TINSUKHIA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD. v. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.

" ..... If the Court comes to the conclusion that the declaration was merely a pretence and that the real purpose of the law is the accomplishment of some object other than to give effect to the poliy of the State towards securing the directive principles in Article 39(b) and (c) the declaration would not be a bar to the court from striking down any provision therein which violates Article 14, 19 or

31. In other words, if a law passed ostensibly to give effect to the policy of the State is, in truth and substance, one for

- accomplishing an anauthorised object, the court would be entitled to tear the veil created by the declaration and decide according to the real nature of the law ...... " (P. 855-56) c Chandrachud, J. observed in the Keshavananda case:

" 'Laws passed under Article 31-C can, in my opinion, be upheld only, and mly if, there is a direct and reasonable D nexus between the law and the directive policy of the State expressed in Article 39-B or C." (P. 996)

To the same effect are the observations of the learned Chief ~- Justice in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. VO!,' (1981] 1SCR206: E " ..... the Courts can, under Article 31-C, satisfy themselves as to the identity of the law in the sense whether it bears direct and reasonable nexus with a directive - principle."

F "The only question open to judicial review under the unamended A'ticle 31-C was whether there is a direct and reasonable nexus between the impugned law and the provi- sions of Article 39(b) and (c).'' (P. 261) (Emphasis Supplied)

G In the same case, Bhagwati, J. observed:

" ..... The point that I wish to emphasis is that the amended Article 31-C does not give protection to a law which has merely some remote or tenuous connection with a directive principle." H

TINSUKHIAELECTRICSUPPLYCO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALJAH,J.l 575

" ..... Even where the dominant object of a law is to give effect to a directive principle it is not every provision of the law which is entitled to claim protection ...... " (P. 338)

" ..... it is not every provision of a statute which has been enacted with the dominant object of giving effect to a B directve principle, that it entitled to protection, but only those provisions of the statute'which are basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the directive principles are protected under the amended Article 31-C " (P. 339) (Emphasis Supplied) c

13Copy pinpoint13. The proposition of Sri Sorabjee, in principle, is, therefore, unexceptionable; but the question remains whether, upon the applica- tion of the appropriate tests, the impugned statute fails to measure-up to the requirements of the Constitution to earn the protection under Article 31-C. Learned counsel sought to contend that the Assam State D Electricity Board having exercised the option of purchasing the under- taking of the Tinsukia Co., under Sectioin 6(1) of 1910 Act by the statutory notice dated 23.5.1972 requiring the company to sell the _,l_, undertaking to the Board on the expiration of the period of the licence, the question of any further need to acquire the undertaking for the purpose of effectuating the objects envisaged in Art. 39(b) of E

- the Constitution by the expedience of a separate and independent legislation was, indeed, unreal or non-existent. The real object, there- fore, of the en~ctment of Assam Act X of 1973 it was urged, was not to enact a law for purposes of effectuating the objects envisaged by Arti- ..... cle 39(b) of the Constitution which had already been accomplished by the exercise of the option to purchase; but was only to deprive the F .;._petitioner of its legitimate entitlements under the statutory-sale. What was sought to be acquired by the impugned law, it is contended, was not the undertaking but the difference between the 'Market-price' and the 'Book-value' which the impugned legislation envisaged. It is urged that the purpose of theimpugned law is, therefore, something other __; than the effectuation of principles in Article 39(b). It is also urged that G '""\ with the exercise of the option to purchase what remained to· be acquired-and what really was sought to be acquired-was a mere actionable-claim or a chose-in-action. It is further urged that, at all events, since not all the provisions of a legislative enactment need necessarily qualify for protection of Article 31-C but only those provi- sions that have a direct nexus with the principles of Article 39(b), the H

576 SU,PREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R. ).._ A provisions in the impugned legislation touching the determination of the quantum of the "Amount" are not so protected as they are intended merely to inter-diet and extinguish the vested rights of the Tinsukhia Co. under the intended statutory-sale. The object of the legislation, it was urged, was not the legitimate one of securing the objects envisaged in Article 39(b) but a less honourable and less sanctimonious one of depriving the petitioner of the benefit of the }- statutory-contract for the sale of the undertaking pursuant to and in 1 terms of the statutory notice dated 23.5.1972. The court, so goes the ~ argument, is entitled to pierce the apparent veil under which the acquiring legislation masquerades as one for securing the object of Article 39(b ). c Dr. Shankar Ghosh and Sri G.L. Sanghi for the State of Assam and the Assam State Electricity Board, the cont~sting-Respondents, however, say that the Assam Act X, 1973, is entitled to tpe protection of Article 31-C as, indisputably, Electrical energy is a material resource of the community and any legislative measure to nationalise D the undertaking falls squarely within the ambit of Article 39(b). Any appeal by the petitioner to the doctrine of colourable legislation, they say, is wholly inapposite as, indeed, where, as here, legislative compe- tence is undisputed, any speculation as to the motives of the legislative is impermissible. No malafides could be attributed to the Legislature. Respondents further submit that on the question of even the possible E 'illusory' nature, let alone the adequacy, of the "Amount" could not be agitated if the law has the protection of Article 31-C. They, how- ever, assert that 'Book-value' is a well accepted accountancy concept ... of value and could never be characterised as illusory, even if the law did not come under Article 31-C. ,J, F The questions that arise for consideration are, sequentially, . whether the electrical-energy generated and supplied by the peti-.~ tioner-companies is a "material resource of the community" within the ' meaning of Article 39(b); whether the impugned legislation has a reasonable and direct nexus to the objective of distributing this materials resource so as to subserve the common good and what are G the appropriate tests to ascertain this nexus. The incidental questions ~ that arise on certain specific comentions centre around the effect of the option to purchase the undertaking exercised by the Assam State Electricity Board in the case ofTinsukia Co. and whether immediately upon the exercise of the option the proprietory rights respecting the undertaking of the company get transformed into a mere "actionable- H claim" or "chose in action", as contended for by the petitioners.

