MAHARAJA PILLAI LAKSHMI AMMAL v. MAHARAJA PILLAI TRILLANAYAKOM PILLAI AND ANOTHER

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by special leave has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated February 7, 1983 passed by the High Court of Kerala in Second Appeal No. 763 of

1970. F \ Under the family partition deed Ex. D 1 executed on August 2, 1950, the properties under 'A' schedule were allotted to Maharaja Pillai and after his death his widow was given the right to take the income therefrom. One of the sons of Maharaja Pillai filed a suit claiming his right to take 1/3rd share in those properties. The trial court G while construing the terms of Ex. D 1 held that the widow got absolute right over 'A' schedule under section 14( 1) of the Hindu Succession -.(, Act. The appellate court, however, took a different view. The appel- late court held that: the widow could get only a restricted right under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Upon further appeal, the High Court agreed with the view taken by the appellate court. The H

782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] 1 S.C ..R.

A High Court, hoWever, granted a smill share to the widow stating that ~ according to law in force in the erstwhile Travancore State, the widow would have inherited the share which would have fallen to any.of the sons.

The question for our consideration is whether the widow got B absolute right or only a restricted right over the 'A' schedule after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. The answer to the question turns upon the scope and meaning to be given to the terms of -f-.. Ex. D 1, the relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:

" •.• 3. As it was decided by us to partition our family .porperties providing .to mamtain Kothamachiyar Ammal, c .who is thew.ife of executant No. 1 and mother of others. and · \ the aforesaid Lakshmi Ammal, this partition deed is written ·with the stipulation mentioned below and it is fully agreed· by us to abide by the provisions contained herein •

.. .D xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (

9. During the life time of the 1st executant as and when the marriage of the· said Lakshmi Ammal is decided to be con- ducted tlie first executant himself shall meet the expense in oonnection with that and conduct her marriage and if her E marriage happened to be conducted after the death of 1st exeeutant;executants Nos. 2 and 3 shall have right to en- cumber the 'A' schedule property for an amount up to · Rs.2,000 to meet the expenses for marriage ceremonies and. for.dowry and gold ornaments and the A schedule proper- · ties shall be liable· for so much amount. 10. Kothamachi- kyar Ammal, ·the wife of first executant and mother of . · other executants may reside in the buildin.g included in the--Y • A Schedule during her life time and take the income of the . ) · properties included in the A schedule after the death of the 1st executant; after the death of the 1st executant the ·successor-in-interest of the 1st executant shall have no right G ! '; to create any document, except in the manner stated in paragraphs 9 above encumbering A schedule properties so as not to affect the right of enjoyment of the ,said person · but this provision will not be binding on the 1st executant as regards his absolute right over. the A schedule properties. H.

MAHARAJA PILLAI v. M.P. THILLANAYAKOM (SHETTY, J.] 783

-f" The first executant referred to above was Maharaja Pillai. The widow we are concerned was his wife. On August 31, 1955 Maharaja A Pillai died. There-a.fter 'A' schedule items in the partition deed were being en joyed by the widow. While she was in possession of those properties the Hindu Succession Act of...1956 came into force. Subse- quently, the widow had gifted those properties in favour of her daugh- ter. The case of the plaintiff was that after the death of Majaraja Pillai, B the said properties would devolve upon his heirs and he would be entitled to !/3rd share. It has been urged by Mr. Vishwanath Iyer, learned counsel for the respondents that the properties in A schedule . would remain in possession of the widow with the right to utilise the income therefrom for her maintenance but the properties were not ( given to her in lieu of maintenance. It was also urged that Maharaja ~ Pillai had abwlute power of disposal over the properties durii\g his life C ·- time, and it would be therefore not proper to hold that the widow got the properties in lieu of her maintenance.

