DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. H.C. KHURANA .' APRIL 7, 1993

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H VERMA, J. The respondent, H.C. Khurana, was employed as Execu

p. 1037 Copy page pinpoint

tive Engineer in the Delhi Development Authority (D.DA.). A preliminary memo was served on the respondent on 6.11.1985, alleging some ir- regularities by him in the construction works, and they were being inves- tigated. A chargesheet was framed on 11.7.1990 against the respondent on the basis of irregularities in the constructions made in a housing colony. On 13.7.1990, the chargesheet was despatched for being served on the respondent. However, the respondent proceeded on two months' medical leave and, therefore, on 17.7.1990 another Executive Engineer R.K. Sood, working in the same Wing as the respondent, received it and gave the intimation that the respondent was on leave, adding that the same would be handed over to the respondent on his return from leave. On 28.11.1990, the Departmental Promotion Committee (D.P.C.) met, and in view of the earlier decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, it followed the 'sealed cover procedure' in the case of respondent. It · appears, that the effort to effect personal service of the chargesheet on the respondent on account of his non-availability continued, and the same could be served personally on the respondent only on 25.1.1991. As a result of the selection made by the D.P.C., certain persons were promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer, while the respondent's matter was kept in abeyance to await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.

In these circumstances, the respondent filed Writ Petition NOf 877 of 1991 in the Delhi High Court claiming a mandamus directing the D.D.A. E to promote him as Superintending Engineer with effect from the date on which his juniors had been promoted to the post of Superintending Engin- ner, on the basis of selection made by the D.P.C. The High Court has allowed that writ petition taking the view, that 'the framing of charge would carry with it the duty to issue and serve the same on the empl"yee, there F was no justification for the respondent to follow the sealed cover procedure in this case on 28.11.1991 when the Departmental Promotion Committee met', since actual s~e of the chargesheet on the respondent was made only after the date .qp· which the D.P.C. met. According to the High Court, issuance of the chargesheet to the employee means its actual service on him, and this should be complete before following the sealed cover proce- G dure. The High Court has read U11io11 of India and Others v. KV. fa11kira111a11 and Others, [1991] 4 SCC 109, to this effect, for taking the view, that on these facts, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be said to have. been initiated prior to 29.11.1990, when the D.P:C. followed the sealed cover procedure. Accordingly, the High Court has directed the D.D.A. to H

p. 1038 Copy page pinpoint

A open the sealed cover; to promote the respondent as Superintending Engineer, if he has been otherwise found suitabie by the D.P.C.; and, in that. event, lo give him seniority with all consequential benefits from the date 011 which his juniors were so promoted. The judgment of the High Court is challenged by special leave, in this appeal.

B The short question for consideration, is: Whether, in the present case, the High Court has correctly applied the decision in Jankiraman? Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Jankiraman cannot be read to hold, in a case like the present, where the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated by framing the chargesheet and despatching the same, C that the chargesheet had not been issued; and, theref.ore, the 'sealed cover procedure' could not be followed by the D.P.C. on 28.11.1990. On the other hand, learned .counsel for the respondent strenuously urged that i Jankiraman holds that without effective service of the chargesheet on the employee, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be said to have been in- D itiated against him. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to the Office Memo~andum No. 2201114/91-Estt. (A) dated 14.9.1992 of the Department of Personnel & · Training, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievanet;s and Pensions, Government of India, issued in supersession of the earlier. Office Memorandum No. 22011J2/86- Estt. (A) dated 12.1.1988, . E consequent upon the judgment in Jankiraman, to support his submission that even though mere issuance or despatch of a chargesheet without the further requirement of its actual service on the employee would now be sufficient according to the O.M. dated 14.9.1992 for following the sealed cover procedure, yet the same was not sufficient earlier according to the O.M. dated 12.1.1988, which required actual service and not mere issuance of the chargesheet for initiating the disciplinary proceedings. Admittedly, "'( the guidelines in the O.M. dated 12.1.1988 were in force, in the present case. The subject of the two memoranda, containing the guidelines, is the same, as under:

G 'Promotion of Government servants against whom dis- ciplinary/court proceedings are pending or whose Con- duct is under investigation - P,foeedure and guidelines to be followed.'

H (emphasis supplied)

D.D.A. v. H.c. KHURANA (VERMA, J.)" 1039

Para 2 is the relevant portion in these memoranda. In O.M. daled A 12.1.1988, para 2 is as under :-

'Cases of Government Servants~to whom Sealed Cover Procedure will ~ applicable.

2. At the time of consideration of the cases of Govern· B ment servants for promotion, details of Government ser· vants in the consideration zone for promotion falling under the following categories should be specifically brought to the notice of the Departmental Promoiion Committee :- c (i) Government servants under suspension;

(ii) Government servants in respect of whom discipli· nary proceedings are pending or a decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings; D (iii) Government servants in respect of whom prosecu· tion for a criminal charge is pending or sanction for prosecution has been issued or a decision has been taken to accord sanction for prosecution.