TINSUKHIA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH, J.) 577

-~ Apropos of the contention that, at all events, the provisions pertaining A to the "amount" could have no reasonable or direct nexus to the principles envisaged in Article 39(b), but are merely intended to extin- guish the legitimate rights of the petitioner-company to receive the price of the undertaking under the 1910 Act, as the law then stood, pursuant to the option exercised by the 'Board', it would, perhaps, be necessary to ascertain the composite-elements that make for a law of B ··( nationalisation and whether provisions touching the quantification of ~ the "amount" payable for the acquisition are not an essential ana integral part of such law.

On the contention urged by Shri Rangarajan as to what could be said to survive for consideration under Article 31(2), (as it then stood), if the law has the protection of Article 31-C the question that arises is c whether anything at all survives for consideration under Article 31. The contention indeed, runs in the teeth of several pronouncements of this Court which lay down that when Article 31-C comes-in, Articles 14, 19 and 31 (the last mentioned article as it then stood) go out. This we will consider under point (c). D

14Copy pinpoint14. It is not disputed that the electricity generated and distri- buted by the undertakings of the petitioner-companies constitute "material resources of the community" for the purpose and within the meaning of Article 39(b). E In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal -- Ltd., [ 1983] 1 SCR 1000 this Court, referring to what constitute "material resources of the community" and whether resources produced by, or at the command of, private, as distinguished from the State agencies, constitute such resources as the resources of the com- munity, noticed the contention urged in that case thus: F

" ..... The submission of Shri A.K. Sen was that neither a coal mine nor a coke oven plant owned by private parties was a 'material resources of the community'. According to the learned counsel they woud become mate- rial resources of the community only after they were G acquired by the State and not until then. In order to qualify as material resources of the community the ownership of the resources must vest in the community i.e. the State . . . . . A law providing for acquisition was not a law for distribution ...... " (P. 1022) H

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A Repelling this argument which suggested a limited concept of "Mate- J.. rial resources of the Community" the Court observed:

" ..... We are unable to appreciate the submission of Shri Sen'. The expression 'material resources of the com- munity' means all things which are capable of producing B wealth for the community. There is no warrant for inter- preting the expression in so narrow a fashion as suggested }- by Shri Sen and confine it to public-owned material~ resources, and exclude private-owned material resources.

c The expression involves no dichotomy ...... " (P. 1022 & 23)

It can, therefore, hardly be gain-said that the electrical energy - generated and distributed by the undertakings of the petitioner consti- -~ lutes "material resources of the community".

15Copy pinpoint15. This takes us to the question whether the provisions of the impugned Assam Act X 1973 have any reasonable and direct nexus to the principles in Article 39(b) of the Constitution. It is true that if such a relationship is merely remote and tenuous the protection under Arti- cle 31-C may not be available. The idea of distribution of the material resources of the community in Article 39(b) is not necessarily limited J._ to the idea of what is taken over for distribution amongst the intended beneficiaries. That is one of the modes of "distribution". Nationalisa- tion is another mode. In State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Abu Kavur Bai, AIR 1984 SC 326 this Court had occasion to refer to this aspect. It was - held:

"In other words, the word 'distribution' does not ~ F merely mean that property of one should be taken over and distributed to others like land reforms where the lands from the big landlords are taken away and given to landless --;- labourers ..... That is only one of the modes of distribu- ' tion but notthe only mode ...... "

G "By nationalising the transport as also the units the \.._ vehicles would be able to go the farthest comer of the State / and penetrate ilS deep as possible ...... "

"This would undoubtedly be a distributi0n for the common good of the people and would be clearly covered H by clause (b) of Article 39.''

TINSUKHIA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. v. STAIB [VENKATACHALIAH, ).] 579

On an examination of the scheme of the impugned law the con- A clusion becomes inescapable that the legislative measure is one of nationalisation of the undertakings and the law is eligible for and entitled to the protection of Article 31-C.

16Copy pinpoint16. It was then contended that not all the provisions of a law can and need b~ eligible for the protection of Article 31-C and that accord- B ' ingly, in the present case the provisions as to the quantification of the Ja.- "amount", which were meant to achieve an oblique motiv:e of inter- dicting and extinguishing the vested rights of the petitioner-company to receive payment in accordance with the provisions of the 1910 Act, as they then stood, should not have the. protection of Article 31-C. We are afraid this contention proceeds on an impermissible dichotomy of the components integral to the idea of nationalisation. The economic c cost of social and economic reform is, perhaps, amongst the most vexed problems of social and economic change and constitute the core element in Nationalisation. The need for constitutional immunities for such legislative efforts at social and economic change recognise the otherwise unaffordable economic burden of reforms. The observations D of Mathew J. in Keshavananda case on the point are worth recalling:

"If full compensation has to be paid, concentration of wealth in the form of immovable or movable property will be tral)sformed into concentration of wealth in the form of money and how is th.e objective underlined in Article 39(b) E and (c) achieved by the transformation? And will there be enough money in the coffers of the State to pay full compensation?"

" ..... I am unable to understand the purpose of sub- stituting the word 'amount' for the word 'compensation' in the sub-Article unless it be to deprive the Court of any yard-stick or norm for determining the adequacy of the amount and the relevancy of the principles fixed by law. I should have thought that this coupled with the express pro- vision precluding the Court from going into the adequacy of the amount fixed or determined should put it beyond any doubt that fixation of the amount or determination of the principle for fixing it is a matter for the Parliament alone and that the Court has no say in the matter." (1973 Supp. SCR 1 at page 846)

It is, therefore, not possible to divorce the economic considera- H

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

J. tions or components from the scheme of nationalisation with which the . A former are inextricably integrated. The financial cost of a scheme of nationalisation lies at its very heart and can not be isolated. Both the provisions relating to the vestiture of the undertakings in the State and those pertaining to the quantification of the "Amount" are integral and inseparable parts of the integral scheme of nationalisation and do B not admit of being considered as distinct provisions independent of '.>-- each other. .J._

17Copy pinpoint17. The memorandum of ihe writ petition contains averments as to the efficiency and public-utility of the services rendered by the undertakings and that on the date of the take-over the market va!Ue of the Tinsukhia and Dibrugarh undertakings were Rs.55 lakhs and Rs.35 C lakhs respectively and that the undertakings were discharging their obligations to the consumers efficiently and satisfactorily. The case of the petitioners is that there was no justification at all for the nationali- sation as the undertakings were efficient and fully catered to the needs of the <:onsumers. It was also averred that it was the Government and D the Board the had come in the way of the expansion envisaged by the undertakings by withholding the requisite permission for the installa- tion of additional capacity for generation of electricity. The Respon- dents have sought elaborately to traverse these grounds and to justify the measure for nationalisation.

