BABULAL NAGAR AND ORS. v. SHREE SYNTHETICS LTD. & ORS. •

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E DesAT, J. Nothing appears more well settled than that the extraordinary ju~~diction under Art. 226 conferred on the High · Court was a -.veapon forged to overreach injustice and secure and · advance justice. When therefore, this extraordinary power is. used to defeat justice and to· promote technicality not only its raison d'etre is violated but. it becomes a handy instrument for those to F whoni litigation cost is a luxury enjoyed at the cost of· others and employed to- exhaust and harass an unequal opponent. Sad as it may appear that unfortunate situation emerges in this appeal. ) The first respondent-Shree Synthetics Ltd. ('respond~nt' for short) appears to be a company governed by the Companies Act, G

1956. It has.set up a factory at Ujjain where it manufactures. poly- • ester fibre. 'Appellants in eacli of these ·appeals were the wdtkmen of the respondent. Th.ere is a trade union of the workmen e)llployed , by the respondent of which at the relevant time three· out of the five appellants in this group of_appeals'wer~ office bearers. Babula! H Nagar was the President of the Union : Babula! Jaiswalwas the General Secretary and Ramesh C~andra was the Secretary.

776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984J 3 S.C.R. ;1 A According to the respondents on June 3, 1975 around 11.10 P. M one Verma a workman of the respondent on the shift being. over· Wdnt,out. of the compound gate-and took his seat in a tempo when Babula! Nagar a_Tld Babula! Jaisw'al along with three other. appellants approached him and asked Verm1 to alight from the B tempo as they wanted to talk to him .. On Venm's disinclination to come ou~ of the vehicle, it was all>ged that Babula! Nagar and

-~ Babula! Jaiswal pulled Verma out of the vehicle and all the appel- lants. assaultod him ·with fists and kicks and felled him down as a result of which Verma sustained .bleeding injuries on his head. On hearing the commotion, ·sta!T of the security department. intervened. c and rescued him. ·

Setting out these allegations a charge-sheet was drawn-up .and served on the five appellants followed by a composite cjomestic enquiry at the end of which all of them were dismi&sed frpm service.

D The ·appellants moved five different .applications before th.e Labour Co trt questioning the validity of the domestic efiquiry held againat them as also tlie]egality and propriety of the orders terminat- ing their services. The Labour Court .was of -the opinion that the domestic enquiry was held according to the relevant ru \es and as there was evidence in support of the alleged m!sconduct the manage,, • E mentwas justified in imposin'g the penalty of dismissal from service

, and accordingly all the five applications· were dismissed.

The appellants filed five separate revision petitions before the Industrial Court under Secs, 66 and 67 of the Madhya Pradesh F Industrial Relations Act, J 950.('Act' for short). All the five revi- sion petitions were he1rd by the President of the Industrial Court at Indore who. was q{ the opinion that the entire approach of the inquiry officer-Manager-in arriving·at the findings of misconduct ·in his enquiry. appear to be biased aµd unfair and that the conclusions are neither fair nor reasonable and as such the dismissal cannot be sustained on the basis thereof. Accordingly he, by, a common judg- • ment dated Febrnary 26, 1979, allowed all the revision petitions and set '!lside the orders of the Labour Court dismissing the applications and n;manded the matters.to the Labour Court for a fresh. decision after giving both the parties due opportunity to adduce evidence in respect of the alleged misconduct. · ll The respondent moved five separate misc, petitions in.the Hi~h

'r . DABULAC v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.)

Court of Madhya Pradesh," Jabalpur at Indore under Arts. 226 and A • 227 of the Constitution questioning the correctness of the decision of the Industrial Court. A Division Bench of the High Court he .Id that the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering 'with the findings of facts and this was in error apparent on the face of the award. Accordingly, it issued a writ of certiorari and quashe_d the decision of the Industrial Court. Hence these five civil appeals B

- by special leave. ·

Conditions of service in respect of the cniployees employed by the respondent are governed by the Certified Standing Orders. s. ·o. 12 (f) which was relied upon by the· respondent for imputing mis- ' r. · conduct to the appellants reads as·under : · C