(iv) Government servants against whom an investiga· E

-- tion on serious allegations of corruption, bribery or similar grave misconduct is in progress either by the CBI or any other agency, departmental or otherwise.'

(emphasis supplied) F

The substituted clause (ii) in para 2, in O.M. dated 14.9.1992, is as under:·

'(ii) Government servants in respect of whom a Char· gesheet has been issued and the disciplinary proceedings are pending; and"

(emphasis supplied)

. It is the change made in clause (ii) of para 2 in the O.M. dated 14.9.1992, from which learned counsel for the respondent tried to find H

1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 2 S.C.R. ' A support for his submission.

Before we refer to Jnnkiraman, we may advert to clause (ii) of para 2 of O.M. dated 12.1.1988 which was the guideline applicable at the )_ material time, in the present case, and is as under :-

B "(ii) Government servants in resped of whom discipli- nary proceedings are pending or a decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings;" __...r

c (emphasis supplied)

These words clearly indicate that the scaled cover procedure was applicable, in cases where the 'disciplinary proceedings are pending' in . Jo:

resp~ct of the government servant; or a decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings'. Thus, on a decision being taken to initiate discipli- D nary proceedings, the guidelines attract the sealed cover procedure. The reason is obvious. Where a decision has been taken to initiate the discipli- nary proceedings against a government servant, his promotion, even if he is found otherwise suitable, would be incongruous, because a government )( servant under such a cloud should not be promoted till he is cleared of the allegations against him, into which an inquiry has to be made according to E the decision taken. In such a situation, the correctness of the allegation being dependent on the final outcome of the disciplinary proceedings, it would not be fair to exclude him from consideration for promotion till conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, even though it would be im- proper to promote him, if found otherwise suitable, unless exonerated. To F reconcile these conflicting interests, of the government servant and public administration, the only fair and just course is, to consider his case for promotion and to determine if he is otherwise suitable for promotion, and keep the result in abeyance in sealed cover to be implemented on con- clusion of the disciplinary proceedings; and in case he is e~onerated therein, to promote him with all consequential benefits, if found otherwise suitable by the Selection Committee. On the other hand, giving him promo- ~ tion after taking the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, would be incongruous and against public policy and principles of good administra- tion. This is the rationale behind the guideline to follow the sealed cove~ procedure in such cases, to prevent the possibility of any injustice or arbitrariness.

D.D.A v. H.C. KHURANA (VERMA, J,] 1041

The question now, is : What is the stage, when it can be said, that 'a A decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings'? We have no doubt that the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings cannot be subsequent to the issuance of the chargesheet, since issue of the char- gesheet is a consequence of the decision to initiate disciplinary proceed- ings. Framing the chargesheet, is the first step taken for holding the enquiry B

- into the allegations, on the decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceed- ings. The chargesheet is framed on the basis of the allegations made against the government servant; the chargesheet is then served on him to enable him to give his explanation; if the explanation is satisfactory, the proceed· ings are closed, otherwise, an enquiry is held into the charges; if the charges are not proved, the proceedings are closed and the government servant exonerated; but if the charges are proved, the penalty follows. Thus, the service of the chargesheet on the government servant follows the decision ; to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and it does not prei;ede or coincide with that decision. The delay, if any, in service of the chargesheet to the government servant, after it has been framed and despatc.lled, does not have the effect of delaying ·initiation of the disciplinary pro~eedings, inas- much as information t" the government servant of the. charges framed against him, by service of the chargesheet, is not a part of the decision making process of the authorities for initiating the disciplinary proceedings.

This plain meaning of the expression used in clause (ii) of para 2 of E

- O.M. dated 12.1.1988, also promotes the object of the provision. The expression refers merely to the decision of the authority, and knowledge of the government servant, thereof, does not form a part of that decision. The change made in clause (ii) of para 2 in O.M. dated 14.9.1992, merely clarifies this position by using the expression 'chargesheet has been issued' F to -indicate that service of chargesheet is not necessary; and. issue of the chargesheet by Its despatch indicates beyond doubt that the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings was taken. In our opinion, Jankiraman takes the same view, and it is not possible to read that decision otherwise, in the manner suggested by learned counsel for the respondent. G The decision in Jankiraman is based, inter alia, on O.M. dated 12.1.1988. The facts of the cases dealt with in the decision in Jankiraman do not indicate that the Court iook the view, that. even though the char- gesheet against the government servant was framed and direction given to despatch the same to the government servant as a result of the decision to H

1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 2 S.C.R. -".. A initiate disciplinary proceedings taken prior to the meeting of the D.P.C., that was not sufficient to attract the sealed evver procedure merely because service of the chargesheet was effected subsequent to the meeting of the D.P.C. Moreover, in Jankiraman itself, it was stated thus :