E We are afraid, the debate whether nationalisation is by itself to be considered as fulfilling a public-purpose or whether the nationalisa- tion should be shown to be justified by the actual effectuation of the avowed objectives of such nationalisation-the choice between the pragmatic and the doctrinaire approaches-is concluded and no longer available. In Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa and Ors., AIR 1963 SC F 1047 this debate on the philosophy of nationalisation is concluded. ·rt was held:

" ..... Broadly speaking, this discussion discloses a difference in approach. To the socialist, nationalisation or State ownership is a matter of principle and its justification G is the general notion of social welfare. To the rationalist, ·),. nationalisation or State ownership is a matter of expe- diency dominated by considerations of economic efficiency and increased output of production ..... ".

" ...... The amendment made by the Legislature in H Art. 19(6) shows that according to the Legislature, a law

TINSUKHIA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 581

), relating to the creation of State monopoly should be pre- A sumed to be in the interests of the general public ...... "

" ..... In other words, the theory underlying the amendment in so far as it relates to the concept of State monopoly, does not appear to be based on the pragmatic approach, but on the doctrinaire approach which socialism B accepts ..... ".

Indeed, in the United States of America after the hey-days of the substantive due process, the Supreme Court in 1963 in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 US 726 said:

"We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the c wisdom of legislation', and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or nut of harmony with a particular school of thought' . . . . . D Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no con- cern of ours." (Emphasis Supplied)

18Copy pinpoint18. Equally untenable is the contention based on the assumption that immediately upon the exercise of the option to purchase, the proprietory-rights of the Tinsukhia Company in relation to the under- taking stood transformed into, and was crystalised in the form of, a mere actionable-claim or a "chose-in-action" and that, therefore, what was sought to be acquired. by the present legislative-measure was merely a "chose-in-action". It was contended that no pulilic purpose is achieved by the acquisition of a "chose'in-action". This needs exami- nation of the legal character and incidents of the consequences that flow from the exercise of the option to purchase under the 1910 Act. The contention presupposes that contemporaneous with the service of the notice on the licensee, the proprietory-rights of the licensee in relation to the undertaking, proprio-vigore, get transformed into a G mere "chose-in-action". This consequence does not flow from the pro: visions of 1910 Act. In Fazilka Electric Supply Company Limited v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi, [1962] Snpp. 3 SCR 496 this court, referring to the nature of the transaction emerging from the exercise of the option, said: H

582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 2 S.C.R.

"It merely provides for an option of purchase to be exercised on the expiration of certain periods agreed to between the parties, and section 10 further provides that in an appropriate case Government may even forego the option. This section does not provide for a compulsory purchase or compulsoJ'y acquisition without reference to and independently of any agreement by the licencee." (See· Page 505). (Emphasis Supplied)

In Gujarat Electricity Board v. Shanti/al, (1969) 1SCR580 refer- ring to the legal consequences that ensue by a mere exercise of the option, it was held:

" .... that the right to purchase the undertaking ~ accrues only at the expiration of the period of licence but for exercising that right, the authority must make its election within the period prescribed in sec. 7(4) and i:;sue a notice as required by that sub-section ..... " (Emphasis Supplied)

That the right, title and interest of the licensee in the under- taking does not get transferred to the Board or the State, as the case _,l may be, immediately upon the mere exercise of the option .to purchase is further clear from what is implicit in the observations of this Court in Godra Electricity Company Limited and another v. The State of Gujarat and another, (1975) 2 SCR 42 at _page 54. The proposition contended for by the Learned Additional Solicitor General in that case was noticed thus:

F "In support of the contention that when once the notice exercising the opti;m to purchase the undertaking has been served, the licensee has no further right to carry on the business, the learned Additional Solicitor General placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Kalyan Singh v. State of V.P . ....... " G This Court held that the exercise of the option would have no such effect on the licensee's right to carry on his business until the undertaking was actually taken over and paid-for. It was held:

"A licensee cannot be told that he has no right to carry on the business unless a valid purchase is made at the expiry of the period ..... "

TINSUKHIAELECfRICSUPPLYCO. v. STATE IVENKATACHALIAH, l.] 583

" ...... Admittedly, the undertaking belonged to the licencee and if delivery of the undertaking is to be taken by the State Electricity Board, the purchase price must be paid before the delivery or, there must be a provision for payment of interest on the purchase price for the period during which payment is withheld. Otherwise, the licence will not cease to have operation and the licensee will be entitled lo carry on the business." (See Page 54).

The contentions that immediately upon the exercise of the option, ipso-facto, the relationship between the parties get trans- formed into one as between a Debtor and a Creditor and that the interest of the licensee in the undertaking becomes an "actionable- right", or a "chose-in-action" and that no public-purpose could be said c to be served by the acquisition of a "chose-in-action" are all out of place in this case.

