STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. ETC. ETC. v. PRADHAN SANGH KSHETIRA SAMITI AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

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A So long as the panchayat areas and the constituencies are delimited in conformity with the constitutional provisions or without committing a -, breach thereof, the courts cannot interfere with the same. We may, in this connection, refer to a decision of this Court in The Hingir- Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and· Others v. T1ie State of Olissa and Others, (1961) 2 SCR 537. · In this case, the petitioner-mine owners, had among others, challenged the B method prescribed "by the legislature for recovering the cess under the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952 on the ground that it was unconstitutional. The majority of the Bench held that the method is a matter of convenience and, though relevant, has to be tested in the light of other relevant circumstances. It is not permissible to challenge the vires of C a statute solely on the ground that the method adopted for the recovery of the impost can and generally is adopted in levyin~ a duty of excise.

What is more objectionable in the approach of the High Court is that although clause (a) of Article 243-0 of the Constitution enacts a bar on D the interference by the courts in electoral matters including the questioning of the validity of nay law relating to the delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies made or purported to be made under Article 243-K and the election to any panchayat, the High Court has gone into the question of the validity of the delimitation of the constituencies and also the allotment of seats to them. We may, in this E ·connection, refer to a decision of this Court in Meghraj Kothari v. Delimita- tion Commission & Ors., [1967) 1 SCR 400. In that case, a notification of the Delimitation Commission whereby a city which had been a general constituency was notified as reserved of the Scheduled Castes. This was challenged on the ground that the petitioner had a right to be a candidate for Parliament from the said constituency which had been taken away. This Court held that the impugned notification was a law relating to the '1/ \. delimitation of the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such con- stituencies made under Article 327 of the Constitution, and that an ex- amination of sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Commission Act showed that the matters therein dealt with were not subject to the scrutiny of any court of law. There was a very good reason for such a provision because if the orders made under sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the result would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from court to court. Although an order under Section 8 or 9 . of the .Delimitation H Commission Act and published under Section 10(1] of that Act is not part

STATE v. P.S.K. SAMITI (SAWANT,J.) 1055 of an Act of Parliament, its effect is the same. Section 10 [4] of that Act A puts such an order in the same position as a law made by the Parliament itself which could only be made by it under Article 327. If we read Articles 243-C, 243-K and 243-0 in place of Article 327 and sections 2 [kk], 11-F and 12-BB of the Act in place of Sections 8 and 9 of the Delimitation Act, 1950, it will be obvious that neither the delimitation of the panchayat area nor of the constituencies in this said areas and the allotments of seats to the constituencies could have been challenged or the Court could have entertained such challenge except on the ground that before the delimita- tion, ·no objections were invited and no hearing was given. Even this r I challenge could not have been entertained after the notification for holding the elections was issued. The High Court not only entertained the challenge but has also gone into the merits of the alleged grievances although the challenge was made after the notification for the election was issued on 31st August, 1994.

While supporting the judgment of the High Court, the respondents raised some additional contentions. The first contention was that it was not competent for the State Government under Section 96-A of the act to ;>- delegate its power to the Director, the delegation being in contravention of the provisions of Articles 243 [g) of the Constitution. We have pointed out earlier that under the Constitution, Governor means the State Govern- E ment. Article 154 (1] enables the Governor to exercise the executive power of the State either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. Hence by virtue of Article 163, the State Government can exercise the power through its officers. Neither Article 243 [g] nor any other provision in Part IX of the Constitution prevents the Governor and, therefore, the State Government from delegating its power F mentioned in the said Part to any subordinate officer. The Act makes a specific provision by Section 96-A thereof for the State Government to delegate all or any of its powers under the Act to any officer or authority subordinate to it subject to such conditions and restrictions as it may deem fit to impose. The State Government by a notification issued on 9th May, G 1994 under Section 96-A delegated its powers under Sections 3 and 11-F of the Act to the Director. We have already pointed out that the power delegated under Sections 3 and 11-F of the Act would impliedly include the power to declare"village" under Section 2[t] of the Act although the said section is not mentioned in the notification specifically. Hence we do H

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A not see any substance fo this contention either.