"14. To bring the record up to date, it may be pointed B out that in view of the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Tejinder Singh, (1991] 4 SCC 129, decided on September 26, 1986, the Government of India in the Deptt. of 'Personnel and Training issued another Office Memor~ndum No.22011/2/86. Estt. (A) dated January 12,

c 1988 in supersession of all the earlier insturctions on the subject including the Office Memorandum dated January 30, 1982 ..... A further guideline contained in this Memoran- dum is that the same sealed cover procedure is to be applied where a government servant is recommended for promotion by the DPC, but before he is actually promoted, he is either D placed under suspension or disciplinary proceedings are taken against him or a decision has been taken to initiate the proceedings or criminal prosecution is launched or sanction fo1 such prosecution has been issued or decision to accord such sanction is taken. E

10. These differences in the two Memoranda have no bearing on the questions to be answered."

(emphasis supplied) (PP. 117-118) F Thereafter, in Jankiraman, the conclusions of the Full Bench of the Tribunal, under consideration, were quoted, and then while restating that the conclusions ofthe Tribunal cou1d be reconciled, it was further stated, thus:

"rl. There is no doubt that there is a seeming contradiction between G the two conclusions. But read harmoniously, and that is what the Full Bench has intended, the two conclusions can be reconciled with each other. The conclusion No.1 should be read to mean that the promotion etc. cannot be withheld merely because some disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against the employee. To deny the said benefit, they must be at H ..-·- the relevant time pending at the stage when charge-memo/charge-shee• has

D.D.A. v. H.C. KHURANA [VERMA, J.] 1043

already been issued to the employee. Thus read, there is no inconsistency in A the two conclusions.'

(emphasis supplied) PP. 119)

It will be seen that in Jankirama11 also, emphasis is on the stage when B 'a decision has been taken to initiate the disciplinary proceedings' and it was further said that 'to deny the said benefit (of promotion), they must

- be at the relevant time pending at the stage when charge-memo/charge- sheet has already been issued to the employee'. The word 'issued' used in this context in Jankiraman, it is urged by learned counsel for the respon- C dent, means service on thr employee. We are unable to read Jankiraman in this manner. The context in which the word 'issued' has been used, merely means that the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings is taken and translated into action by despatch of the chargesheet leaving no doubt that the decision bad been taken. The contrary view would defeat the object by enabling the government servant, if so inclined, to evade service and thereby frustrate the decision and get promotion in spite of that decision. Obviously, the contrary view cannot be taken.

'Issue' of-the chargesheet in the context of a decision taken to initiate the disciplinary proceedings must mean, as it does, the framing of the chargesheet and taking of the necessary action to despatch the cbargesheet to the employee_ to inform him of the charges framed against him requiring

- his explanation; and not also the further fact of service of the cbargesbeet on the employee. It is so, because knowledge to the employee of the charges framed against him, Qn the basis of the decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings, dues not form a part of the decision making process of the authorities to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, even if framing the charges forms a part of that process in certain situations. The conclusions of the Tribunal quoted at the end of para 16 of the decision - in Jankiraman which have been accepted thereafter in para 17 in the manner indicated above, do use the word 'served' in conclusion No.(4), but the fact of 'issue' of the chargesheet to the employee is emphasised in para 17 of the.decision. Conclusion No.(4) of the Tribunal has to be deemed to be accepted in Jankiraman only in this manner.

The meaning of the word 'issued', on which considerable stress was laid by learned counsel for. the respondent, has to be gathered from the H -

1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 2 S.C.R.

4, A context in which it is used. Meanings of the word 'issue' given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary include : 'to give exit to; to send forth, or allow to pass out; to let out; .... to give or send out authoritatively or officially; to send forth or deal out formally or publicly; to emit, put into circulation'. The issue of a chargesheet, therefore, means its despatch to the govern- ment servant, and this act is complete the moment steps are taken for the B purpose, by framing the chargesheet and despatching it to the government se..Vant, the further fact of its actual service on the government servant not . - being a necessary part of its requirement. This is the sense in which the word 'issue' was used in the expression 'chargesheet has already been issued to the employee', in para 17 of the decision in Jankiraman. c In view of the above, we are unable to accept the respondent's contention, which found favour with the High Court, that the decision in Jankiraman, on the facts in the present case, supports the view that the decision to initate the disciplinary proceedings had not been taken or the chargesheet had not been issued to the respondent prior to 28.11.1990, D when the D.P.C. adopted the sealed cover procedure, merely because service of the chargesheet framed and issued earlier could be effected on the respondent after 28.11.1990, on account of his absence.

Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court Is set aside, with the result that the writ petition 01 the respondent )r E stands dismissed. No costs.

N.V.K. Appeal ailowed.