became integral part of the proviso to Section 19 of the Act. As we have upheld the ·,Act, they are at liberty to file their claims within: two months from~ today. The Tribunal shall have due regard to the guidelines in determining the income of p Baridars before the Tribunal makes its recommendations to the Board for consideration and the Board shall also take a decision, as it may deem appropriate, consistent with proviso to Section 19(1) and the guidelines, in the light of the recommendations made by the Tribunal. It would be obvious that in case the Board does not find itself in agreement with the recommendations made by the Tribunal, it would be required to state its G reasons in that behalf, give an opportunity to the Baridars and, if necessary, a personal hearing through their representatives or a counsel and then take a decision to pay compensation as it may deem appropriate. In case it disagrees with the recommendations of the Tribunal, it should record reasons in writing and would communicate the same to all the affected H

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A persons. This exercise should be done within two months from the date of the receipt of t~e recommendations of the Tribunal. The Governor would appoint the Tribunal within six weeks from the date of the receipt of the judgment. We hope and trust that the Tribunal would dispose of the claims as expeditiously as possible since more than a decade had passed by now.

B Tlie appeals are a_ccordingly /disposed of but, in the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.

v.s.s. appeals are dispose& of.

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