A .part of the aforesaid contention was that the Director by his -L Circular dated 12th May, 1994 had delegated the function of delimiting the panchayat areas to the District Magistrates of various districts which he could not have done since Section 96-A does not permit sub-delegation of B the powers given by the State Government. We are afraid that this conten- tion results from the incorrect appreciation of the contents of the said Circular. By the said Circular, the Director had only asked the District Magistrates to do the ministerial work of submitting the proposals for {- re-organisation of gram panchayats according to the guidelines given in the 1' C Circular which were in terms of the provisions of the Act. Those proposals were to be finally processed by the Director himself and that is what the Director ultimately did as he himself took the final decision with regard to the reorganisation of the existing gram panchayats constituted under the unamended Act and delimited the panchayat areas. In the circumstances, there is no merit in the contention. D

12Copy pinpoint12. The second contention raised on behalf of the respondents was that the delimitation of the panchayat areas and gram sabhas was done without giving adequate opportunities of being heard to the people in the areas concerned. The lists of gram panchayats were published from 20th E to 26th August, 1994 and objections were heard and disposed of on 27th and 28th August, 1994 and the final lists of the panchayat areas and gram sabhas were published on the 31st August, 1994. While it was conceded on behalf of the State Government that the proposals for delimiting the panchayat areas were published and finalised as above, it was pointed out p on their behalf that this was done bona fide to complete the elections on time and without any ulterior motive, since the State Government was racing against time to meet the deadline set by the Centre to constitute the new panchayats. However, during the hearing of the writ petitions before the High Court, the State Government had in its counter-affidavit volun- tarily offered to remove the said grievances and invite the objections afresh G and finalise the delimitation of the panchayat areas. However, no order was passed . on the said offer by the High Court. Subsequently, the State Government on its own canceled the notification of election dated 31st August, 1994 to meet the said grievances of the writ petitioners, i.e., the respondents herein. However, in view of the letter dated 12th November, H 1994 received from the Centre, to which we have already made a reference,

STATEv. P.S.K.SAMffi[SAWANT,J.) 1057 threatening to stop the release of funds, the State Government wai. com- A pelled to renotify the elections of 26th November, 1994 in pursuance of which the election process was to commence on 3rd December, 1994. In the meanwhile, on 2nd December, 1994 the impugned judgment was delivered by the High Court.

Before us, again, in order to prove its bone fides, the State Govern- B ment voluntarily offered to hear the respondents with regard to their grievances and for that purpose to cancel the notification dated 26th -t r November, 1994 and reschedule the election process without prejudice to their contentions in the appeal. By our interim order dated 9th February, I 1995, we permitted the State Government to cancel its notification dated c 26th November, 1994, to hear the respondents with regard to their said grievances and to reschedule the election process. That .order of 9th February, 1995 is reproduced below:

"Pending the decision, we direct as follows : D The Governor may adopt the Notifications issued by the Direc- tor of Panchayat Raj under Section: 3 read with Section 11-F of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 [Act) between 2nd and 5th August, 1994 as his own proposals for the purpose of specifying villages and constituting Gram Sabha and Panchayat areas under E the Act. The Governor may thereafter or· simultaneously issue a fresh notice inviting objections to the said proposals. He will give at least 10 days' clear time for lodging objections. He may also nominate officers to hear the said objections. After the obje~tions are disposed of final Notification or Notifications will be issued by the Governor. F

The notice inviting objections must be prominently displayed at least in the offices of all the Block Development Officers throughout the period fixed for filing the objections. In addition, wide publicity to such notice should be given on T.V., Radio and G in Newspapers having wide circulation in the areas concerned.

It would not be necessary to give oral hearing to the objector unless the officer concerned, considers it necessary to do so.

After the final Notifica:tioo/s/is/are iss~ed, the State Election H

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A Commissioner may proceed with the conduct of the elections."

We understand that the grievances of the people in the areas have since been heard and the process of election is underway according to the revised schedule.

13Copy pinpoint13. The above order was passed as stated earlier without prejudice to the contentions of the State Government that the notifications issued by ( the Director under Section 3 read with Section 11-F of the Act between f- 2nd and 5th August, 1994 were valid. We have already held that since the Governor means the State Government, the Legislature could emJoWer the C State Government to delegate all or any of its powers under the Act to any 1 officer or authority subordinate to it. This is what the legislature has done by enacting Section 96A and the State Government in pursuance of the provisions of the said Section, delegated its powers to the Director. We have held that both the provision of Section 96A and the delegation made D by the State Government to the Director under the said provision is valid. Hence, the notifications in question issued by the Director are valid. The adoption by the Governor, of the notifications issued by the Director pursuant to our interim order of 9th February, 1995 has, therefore, to be ·{ deemed to be by way of abundant precaution, pending the decision on the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents. The actions of the Gover- E . nor pursuant to our interim order, therefore, in no away reflect adversely on the validity of the notifications issued by the Director.