"12. Disciplinary action for !llisconduct (1) The folio- . wing ~ts or omissions on tM ·part of an employee shall amount to a major misconduct : D (a) to (el xx xx xx

xx xx xxxx xx xx (f) drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour, during I. working hours at the undertaking or condut:t endangering the E life or ·safety of any person, intimidation, physical duress, or any act subversive of dmcipline." - • The allegation in the charge-sheet on the basis of which the domestic enquiry wa~ held reads as under : ' .. . • ...Babula! was on duty on 3.6.1975 in the B Shift from F

3 p. m. to 11 p. m. At about 8.15 p.m. when Shri Satya- Prakash Verma, a Telephone Operator and Shri K. C. Bagdi, · Shift-time keeper were coming out ofthe canteen after taking their meals, Babula] Nagar and Babula\ Jaiswalwere sitting in G the lavyn in front of the canteen. At that time, Babula! Jai'swal asked Babula! Nagar to explain to Verma the whole position in Hindi. There upo11 Babula! J\'agar went to Bagdi and Verma and uttered the following meanjngful words : _:_"You are just ' a child now. You do not understand anything; if you inter- fere in this, you will have to pay a heavy price, (true trans- l;ltion)" Verma ~ave no reply and both Veq:na and Ba¥di · •

' 778 SUPREME C\tURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R • • .. -( A iv.ent into the office. Thereafter, at 9.15 p. m. A. K. Awdsthi and Rajendra Jain went to the canteen to iake their meals. At that time both the petitioners namely, Babula! Nagar and • Babula! Jaiswal we.re. present there. Babula! Nagar took oµt a· false token and . challenged that it may be checked b) any security officiaL Rajendra Jain thereupon said that he was B not in his uniform. At. that time, Babula! Jaiswal uttered ·some filthy words and thereafter both Babula! Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal left the cantoen uttering filthy abuses.

At 9.30 p. m. Babula! Nagar spoke to Verma on tele- phone that he should. come. out of the Plant as he wanted to e talk to him. Verma, therefore, come ont in the lawn from his office where both B~bulal Nagar and Babula! Jai~wal were pre- sent. At that time, Babula! Jaiswal said to Verma as under :- • "You. have put end to our movement. Jn future things · D -will not be ri,gllt, if you interfere with us, and threatened, , that we shall see at 11'0 clock outside the gate." (true traµslation)

After the shift was over at about 11.10 pm. when Verma went ·outof the gate and too.k his seat _in the tempo E Babula! Nagar and Babula!. Jaiswal along with the otl!er three petitioners wtnt to him and asked Verma to come cut of the tempo as they Mnted to talk to him .. Verma replied that they could talk to him there.' Thereupon both Babula! Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal pulled Verma out of fhe tempo and all the petitioners as•aulted Verma with fists and kicks and felled him dJwn as a result of which he sustained a. bleeding injury on his head."On hearing the cries of Verma members. of the security Department rescued him an~ took him inside the gate." · \ ' . ' ......-...._

Apart from anything else, a very serious question touching upon the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority to hold an enquirf on the ,allegation that S. 0. 12 (!) (f) was violated would arise before the Labour Court more particularly in view of the recent decision of this Court in M/s Glaxo Lcboratorles (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Office;, Labour Court, Meerut & Ors. \ 1) wherein S. 0. 22 IL 11pplicable to. Glaxo l,aboratori_!!S (I) Lt<;!. wh:vb. is in pari materia (O [1984) 1 src 1, •

llABULAL \', ~H~EE SYNT!IETlCS (Desai, J.) 779 "r . with the S. 0. 12 (!) (f) came up for construction nt' this Court. A After an exhaustive rcvie\.v of the various di.;cisions on the subject, this Court after repelling the construction canvassed on behalf of the appellant in thaf'c<1se th1t such acts as drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour are per se misconduct unconnected with time place content and wherever committed would constitute misconduct, B held that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would be misicondnct for the purpose of the relevant standing orders, if commit '• ted within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. The Court further held that what constitutes 'establish- ment' or 'its vicmity' wouldde pend-upon the facts and circumstances of each case. But we shall not flr.ally pronounce on this point c as the Industrial Court had remanded the matter to the Labour Court which has jurisdiction to examine this cesc and we are inclined to uphold that order.