19Copy pinpoint19. It is not necessary, therefore, to go into the question whether a "chose-in action" can at all be acquired. Certain observa- D tions of this Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India and Ors., [1978] 3 SCR 334 do suggest that "chose-in-action" could also be acquired. It will also not be necessary to go into the legal concept of a "chose-in-action" in Indian law and its distinctiveness from the princi- ples in English law. E Williams on "Personal-property" refers to "chose-in-action" thus:

" ............ another important distinction exists among personal things. Such things are said to be in possession or in action; or they are called, in law French, choses in F possession or choses in action. Choses in possession are movable goods, of which their owner has actual possession and enjoyment, and which he can deliver over to another upon a gift or sale; tangible things, as cattle, clothes, furni- ture, or the like .... " G "The term choses in action appears to have been applied to things, to recover or realise which, if wrongfully withheld, an action must have been brought; things, in respect of which a man had no actual possession or enjoy- ment, but a mere right enforceable by action. The most important personal things recoverable by action only were H

584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

money due from another, !hi' benefit of a contract and ,.\_ A compensation for a wrong; and .these have always been the most prominent choses in action, though not the only things to whici>the term has been applied ..... "(see page 29 and30)

B Indeed, in English law the difficulties in the precise definition of chose-in-action arise out of the fact that the meaning attributed to the ) expression has been expanded from time to time by judicial decisions ~ and the principles pertaining to the concept did not develop on any logical or scientific basis.

W.S. Holdsworth also refers to this difficulty in apprehending c the precise incidents of the concept of a "chose-in-action":

"It is sometimes difficult to ascertain the sense in which the legislature has used the term 'chose-in-action' - we have seen that Bankruptcy Act affords one illustration, and, as we can see from the case of Edwards v. Dicard the modifications introduced by the Courts have some times occasioned a similar difficulty. Some of these difficulties might be perhaps mitigated by a codifying Act, for which there is plenty of material. But, it is probable that a branch ) of the law which comes at the meeting place of the law of property and the law of obligation can never be anything but difficult to formulate and apply." (Emphasis Supplied)

(See: "The History of the treatment of chose-in- action by the common law":- Vol. 33-Harvard Law Review 997 at 1030).

20Copy pinpoint20. Petitioners, however, placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bihar State Electricity Board v. Patna Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 1982 Cal. 74 and in particular on the following observations of the Division Bench of the High Court in G para22:

" ...... The purported acquisition of part of the debt or chose in action by Sections 2(ii) and 3 of the Bihar Act 7 of 1976 with retrospective effect is, therefore, without any public purpose. Sections 2(ii) and 3 also do not provide for payment of compensation. In the circumstances, it must be

TINSUKHIAELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH, J.I 585

.. ), held that Sections 2(ii) and 3 of the Bihar Act 7 of 1976 are ultra vires Art. 31(2) of the Constitution."

It is not necessary to consider the correctness of this pronounce- ment in view of the circumstance that even to the extent the decision goes it is distinguishable. On 5.1.1973, the Electricity Board exercised its option to purchase the undertaking. On 2.2.1974, the Board paid a B -~ sum of Rs.36,00,000 "on-account" to the licensee. On o.2.1974, posses- sion was taken. On 2.2.1974, Ordinance 50 of 1974 was promulgated ).. amending Section 7A of the 1910 Act reducing the price payable under Section 7A to the book-value of the assets. This Ordinance was re- newed by two successive ordinances No. 83 of 1974 and 123 of 1974, The last ordinance was replace by Bihar Act 15 of 1975. On 10.2.1976, the Indian 'E1ectricity (Bihar Amendment) Act 7 of 1976 was brought c '!-· Biharforce into validating the substitution of Section 6 and 7A, made by Act 15 of 1975 with retrospective effect from 2.2.1974. The Validating Act sought to affect the rights and obligations of the parties retrospectively. The High Court was .persuaded to the view that the purported acquisition, virtually, pertained to the debt or "chose-in- D action" and not the undertaking itself. It is, therefore, not necessary to consider the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent that it does not lay down the law correctly in as much as the arguments ,_)_ based on Article 31-C were neither advanced nor considered in that case. E It requires, therefore, to be held that the impugned legislation

- viz., Assam Act X, 1973, was broughtforth for securing the principles contained in Article 39(b) of the Constitution and is protected under Article 31-C. The amendment made to the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, by Assam Act IX of 1973, amending the basis for ~- quantification of the amount payable in the case of a statutory pur- F chase pursuant to the exercise of the option in terms of the licence t would apply to and govern cases of statutory-sales and would not assume any immateriality in this case as the Assam Act X of 1973 is itself-as we have held-a valid piece of legislation.

22Copy pinpoint22. We find, therefore, no substance in the contentions (a) and G -4\ (b) urged by the petitioner.

23Copy pinpoint23. Re..contention (C):,

This pertains to the question whether the principles laid down in the Act for determination of the "amount" payable for the acquisition H

586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A are so arbitrary as to render the "amount" unreal and merely illusory. ). 'This contention would not, in law, be available to the petitioners inasmuch as the law providing for the acquisition has the protection of Article 31-C of the Constitution. The arguments of Shri Soli J. Sorabjee in regard to the alleged "illusory" nature of the "amount" presupposes and proceeds on the premise that the impugned law does not have the\ protection of Article 31-C. Now that we have held that Article 31-C is attracted, the argument in regard to the alleged illusory ~ nature of the amount does not survive at all. .....

24Copy pinpoint24. Shri Rangarajan, however, contended that notwithstanding that a law has the protection of Article 31-C, the question would yet be justiciable under Article 31(2), as it then stood, if the "amount" is illusory or the principles for its determination arbitrary. To support this, somewh.at difficult, proposition Shri Rangarajan relied upon ---1' certain observations of Chandrachud, J. in the Keshavananda case; whose import and importance, according to the learned counsel, has not been fully and properly comprehended in subsequent cases. The D passages relied upon are:

" . . . . But to say that an amount does not bear reasonable relationship with the market value is a different thing from saying that it bears no such relationship at all, )-__ none whatsoever. In the later case the payment becomes E illusory and may come within the ambit of permissible challenge." (See para 2137 at page 2051 of AIR 1973).