We must also make it clear that we had passed the interim order, as stated earlier, pending the decision and without prejudice to the conten- F tions of the State Government that the election process once started could 'I not be set at naught by raising objections on the ground that the delimita- ~4 \- tion of the panchayat areas was defective. We have pointed out that the original delimitation of the panchayat areas having been made much prior to the election notification of 31st August, 1994, the respondent-writ petitioners could not have challenged the same after the said notification and the Court could not have entertained the challenge. There was, there- fore, no invalidity in the action taken by the State Government by its notification of 31st August, 1994 to commence the election process. We are, in these proceedings, referring to the lacuna in the steps taken by the State Government to finalise the panchayat areas only with a view to point out that it was obligatory on the State Government to heat the objections

STATEv. P.S.K.SAMffi[SAWANT,J.) 1059

before the panchayat areas were finalised. The ratio of the decisions of this A _\ Court in Visakhapatnam Municipality v. Kandregula Nukaraju & Ors., [1976] 1 SCR 545, S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., [1980) 3 SCC 379, Baldev Singh & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., [1987) 2 SCC 510, Sundarjas Kanya/al Bhatija & Ors. v. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra & Ors., [1989] 3 SCC 396 and Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Hmyana & Ors., B [1993] Supp. 2 SCC 278 requires that a reasonable opportunity for raising the objections and hearing them ought to be given in such matters since the change in the areas of the local bodies results in civil consequences. It was not disputed before us that the action of bringing more villages than one under one gram panchayaI when they were earlier under separate gram panchayats, does involve civil consequences. However, as held in Visak- c . hapatnam Municipality, S.L. Kapoor, Baldev Singh, S.L. Bhatija and Atlas Cycles cases, in m.attres which are urgent even a post-decisional hearing is a sufficient compliance of the principle of natural justice, viz., audi alteram partem. It is in view of this position in law that the State Government had offered to hear the grievances of the writ petitioners before the High Court D and before us.

14Copy pinpoint14. We are, therefore, more than satisfied that there were no ma/a fide intentions on the part of the State Government in giving the short time for submitting the· objections and for hearing and disposing them of. We may, however, make it clear that although, as pointed out earlier, the E challenge to the delimitation of the panchayat areas on the said grounds could not have been made in the present case after the election notification was issued, the State Government should bear it in mind that if and when the next regrouping of the villages and redetermination of the panchayat areas is undertaken, the authorities will have to give sufficient opportunity p to the people of the areas concerned for raising the objections. This is with a view to remove their grievances, if any, with regard to the difficulties, invonveniences and hardships, likely neglect of their interests, domination of certain sections and forces, remoteness of the seat of administration, want of proper transport and communication facilities etc. The opportunity will also provide an occasion for the people to come forward with sugges- G tions for better and more viable, compact and cohesive regrouping of the villages for efficient administration and economic development. The objec- tions are not to be invited to enable the people to exercise the sort of a right of self- determination which is sought to be spelt out by the High Court. The final decision with regard to the delimitation of the panchayat H

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A areas, after hearing the objections and suggestions, will, of course, be that of the State Government acting through the Director.

The last contention of the respondents was that the Act makes provision for the nyaya panchayats whereas the amended provisions of the Constitution do not direct the organisation of sucli panchayats e.nd, there- B fore, the Act is ultra vires the Constitution. The contention is only to be stated to be rejected. Admittedly the basis of the organisation of the nayay panchayats under the Act is different from the basis of the organisation of (

C the gram panchayats, and the functions of the two also differ. The nyaya panchayats are in addition to the gram panchayats. The Constitution does not prohibit the establishment of nyaya panchayats. On the other hand, the ¥ organisation of the nyaya panchayats will be in promotion of the directive principles contained in Article 39A of the Constitution. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate this contention.

As pointed out above, the decision of the High Court suffers from D errors and has to be set aside. The appeals, therefore, succeed and are hereby allowed and the impugned decision of the High Court is set aside with costs throughout.

R.A. Appeal Allowed.