Therefore, the narrow question which we propose to examine in this case is whether the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary D jurisdiction under Art,. 226 and 227 should have by giving undue importance to a technical objection of jurhdiction which on proper fathoming, it itself lacked should have set a.ide a well-con,idered reasoned judgment of the President of the Industrial Court which again had merely remanded the matter thus prolonging to some extent the agony of the unemployed workers commencing from E 1975,

Let us at the commencement acquaint ourselves with the scope and ambit of the power of the Labour Court as well as.the Industrial Court under the Act which would provi:ie a correct perspcclive to determine whether the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 was at all justified in inter- fering with the order made by the Industrial Court or that legalese prevailed over substantial social justice.

Sec. 61 prescribes the powers of the Labour Court which inter alia includes the power-(A) to decide-(a) disputes regarding which application has been m1dc to it under sub-section (3) of section 31 of the Act. Sec. 3 l enables an employee to make an application for relief against an ord·er of an employer made under any of the standing orders. D:smissal from service is an order made under the relevant standing orders. A relief against such order can be obtained by making an application under Sec. 61. Entry l in

p. 780 Copy page pinpoint

A Schedule II of the Act prior to the amendment of l "81 provided that the Labour Court may examine :

"the propriety or legality of an order passed or action taken by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders." B Tile only feature worth-noticing is that the scope ambit and •' contours of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in such an appli· cation would have to be determined within the parameters or the expression 'the propriety or legality of an order.' Against an order made by the Labour Court under Sec. 61, a revision would lie under Sec. 66 to the Industrial Court. Sec. 66 has been wholly recast in I 98 l. However at the relevant time, Sec. 66 read as under :

"66; Revision. (!) The Industrial Court may, on the application by any party to a case which has been finally. decided by a Labour Court other than a case decided under paragraph (D) of sub· section (l) of section 61, call for and examine the record of such case and may pas• order in reference thereto as it thinks fit :

Provided that the Industrial Court shall not vary or reverse any order of the Labour Court under this section unless-

(i) it is satisfied that the Labour Court has-

(a) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or F

(b) failed to exercise a jucisd1ctbn so vested; or

(c) acted in exercise or its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity; G (ii) not~e has been served on tho part_ies to the case and opportunity given to them for bemg heard.

(2) No application under sub-section (I) shall lie to the Industrial Court unless it is made within thirty days of the date on which the case has been finally decided by:the Labo11r Court;

DABULi\L ,._ SllREE Si'NT!llTlCS (Desai, J.) 781 'r . Provided that in computing the p(·riod of thirty days the A period requisite for obtaining a copy of the order shall be excluded." ..

Having noticed the relevant provisions, it is now necessary to ascertain with precision the jurisdiction of the labour Court under B Sec. 61. The scheme of the standing orders applicable to jhe •' respondont-Company would show that a penalty of dismissal or removal from service can be imposed after hold:ng a domestic enquiry. According to the relevant provis:ons in the standing orders,· such an order when made would be opeu to challenge by a substantive application under Sec. 66 (I) and in st1clr an application, if and when made, the Labour Court will have jurisdictinn to decide c the legality and the propriety of the order. When jurisdiction is conferred upon the Labour Court, not onl:)'. to examine the legality of the order as also the propriety of the order, the Labour Court can in exercise of the jurisdiction examine the propriety or 1mpro· priety of the order. The expression 'propriety' is variously under- D stood, one meaning assigned to it being 'justice' in Legal Thesaurus by Burton at page 902. Amongst various shades of meaning a&signed to the expression, the Oxford EPglish Dictionnry, Vol. VIII page 1484 sets out 'fitness; approprfateness; apt'tude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions, conformity \vith requirement; rule or principle, rightness, correctness, justness etc.' E If therefore, the justice or the justness in relation to a legal proceed- • . > ing where evidence is led is questioned and the authority is cunferred with jur:sdiction to examine the propriety of the order or decision that authority will have the same jurisdiction as the orig'nal authority to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts. If uny oth~r vic\v is taken the cxpress:on 'propriety' would Jo'."c all s~gnift­ F •1 cance. The expression 'legality and propr'ety' hm bc:e;i med in various statutes where appellate or revisional jurisdiction is conferred upon a superior authority. Jn Raman & Ranum Ltd. v The State of 1 Madras & Anr\1 ) while examining the ambit of the jurisdiction of the -( State Government under Sec. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 G as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras) Amendment Act, 1948 to interfere with the orders of subordinate Regional 1 ransport Authority on the ground of propriety, this Court observed as under :

"The word "propriety" has nowhere been defined in the Act and is capable of a variety of meanings. fn the H OlH19l6) SCR 256.