" . . . . . Courts would have the powers to question such a law if an amount fixed thereunder is illusory; if the - principles, if any are stated, for determining the amount __ ,.l. F are wholly irrelevant for fixation of the amount; if the power of compulsory acquisition or requisition is exercised for a collateral purpose; if the law offends Constitutional ~ safeguards other than the one contained in Article 19(1)(f); or if the law is in the nature of a fraud on the Constitution". (See: para 2138 at page 2051 of AIR 1973). G 'These observations, Sri Rangarajan says, were intended to govern even a law which had the protection of Article 31-C. Shri Rangarajan also relied upon certain observati,ms of Fazal Ali, J. in State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Abu Kaur Bai AIR 1984 SC 326 which say:

H "87. Thus. so far as this aspect of the matter is con-

TINSUKHJA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH, J.l 587

cerned, two conclusions broadly emerge: A (1) that in view of the express provisions of Article 31-C which excludes Art. 31(2) also where a property is acquired in public interest for the avowed purpose of giving effect to the principles enshrined in Art. 39(b) and (c), no compensation is necessary and Art. 31(2) is out of the B harm's way, and

(2) that even if the law provides for compensation,

- the courts cannot go into the details or adequacy of the compensation and it is sufficient for the State to prove thiit the compensation was reasonable and not monstrous or illusory so as to shock the conscience of the court." c (Emphasis of counsel}

Sri Rangarajan would say that the observations emphasised would show that even if Article 31-C was attracted yet the State should show that compensation was reasonable and not illusory. D

We are afraid, these passages are quoted out of context and, if

.. .-(__ properly understood, were not intended to support .the proposition now propounded by Shri Rangarajan. Indeed in the Keshavananda case itself Chandrachud J. referring to the .effect of Article 31-C observed: E

- " ... In fact article 3 lC is a logical extension of the principles underlying article 31(4) and (6) and article 31A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The true nature and character of article 3 lC is that it identifies a class of legislation and exempts it from the operation of articles 14, 19 and 31 ........ " F (1973 supp. SCR 1at995)

Khanna J. observed in that case:

Both articles 3 lA and 3 lC deal with right to pro- perty. Article 31-A deals with certain kinds of property G and its effect is, broadly speaking, to take those kinds of . property from the persons who have rights in the said pro- perty. The objective of article 31C is to prevent concentra- tion of wealth and means of production and to ensure the distribution of ownership and control of the material ·re- sources of the community for the common good. Article H

588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A 3 lC is thus essentially an extension of the principle which ~ was accepted in article 3 lA ...... "(page 743)

Beg, J said:

"Article 3 lC has two parts. The first part is directed B at removing laws passed for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution from the vice of invalidity on the ground that any such law "is incon- sistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution." ...... the effect of invalidity for alleged violations of Arti- c cles 14 or 19 or 31 would vanish so long as the law was really meant to give effect to the principles of Article 39(b) and (c) ...... "

In State of Kamataka v. Ranganath Reddy, (1978] 1SCR641 this D Court had occasion to observe:

" ..... For the purpose of deciding the point which falls for consideration in these appeals, it will suffice to say that still the over-whelming view of the majority a/judges in Kesavandanda Bharati's case is that the amount payable for E the acquired property either fixed by the legislature or deter- mined on the basis of the principles engrafted in the law of acquisition cannot be wholly arbitrary and illusory. When • we say so we are not taking into account the effect of Article 31-C inserted in the Constitution by the 25th Amendment (leaving out the invalid part as declared by the majority)." F (p. 653) (Emphasis Supplied} -~ In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Com- ' pany Lt., [1983] 1SCR1000 this Court said:

G " ..... To accept the submission of Shri Sen that a law founded on discrimination is not entitled to the protec- ).... tion of Article 31-C, as such a law can never be said to be to further the Directive Principle affirmed in Art. 39(b}, would indeed, be, to use a hackneyed phrase, to put the cart before the horse. If the law made to further the Direc- H tive Principle is necessarily non-discriminatory or is based

TINSUKHIAELECTRICSUPPLYCO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 589

on a reasonable classification, then such law does not need A any protection such as that afforded by Art. 31-C. Such law would be valid on its own strength; with no aid from Art. 31-C~ To make it a condition precedent that a law seeking the haven of Art. 31-C must be non-discriminatory or based on reasonabfo classification is to make Art. 31-C meaningless ....... " B (p. 1019)

"We are firmly of the opinion that where Art. 31-C

- comes in Art. 14 goes out .... " (p. 1021) c What applies to Article 14 would equally apply to Article 31 (as it then stood before its deletion by the Constitution Fortysecond (Amendment) Act, 1978).

In State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Abu Kavur Bai, AIR 1984 SC 326 on which Shri Rangarajan relied, Fazal Ali J. categorily said: D

"It is manifest from a bare reading of the newly added Art. 31-C that any law effectuating the policy of the State in order to secure or comply with the directive princi- ples specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 would not be ·deemed to be void even if it is inconsistent with or violates E Articles 14, 19 or 31 ..... " - In the same case Fazal Ali J. further said: (P. 332)

" .... If, once the conditions mentioned in Article 3 lC are F fulfilled by the law, no question of compensation arises because the said Article expressly excludes not only Articles 14, and 19 but also Ji which, by virtue of the 25th amend- ment, had replaced the word 'amount' for the word 'com- pensation' in Article 31(2) ..... " (p. 334) G (Emphasis supplied)

Sri Rangarajan cannot, therefore, draw any sustenance from Fazal Ali J. for his argument.

Sri Rangarajan then placed reliance on the following observa- H

590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

lions of Krishna Iyer J. in Gwalior Rayon v. UOI, [1974] SCR 1671. A " . . . . the legislature is expected except in excep- tional socio-historical setting, to provide just payment for the deprived persons. To exclude judicial review is not to block out the beneficient provisions of Articles 14, 19 and B 31." (p. 695)

But we see nothing in these observations which can lend support

c to justiciability of an alleged violation of Article 31 by a law protecteo under Article 31-C. Ideally, perhaps, it may not be just to deprive a recompence that is just and fair, in all cases. But that is not to say that even under a law which has the protection of 31-A or 31-C, the adequ- - acy, or justness or fairness of the compensation would, yet, be --+ justiciable.