We are unable to agree with these contentions. It is not neces- sary for us to examine what would have happened to the rights of the wife if Maharaja Pillai had disposed of the 'A' schedule. The fact remains that he did not. During the life time of Maharaja Pillai, the wife was residing in the house allotted to her husband. She was being maintained by her husband. After the death of husband, she was in J exclusive possession of the 'A' schedule. She was taking the income from those properties. She had a right to utilise that income for her maintenance. That right was conferred on her under Ex. D 1. The children alw were allotted separate properties under Ex. D 1. They r had taken their respective shares from the family properties. In our opinion the properties possessed by the widow fairly and squarely fall under Section 14( 1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 14 provides: F "1. Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation-In this sub-section, "Property" includes G both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription or any other manner what so H

p. 784

ever, and also any such property held by her as stridhan ~ A immediately before the commencement of this Act. ·

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired.by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a degree or order of a civil court B or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument Or the, decree, order or award prescribe "a ~ .restricted state in such property."

The property possessed by a female referred to under Section 14(1f includes property both movable and immovable, property. It C may be acquired by a female Hindu by iJlheritance or devise or at a \ partition or in lieu of maintenance or ~ears of mai~ten~ce etc. The _,A_ deed or any other arrangement by which the husband gives the pro- · · · perty to his wife for maintenance need not specifically state that it is given in lieu of maintenance. It is not an act of charity the husband does. It is out of his personal obligation to maintain her. The right to D maintenance of a Hindu woman is a personal obligation of the husband. If, therefore, the wife is put in exclusive possession·of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenanc~. it must be presumed that the property is given to her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance which is inher~nt in her; is itself sufficient to enable the ripening of possession of any property into full \..._ E ownership under Section 14( 1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

It was, however, urged for the respondents that Section 14( 1) does not take within its fold every property that comes into possessio:: , of the widow. It must be a limited estate in the sense of ownership . without the right of disposal. It should be a specific property given to F her in lieu of her rightto maintenance.

Similar contentions have been considered and rejected in a ) recent decision of this Court in Gu/want Kaur & Anr. v. Mohinder Singh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. lU of 1980 date 20.7.87 (to which one of us was a party, K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. ). There it was observed: G "It is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restric- tion no limitation on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner property possessed by her so long as her )t: I • ·possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if .~he has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether 1-i the property is acquired by inheritance or device or at a

MAHARAJA PILLAI v. M.P. THILLANAYAKOM [SHETIY, J.] 785

-( partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of mainte- A nance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by pruch- ase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before she can claim full ownership under Section 14( 1) in respect of property given B to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to en- able the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of m:lintenance. Sub- section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situation where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a c decree of court and not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedents right."

It was urged that the view taken in above case was contrary to the decision in Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., [1979) 3 SCR D

291. We do not agree with this contention also. Indeed a similar con- tention was urged in Gu/want Kaur's case and it was rejected by observing: - ... "We do not understand that court as laying down that what E was enlarged by sub-section 1 of Section 14 into a full estate was the Hindu women's estate known to Hindu law. When the Court uses the word limited estate, the words are used to connote a right in the property to which the possession of the female Hindu may be ligitimately traced, but which is not a full right of ownership. If a female Hindu is put in F \ pmsession of property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance, it cannot be denied that she has acquired a limited right or interest in .the property and once that position is accepted it follows that the right gets en- larged to full ownership under Sec. 14( 1) of the Act. That seems to us to follow clearly from the language of Sec. G 14(1) of the Act."

~ Bai Vijia's case, has not laid down any different principle. It has expressly accepted the view taken in V. Tulsamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1977) 3 SCR 261 at 310 this Court summarised the scope of Section 14 as follows: H

p. 786

"(l) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual r~•·•ionship between the husband and the. wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurist starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to +_ property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property the female h2.s the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the mainte· nance of a female the said right becomes a legally enforce· - \ c able one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not con· fer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre· 1 • existing rights. D f (2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible term and must be liberally construed in favour of the female so as to advance the object of 1956 Act and promote the socio economic ends sought to be achieved by this long need legislation . E . (3) Sub-section (2) of S. 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of S. 14( 1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by S. 14( 1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. xxx xxx . .. . xxx . xxx· xxxT In the ins~ant ~s; the prope~y under A Schedule was allotted against the share of Maharaja Pillai. The same property was given to the possession of the widow with a right to tllke the income for her maintenance. This is sufficient to call into aid Section 14(1} of the G · Hindu Succession Act.

In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of ·• .· . High Court and also the lower appellate court and restore that c . · "'t:~: trial court. · ~ ·~ '.?"'?

S.L.