782 SUPREME COURT R~PORTS (1984] 3 S C.R. .../ A Oxford English Dictwnary (Vol. VIII), it has been stated to mean "fitne>'S; appropriateness; aptitude; suitability; appro- priateness to the circumstances or condtions; conformity • with requirement, rule or principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy". If the State Govenment was of the opinion .that·respondent No. I had better facllities for ope- B ration than the appellant and their servic! to the public would be more beneficial, 1t could not be said that the ,. State Government was in error in thinking that the order • of the Board confirming the order of the Regional Trans- port Authority was improper." .c In Moti Rom v. Suraj Bhan & Ors. 11) while exammmg the scope and ambit of junsdiction of the High Court under Sec. 15 (5) of the East Punjab Urban R~nt Restriction Act, 1949, this Court observed as under :

"Under Sec. 15 (5) the High Court has jurisdiction to DJ examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the pro- priety or legality of the finding made by the 1uthorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under s. 13 (3) (a) (iii) ... E After referring to these two decisions, in Ching Chong Sine v. Puttay Gowd~r,(') Alagiriswami, J. held that the court exercising . ~. revisional jurisdiction to decide the legality or propriety of an order has the power to come to a conclusion different from that arrived by the subordinate court on the same set of circumstances. In Ahmeda- . Ii bad Sarangpur Mills Company Ltd. v. Industrial Court, Ahmedabad and Anr.(3) a Div'sion Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that the expression 'legality and propriety' in S. 78(1J of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act does not limit the jurisdiction of the labour court to a revisional jurisdiction. And that any order made by the employer undor the standing order is subject to the jurisdiction G conferred on the labour court under Sec. 78, which can scrutinise the legality and propriety of the order. This jur;sdiction was described by the court as original jurisdiction meaning thereby that the labour

(1) [1960] 2 SCR 896. H (2) AIR 1968 Madras 152. (3) [1965] 1 LLJ;155,

llABULAL ·v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.) 783

court c1n come to an entirely differer.! conclusion on the same set of facts. This vi·ow was followed by another Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Manekchown and Ahmedabad Manufacturing Company Ltd v. Industrial Court and another.(1 ) In Vithoba Maruti Chavan v. S. Tuki Bilgrami, Member Industrial Court, Bombay and Anr.,(2) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the power to decide 'propriety' and legality of the order made under standing order doos not confer a mere revisional jurisdiction but a wider jurisdiction wh'ch will enable the ·Labour Court to set aside the order of the employer depending upon the facts and circumstances of tile case.

Mr. Pai on the other hand C:rew our attention to Vaidyanath v. c The Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.(3) While observing that a Labour Court c1nnot exercise the power of an appellate court and cannot rea;1~:aise the evidence, yet both the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal can interfere with the findings of fact of the inquiry otlicer of the employer only where D they are not supported by any legal evidenco or are so perwrse that no reasonable p:::rson would arriv~ at such findings on the materials placed before him. It was held that the power of the Labour Court or the Industrial Court under the Act are not wider than those of Industrial Tribunal under the Indu5trial Disputes Act, 1947 before the introduction of Sec. ll·A in the latter Act. In Kymore Cement E ,> Mazdoor Congress v. Industrial Court, Indore and Ors.,(') it was held that the expression 'illegally or with material irregularity' in sub-cl. (c) of the first provho of Sec. 66(1) do not cover either errors of facts or law and they do not refer to the decisi0n arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. Approaching the matter from this angle, the High Court set aside the decision of the Industrial F Court in rcvhion against the order of the Labour Court on the ground that the Industrial Court had interfered with a finding of fact which even if erroneous would not confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Court to interfere in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Mr. Pdi emphasised that the view of M.P. High Court on the G interpretation of Sec. 61 should prevail over the view of Gujarat High Court interpreting a different statute. This does not carry conviction because Sec. 61 of the Act is iJi pari materia with Sec. 78