The contention of Shri Rangarajan in our opinion, is wholly D unsupportable. Indeed, the purpose of Article 31-C is, amongst others, to exclude Article 31, as it then stood. The effect of accepting Sri Rangarajan's contention would be to let in Article 31 by the back- door, frustrating the very object of Article 31-C and to unsettle the law laid down in a series of authoritative ptonouncements of this Court. )..... The contention really, is not available to the petitioners at all. E

26Copy pinpoint26. Even if the impugned law did not have the protection of Article 31-C, a hypothesis on which contention (c) is based, the adequ- acy or inadequacy of the amount is not justiciable. The limitations of the courts' scrutiny explicit in Article 31(2), are referred to by Mathew J. in the Keshavananda case: F " . . . . the word 'amount' conveys no idea of any norm. It supplies no yard-stick. It furnishes no measuring rod. The neutral word 'amount' was deliberately chosen for the purpose. I am unable to understand the purpose in substituting the word 'amount' for the word 'compensation' G in the sub-article unless it be to deprive the Court of any yard stick or norm for determining the adequacy of the amount and the relevancy of the principles fixed by law ,, (para 1765)

H Referring to what might, yet, be open to judicial scrutiny, under

TINSUKHIA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. v. STATE IVENKATACHALIAH, J.I 591

.J.-.. Article 31(b), Shela! and Grower, JJ observed in the Keshavananda A case:

"But still on the learned Solicitor General's argument, the right to receive the amount continues to be a fundamental right. That cannot be denuded of its identity. The obligation to act on some principle while fixing the B amount arises both from Article 31(2) and from the nature of the legislative power for, there can be no power which permits in a democratic system an arbitrary use of power."

- "But the norm or the principle of fixing or determin- ing the 'amount' will have to be disclosed to the Court. It will have to be satisfied that the 'amount' has reasonable c +- relationship with the value of the property acquired or re- quisitioned and one or more of the relevant principles have been applied and further that the 'amount' is neither illus- ory nor it has been fixed arbitrarily, nor at such a figure that it means virtual deprivation of the right under Article D 31(2). The question of adequacy or inadequacy, however, cannot be gone into."

, .J.. Justice Chandrachud observed:

"The specific obligation to pay an 'amount' and in the E

- alternative the use of the word 'principles' for determina- tion of that amount must mean that the amount fixed or determined to be paid cannot be illusory. If the right to .property still finds a place in the Constitution, you cannot mock at the man and ridicule his right. You cannot tell him: 'I will take your fortune for a farthing'." F

27Copy pinpoint27. All the same, the concept of "Book-Value" is an accepted accountancy concept of value. It cannot be held to be illusory.

In Eswari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR 331 ' at page 359 it has been held that even the concept of "written down G --1 value" which is more disadvantageous to the owner than the "Book- value" is not irrelevant:

" . . . . . . . . This Court has in. terms accepted that payment of compensation on the basis of written down value calculated according to the income-tax law for used H

592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

machinery is not irrelevant as a· principle for determining A compensation. That principle appears to have been -adopted for valuing used machinery though the legislation fixes compensation payable to each undertaking in round sum ... ,".

28Copy pinpoint28. Accordingly, even if the impugned law had no protection of Article 31-C and tests appropriate to and available are applied, in the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the principles en- visaged in the impugned law lead to an "amount" which can be called unreal or illusory. Contention (c) is accordingly held and answered against the petitioners. - c 29. Re: Contention (d):

This point is again, available only if the impugned law is outside Article 31-C. The contention that "Service Lines" which are expressly excluded from the valuation do constitute the property of the licensee and their exclusion from valuation would make the principles for determination of the 'amount' arbitrary does not have much to com- mend it. Learned-counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the definition of 'works' in Section 2(n) of the 1910 Act and on the pro- - nouncement of this Court in Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, [1972] 1 SCR 159. The question in that case was whether in the computation of net wealth of the licensee, the "Service-lines" should be included. That was a converse case where the licensee relying upon the statutory provisions of the Electricity Act contended that "Service-lines" were not a part of his wealth. This - Court negatived that contention for purposes of assessment to wealth- tax. Learned counsel placed some store by this pronouncement to contend that the exclusion of this 'wealth' from valuation is arbitrary.

But, in our opinion, the pronouncement relied upon does not advance petitioners' case on the point. While it is true that the expres- sion 'works' in Section 2(n) of the 1910 Act includes 'Service-lines', the reason why 'Service-lines' could justifiably be excluded from valuation for purposes of determination of the 'amount' is indicated in page 166 }- of the report:

"It is true that in view of Sec. 7(A)(2) of the Electri- city Act, in computing the market value of the undertaking sold under sub-section ( 1) of section 5 of that Act the value of service lines which had been constructed at the expense

TINSUKHIA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 593

of the consumers will not be taken into consideration. The A reason for this provision is obvious. It will be the duty of the new licensee to not only maintain and repair those lines but also to replace them when they become unservice able."

Under the law when a requisition is made by an intending- B consumer for electrical-energy, the licensee has an obligation tci lay down Service-lines. But, according to the provisions the entire cost of

- service-line is not required to be borne by the licensee. The licensee is entitled to call upon the consumer to pay part of the cost of service- line-which may in a given case amount to a substantial part-in accordance with the provisions in the Schedule to the Electricity Supply Act. c Oealing with a similar prov1S1on the Gujarat High Court in Dakor-Umreth Electricity Company Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, ( 13 Gujarat Law Reporter 88 at page 106) held:

" ...... The question is whether the exclusion of such service lines from the valuation can be said to have rendered the principle of compensation irrelevant or in- appropriate. We do not think so ....... The petitioner is not constituted the owner of these service lines for all purposes. More-over, even after the purchase, these E

- service lines would continue to be utilised for supplying electrical energy to the consumers who paid for them. It would be most inequitable in these circumstances to pro- vide for payment of compensation to the petitioner for these service lines. There is no reason in logic or principle why the petitioner should be allowed to make unjust and undeserved profit from transfer of these service lines for which it has paid nothing and which are not the product of its own labour ..... "

This reasoning, if we may say so with respect, is sound and should ·--' be accepted. Contention (d) is, therefore, insubstantial and is answered against the petitioners.

