S. SUNDARAM PILLAI, ETC. v. V.R. PATTABIRAMAN ETC.

(I) Indian Appeals, Vol. xxxr, p. 195. H

682 SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [ 1985] 2 s.c.R.. A with respect. If in c1~es where there are genuine and bona fide reasons for failure or non-payment of rent which cannot be excused after two months' notice to pay rent, then other causes which lead to inference of wilful default cannot also be construed as 'wilful default' in the context of the Explanation. The legislature has B provided an absolute and clear definition of 'wilful default'. Other circumstances cannot be considered as wilful default.

[n my opinion, the expression "shall be construed" would have the effect of providing a definition of wilful default in the c proviso to sub-section (2) of section 10.

If a definition is provided of an expression, then the Courts are not free to construe the expression otherwise unless it is so warranted by the use of the expression such as "except otherwise provided or except if the context otherwise indicates". There is no such expression in the instant case. There may be in certain circumstances intrinsic evidence indicating otherwise. Here there is none.

The whole scheme of section 10 is that in order to be entitled to eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, the ingredients of which the Controller must be satisfied are ; (a) default; (b) default was wilful. Whether in a particular case default is wilful or not, must be considered in accordance with the definition provided in the Explana- tion to Proviso to sub-section (2) of section I 0 of the Act. If it was intended that the Courts would be free to judge whether in a particu- lar set up of facts, the default was wilful or not where no notice has been given, then in such a case there was no necessity of adding this Explanation to the Proviso which is a step to the making of the findings under clause (I of sub-section (2) of section 10 ofthe Act. It is well-settled that the Legislature does not act without purpose or in futility.

It was contended on behalf of the landlords that the Legislature has not used the expression default to pay or tender rent shall be construed as wilful only if the defauit by the tenant in the payment or tender of rent continues after the issue of two months' notice by the landlord claiming the rent. It is true that legislature has not chosen to use language to indicate that in no other cases, the default could be considered to be wilful except one case which has been indicated in the Explanation. ,H

s. s. PILLAI v. V, R. PATfABIR~\IA'I cs. Mu'cha,ji, J.) 683 As I read the E~plan1tion it is not 30 necessary because Legis- A lature has defined 'wilful default' by the expression that 'default to pay or tender rent shall be construed' meaning thereby that it will mean only this and no other. My learned brethren have given instances of difficulties and hardships, if the other defaults, that is to say, default apart from tenant not paying after the expiry of notice by the landlord are not considered as wilful default. B ft is true that there may be hardships and many problems might arise. I share the apprehension of these problems and hard- ships but I find no justification to read that these hardships of which Legislature must have been aware, were also intended to be covered by the Explanation. It appears to me that the meaning is clear about the purpose of introduction of the Explanation, i.e., to obviate the c difficulties and divergence of judicial opinions depending upon vary- ing circumstances, the legislature has provided a uniform definition to the concept of 'wilful default'. It is true that where two construc- tions are possible, one which avoids anomalies and creates reasonable results should be preferred but where the language is clear and where there is a purpose that can be understood and appreciated for construing in one particular manner, that is to say, avoidance of D divergence of judicial opinions in construing wilful default and thereby avoiding anomalies for different tenants, one judge taking a particular view on the same set of facts, another judge taking a different view on the same set of facts, in my opinion, it would not be proper in such a situation to say that this definition of wilful default was only illustrative and not exhaustive. I cannot construe the expression used in the Explanation to the Proviso to sub-section (2) of section 10 as illustrative when the Legislature has chosen to use the expression "shall be construed". It has been observed that statutory provisions must be so construed, if it is possible, that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. Where the plain and literal interpretation of a statutory provision provisio produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result, F the Court might modify the language used by the legislature or even do some violence to it so as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce rational construction and just results. (See v. in this connection the observations in the case of Bhag Mal Vs. G Ch. Prabhu Ram and Others (Civil Appeal No. :451 (NCE) of 1984). Lord Denning in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd v. Asher(') has observed : "If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this

1. [1949] 2 All E.R. 155 a 164 (CA). H

684 si:JPREME COURT REPORTS [19851 2 s.c.R.. A ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened i out ? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must .• not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases."

B Ironing out the creases is possible but not re-writing the langu- age to serve a notion of public policy held by the judges. Legislature .i must have legislated for a purpose by Act 23 of 1973 and used the {' expression "shall be construed" in Explanation in the manner it did.

c The fact that in interpreting the statntory language, judges should avoid policy as an approach was emphasised by Lord Scarman in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Regina v. Barnet London Borough Council Exparte Ni/ish Shah.(') User of policy in interpretation of statutory language, Lord Scarman observed, was D an impermissible approach to the i.nterpretation of statutory language. Judges should not interpret statutes in the light of their own views as to policy. They may, of course, adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament's purpose or policy.

E In the case of Carrington and Others v. Therm-a-Stor-Ltd,(') the Master of the Rolls observed that "If regard is had solely to the apparent mischief and the need for a remedy, it is only too easy for a judge to persuade himself that Parliament must have intended to provide the remedy which he would himself have decreed if he bad legislative power. In fact Parliament may not have taken the same view of what is a mischief, may have decided as a matter of policy not to legislate for a legal remedy or may simply have failed to realise that the situation could ever arise. This is not to say that statutes are to be construed in blinkers or with narrow and legalistic literalness, but only that effect should given to the intentions of Parliament as expressed in the statute, applying the normal canons of construction for resolving ambiguities or any lack or clarity."

I. 1983 (2) Weekly Law Reports, 16 at 30.

2. 1983 (I) Weekly Law Reports 138 at 14l.

s. s. PILLAI V, v. R. PATTABIRAMAN cs. Mukharji J.) 685 'A Tn the aforesaid view of the matter, I would construe the • ->, expression 'wilful defavlt' in the Explanation to Proviso to sub- "" section (2) of section IO of the Act in the manner I have indicated. In that view of the matter, I would decide the appeals accordingly, that is to say, I would agree with my learned brethren in the order passed in those cases where eviction orders have been passed after B two months' notice had been given and there was continuance of default by the tenant thereof. Appeals which have been disposed of on the basis of wilful default as understood in the m1nner indicated in the aforesaid observations of mine, l respectfully agree. Appeals which have been disposed of on wilful default other than in the manner l have indicated hereinbefore, I respectfully differ. The individual appeals are diiposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. c

M.L.A. Appeals dfrmissed.