(l) (1967) I LLJ 463. (2) AIR 1965 Bombay 81. H (3) 1974 Lab. & I.C. 1447. (4) (1966) 1 LLJ 117,

784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) 3 S.C.R. {

A of the Gujarat Act. However, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of this Court in iwdesh Kumar Bhatnagar v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Weaving) Co. Ltd. and Anr.(1 ) in which this Court while examining the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by Sec. 66 on the Industrial Court under the Act held that if the Labour Court has committed serious mistakes, the Industrial Court has jurisdictio!l B to interfere with the same and upheld the decision of the Industrial Court which had interfered with the·find ings of facts recorded by the. Labour Court A full B·~nch of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nandkumar Singh v. The State Industrial Court, Indore and Ors(.2) held that perverse or arbitrary findings based on no material fall within foe ambit of the phrase "exercise of jurisdiction illegally or c with rnaterbl irtegularity" justifying interference in revision. It is not necessary to farther multiply the authoriti~s. Therefore, it appears.well-established that the Labour Court having jurisdiction to examine the legality and propriety of the order made by the employer under the standing order will have jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the orJ.er which will permit it to come to a con· c!usion dilforent from the one to which the employer arrived at. Such being the amplitude of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court if upon a wrong view of ambit of its jurisdiction Labour Court approaches the matter as if it exercises narrow revisional jurisJiction, the ludustrial Courr in rJvision cin interfere on the ground of failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.

Sec. 66(1) of the Act provides that the Industrial Court omit·· ting the portion nm relevant for the present purpose, may call for and examine the record of such case and pass order in reference thereto as it tbinks fit. If the Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to pass any order in reference to a case called for by it thinks fit, obviously it c:in come to a conclusion on the same set of facts different from the one to which the Labour Court had arrived. It was however urged that this jurisdiction of wide amplitude has been cut down by the· proviso which provides that the Industrial Court shall not very or reverse any order of the Labour Court under Sec. 66(\) unle'5-(i) 1t is s_atisfied that the Labour Court has-(a) exer- cised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) failed to exercise a

H (I) (1972) Lab. & I.C. 842.

(2) (1977) Lcb. & l.C'. i279.

BABULAL v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai,.J) . 78~

jurhdiction so vested; or (c) acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with mitcrial irregularity. It was urged that these clauses so circumscribe and cut down the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Sec. 66 as to be on par with Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The maill part of Sec. 61 clearly spells out the jurisdic- tion of the Industrial Court to pass any order in reference to the case brought before it as it thinks fit. The expression 'as it thinks fit' confers a very .wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. The expression 'as it thinks fit' confers a very wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. The expression 'as it thinks fit' has the same connotation, unless context otherwise indicates, 'as . he deems fit' and the btter expression was interpreted by this Court in Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype & Ors. v. Aha Maruti Mali & Ors.(1) to mean to make an order in terms of the statute, an order which would give effect to a right w'.iich the Act has elsewhere con- ferred. Is this jurisdiction so circumscribed as to bring it on par • with Sec. ll5 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Proviso does cut down the ambit of the main provision but it cannot be interprted to denude the main provision of any efficacy and reduce it to a paper proviSion. Both mus.t be so interpreted as to permit interference which if not undertaken there would be miscarriage of justice. Sub-cl. (c) of the first proviso to Sec. 66(1) will permit the Industrial Couit to interfere with the order made by the Labour Court, if the Labour Court has acted with material irregularity in disposal of the • dispute before it. If the finding recorded by the Labour court is such to which no reasomble man can arrive, obviously, the Industrial Com t in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would be entitled to interfere with the same even if patent jurisdictional error is not pointed out.

Reverting to the facts of this case, the Industrial Court while ) hearing the revision petitions found that the petitioners were trade union workers and the three of them were the office-bearers of the Union. It was further found that a material piece of evidence clearly pointing to the contrary was wholly overlooked by the inquiry officer. It extracted the relevant portion of the evidence of witness Balchand and pointed out in no uncertain terms that if the inquiry officer had taken note of the relevant piece of evidence and

(1) [1962] Suppl. I SCR 739.