30Copy pinpoint30. Re: Contention (e):

The apprehensions of the petitioners on this point is that while under Section 9(1)(i) of the impugned Act X of 1973, Government H

594 ~UPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A would be entitled to deduct from the 'amount' such sums as remain in the "Tariffs and Devidend Control Reserve"; "Continency-Reserve" and the "Development Reserve", in so far as such amounts have not been paid over by the licensees to the Government, the provision, however, does not take into account and provide for cases where such reserves are invested in 'fixed assets' and as such "fiRed assets" vest in B the Government under the Acquisition. There would, <herefore, it is urged be, a duplication of the liability of the licensee on this score, in the sense that while the "Reserves" in the form of fixed-assets vest in the Government, the licensee is still exposed to the liability for the deduction of the amount shown in the accounts. Section 9(1)(i) provides.: - c "Deductions from the Gross amount: The Govern- ment shall be entitled to deduct the following sums from the gross amount payable under this Act to the licensee.

(a) D (to) (h) Omitted as unnecessary

(i) The amounts remaining in tariffs and dividends control reserve, contingencies reserve and development re- serve, in so far as such amounts have not been paid over by. E licensee to the Government;

(j) (k) Omitted as unnecessary - On a reasonable construction, the expressions 'amounts remain- _j.. F ing' and 'in so far as such amounts have not been paid over' necessarily exclude any such duplication of the accountability of the licensee for ~ these 'Reserves'. If any part of the reserves is invested in "fixed assets" and the reserves in the form of such "fixed assets" are taken- over by the Government pursuant to the acquisition, what remains to be accounted for by the licensee is only the 'amounts remaining' in the G pertinent accounts. The liability of the licensee for deduction of the ~ 'Reserves' from the 'amount' would arise only if the balance remaining in those accounts are not paid. Indeed, Dr. Shankar Ghosh, learned counsel for the State of Assam, submitted that this is the correct interpretation to be placed on Section 9(1)(i) of the Act. With this construction of the provision, the contention of the petitioner- H company on this point, does not survive.

TINSUKHIAELECTRICSUPPLYCO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH,l.] 595

31Copy pinpoint31. The other contention raised under this point is that the pro- A ""' perty of the licensees represented by the unexpired portion of the licence has not been taken into account in computing the amount payable for the acquisition. As already indicated, the law having the protection of Article 31C the contention is not available at all.

Section 7(3) of the impugned Act provides: B .;>{ ' ~ "In the case of an undertaking which vests in the Government under this Act, the licence granted to it

- under Part II of the Electricity Act shall be deemed to have been terminated on the vesting date and all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the licensee under any agree- ment to supply electricity entered into before that date c + shall devolve or shall be deemed to have devolved on the Government:

Provided that where any such agreement is not in conformity with the rates and conditions of supply appro- D ved by the Government and in force on the vesting date, the agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Government." _l,_. This provision is a part of a scheme of nationalisation and is protected by Article 3 lC. E

- 32. Contention (e) is accordingly held and answered against the petitioners.

33Copy pinpoint33. Re: Contention (f): , ·~ F This contention pertains to the liability of the licensee under 'f· Section 11(3) of the Act in respect of the amounts payable to emp- loyees retrenched by the. Government or the 'Board' as the case may be, within one year from the vesting-dare after the take-over. Section 11(3) provides that if the Board or the Government, as the case may be, retrenches any employee within a period of one year from the G .-.1, vesting-date, the liability for the amounts payable to the retrenched employee shall be deducted from the 'amount'. This provision, it is contended, imposes a liability which is arbitrary. Dr. Shankar Ghosh submitted that this point is purely academic inasmuch as there has been no such case of retrenchment. Dr. Ghosh further submitted that the provision is not unreasonable because in the case of employees so H

596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A retrenched, the amounts payable would substantially relate to the '~ period during which the employment subsisted under the licensee and that it is not unreasonable to take this circumstances into account in continuing the licensee's liability which would, even otherwise, be substantially be that of the.licensee. On a consideration of the matter, we are inclined to the view-even if this question is justiciable-that B the provision is not unreasonable or arbitrary as it envisages the con- )ic tinuance of a liability which was, otherwise, substantially that of the , licensee. There is no merit in this contention (f) either. ~

34Copy pinpoint34. Re: Contention (g):

The grievance of the petitioners on this aspect, we are afraid, - c proceeds on a total misconception of the effect of the statutory provi- sions. The contention, in substance, is that while certain liabilities of -+ the licensee arising out of its Quondam business-operations are not expressly taken-over by the Government and are declared to be ,he subsisting and continuing liabilities of the licensee, however, Section D 9(7) authorises the deduction of some of those very liabilities from the 'amount' without a corresponding statutory obligation on the part of the Government, in turn, to pay the same to the creditors on whose account and for whose benefit the deductions are made and without providing an express statutory discharge to the petitioners in that behalf. E There is no substance in this contention. The legislative intention is plain and manifest. Though some of the liabilities arising out of the conduct of the licensees' business prior to vesting are not taken over by - Government, some of those liabilities are, yet, authorised to be deducted from the amount. The purpose of this provision is too obvi- .Ji- F ous to require any statutory declaration of the obligations that arise in Jaw and are attendant upon these sums coming to the hands of and ~ retained by the Government. Quite obviously, the provision is not ' . intended for an unjust enrichment in the hands of Government. The purpose is obviously to facilitate· recovery of certain types of debts owing to public institutions etc., and the deduction is for the benefit of those creditor-institutions. Government would, plainly, be under a ~ legal obligation to pay the sums. so deducted to the concerned • creditors. The provisions of the Statute must be read along, and in consonance, with the general principles of law which import such obli- gations on the part of the Government and an implied corresponding discharge to the petitioners to the extent of such deductions in their liabilities. There is a resulting, statutory-trust in the hands of the Gov-