• '786 • SUPREME COURT AEPORTS [1984] 3 S.C.R. j

A had applied its mind to it and dealt with it in the report, it would have been difficult to hold the charge proved. The non-application of mind of the inquiry officer was pointed out by referring to that part of the final order which manifestly overlooked the material piece of evidence which would go to the root of the matter. The Industrial Court observed that the inquiry officer quitely skipped B over very ma'.erial portion of the evidence of Balchand which went a long way to falsify the charges relating to the incidents which preceded the actual assault on Verma. 'The Industrial Court then pointed out that report \Ex. D/18) purporting to have been made by victim Verma to the factory Manager on the day following the date of the occurrence when properly scanned appears to be a highly c suspicious evidence because: 'it is not dated and does not bear the endorsement of the officer to whom it was presented.' This is permissible bocause the revisional jurisdiction enables the authority to point something which is no evidence legally speaking or in the eye of law. It was pointed out that Verma did not identify the report. The Industrial Court concluded that the possibility of this - D report being intwduced at a later stage to strengthen the case against the five appellants cannot be rukd-out. After referring to other infirmities in the approach of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court concluded that the entire approach of the Manager in arriving at the findings of mISconduct in bis inquiry 'appear to be biased and • unfair', and 'the conclnsions are neither fair nor reasonable and any E .order of dismissal based thereon cannot be sustained.' Can it ever be said that in reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Court excee- ded its revisional jurisdiction '/ The whole approach .of the Labour Co11rt dealing with tile report of the inquiry as also th~ inquiry itself clearly disclosed material irregularity and thereby the Labour Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested Ill it namely, to examine the propriety of the order wilith it failed to do. The Industrial Court, in our opinion, was perfectly justified in interfering with the order of the Labour Court. Even then the approach of the Industrial Court, being conscious of the severe constraints on its jurisdiction was of digmlied restraint and just. It merely set aside the award of the Labour Court and did not proceed to reappraise evidence but remitted the case to the Labour Court for a fresh decision. ·It was thus an eminently just order.

Is it such an order which the High Court could have interfered with in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction 1 Ihe High Court

' - UABULAL v. Sl!REE SYNTl!ETICS (Desai, J.) 787

observed that the Labour Court can only interfere with the decision of the inquiry officer, if the findings arrived at by him were p_erverse. The High Court completely missed the ambit of jurisdiction of the Labour Court in that it had the jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of the ord;r. Improprioty as converse of propriety cannot be equated with pervorsity as understood by the High Court. B The High C~urt further observed that if 'the finding of ihe misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence adduced at the enquiry, the labour tribunals have no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer, as an appellate body. This betrays complete fack of understanding of the jurisdic- tion of th' Labour Court in re>pect of an order made under the c standing order as set out m Schedule II item I to the Act which enables the Labour Court to examine the legality and propriety of the order. The High Court therefore, wholly misread the relevant provision and interfered with the decision of the Industrhl Court which was pre-eminently just and within the four corners of its jurisdiction. What left us guessing was that according to the High D Court the Industrial Court had narrow jurisdiction while dealing with the order of the Labour Court, yet the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction interfered with the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. Times "ithout number, it has been pointed out that Art. 226 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. (Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation)(l) E

Ordinarily, the courts exerc1smg extraordinary jurisdiction is loathe to interfere with an order remanding the matter to the authority directed to investigcite facts. The Industrial Court had made an order of remand. The High Court was not justified in interfering with the same. By this uncalled for interference, it has merely prolonged the agony of the unemployed workmen and permitted the jurisdiction of the High Court under Act. 226 to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the deteriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. (D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors.\ 2 )

(Il [1983] 4 sec 156. (2) [1983] 4 sec l93. H

?88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ984] 3 s.c.R. . {.,,. A Accordingly these appeals succeed and are allowed and. the decision of the High Court is set aside and the one of the Industrial Court is restored with costs.

As the matter is an old one, the Labour Court is directed to give top priority to this matter and dispose this of as early as B possible and not later than six months from today.

N.V.K. Appeals allowed.'<