TINSUKHIA ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH, J.I 597

ernment to pay the sums so deducted to the respective creditors, even in the absence of express provisions in this behalf in the Statute the general principles of law operate. As a matter of construction it re- quires to be held that these obligations and consequences follow. There is really no justifiable grievance on this score. Contention (g) is, accordingly, held and answered against the petitioners. B

35Copy pinpoint35. Re: Contentions (h) and (i):

··~ These two contentions pertain to the machinery envisaged by and set up under the impugned law for 'resolution of disputes on ques- tions essential for the determination of the amount in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The contention of the petitioners, in sub- c + stance, is that there is.no machinery set up under the Act to determine the amounts under Section 9(c), (d) and (e) and to assess the loss referred to in Section 8.

The other contention on the point is that the arbitration clause is a limited one and is confined only to d\sputes in four areas specifically enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act.

Tues~ lacunae in the Statute, it is contended, render-the scheme of the Act for the determination of the 'Amount' unreasonable and the

- scheme of the 'Act' in relation to the determination of the 'Gross E Amount', the deductions to be made therefrom and the assessment of the 'amount' payable for the acquisition, unworkable.

36Copy pinpoint36. The Courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a Statute to a futility. The provision of a Statute must be so c@nstrued as to make it effective and operative, on the principle \ F "ut res majis valeat quam periat". It is, no doubt, true that if a Statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the Statute could be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial-review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreason- ableness under Article 14; but what a Court of construction, dealing with the language of a Statute, does in order to ascertain from, and. G accord to, the Statute the meaning and purpose which the legislature intended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co., [1904] 2 Ch. 352 Farwell J. said:

"Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find H

598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

some meaning and not to declare them void for uncer- A tainty." (See page 360 and 361)

In Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham Country Council, [1960] 3 All ER 503 Lord Denning approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said:

B "But when a Statute has some meaning, even though f- it is obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to t choose between them, the Courts have to say what mean-·~ ing the Statute to bear rather than reject it as a nullity." >- (Vi de page 516)

It is, therefore, the Court's duty to make what it can of the c Statute, knowing that the Statutes are meant to be operative and not inept and that nothing short of impossibility should allow a Court to + declare a Statute unworkable. In Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commis- sioner, [1926] AC 37 Lord Dunedin said:

D "A Statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by il, Court should be to secure that object, unless crucial· omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable." (vide page 52)

37Copy pinpoint37. On consideration of the Statute on hand, it is not possible to subscribe to the view that the impugned law has not envisaged any machinery for the due ascertainment of the sums referred to in clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Section 9 which require, on such ascertainment and quantification, to be deducted from the gross amount. Section 10 en joins upon the Government to appoint a person having adequate - knowledge and experience in matters reling to accounts "to assess the net amount payable under this Act by the Government to the licensee after making the deductions mentioned in Sectfon 9". Sub-Section (2) of Section 10 provides that the Special Officer may call for the assis- tance of such Officer and staff of the Government or the Board or the undertaking as he may deem fit "in assessing the net amount payable". These provisions, contemplate the determination by the Special G Officer, who is constituted as a statutory authority under the Act, of .;.,.. the net amount payable. The functions of the Special Officer include an examination of the correctness of all the determinations made by the Government in the matter of the deductions, except where Government is statutorily specially constituted as an appellate autho- rity in respect of certain matters under the Act. H The Proviso to Sections 8 and 9 envisages prior notice to be

TINSUKHIAELECfRICSUPPLYCO. v. STATE [VENKATACHALIAH,J.] 599

_,J issued to the licensee by the Government to show cause against any A deduction proposed to be made under Section 8 or 9, as the case may be, within the period specified in the Provisos. Even after the Govern- ment so makes such determination of the amounts which, according to it, are deductible from the gross amount, such determination would not be final. The assessment of the net amount payable to the licensee will have to be made by the "Special Officer". It is reasonable to B .). construe that the decision of the Government both under Sections 8 \, and 9 arrived at, even after giving an opportunity to the licensee of ).being heard, would not be final, but the final determination will have to be made by the "Special-Officer" appointed under Section 10 of the Act. Section 10(1) and (2) of the Act must be so construed as to enable the "Special-Officer" to take into account the determinations respect- ing the deduction under Section 9 and 10 of the Act made by the c + Government and take a decision of his own in the matter. The power to "assess" the net amount by necessary implication takes within its sweep the power to examine the validity of the determination made by the Government in the matter of deductions from the gross amount. This power to determine and assess the 'net-amount' payable by neces- D sary implication cover matters envisaged in Sections 8 and 9. Though only Section 9 is specifically referred to in sub-section (1) of section 10, the language of sub-section. (1) and (2) which enable the Special ' Officer to "assess" the net ar~ount payale would, by necessary impli- _,.,(,_ cation, attract the power to decide as to the validity and correctness of the deduction to be made under Section 8 as well. So construed, the provisions of Section 10 would furnish a reasonably adequate machin- ery for the assessment of the "net-amount" payable to licensee.

38Copy pinpoint38. So far as Arbitration is concerned, even after the decision of the "Special-Officer", there is the further Arbitral forum to decide ...l.. disputes in respect of the specific areas in which disputes are rendered arbitrable under Section 20. + In view of these circumstances, we think the grievance of the petitioners on these points questions are not substantial. The points (h) and (i) are also, accordingly, held and answered against the petitioners. G

39Copy pinpoint39. In the result, for the foregoing reasons all the contentions urged by the petitioners in support of their challenge to the impugned legislations fail. The Writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. H G.N. Petitions dismissed.