SA:DHU RAM v. DELHI TRANSPORT COR;PORATION

c The Order of the Court was delivered by

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Special leave granted.

Sadhu Ram was a: probationer Bus Conductor whose services D were terminated on 7th September, 1967 by the respondent, the Delhi Transport Corporation. On the failure of conciliation proceedings, the Conciliation Officer, Delhi submitted his report to the Delhi Administration under s. 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, where- upon the Delhi Administration referred the following dispute to the E Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Delhi for adjudication : "Whether the termination of service, of Shri Sadhu Ram, conductor is illegal and unjustified, and if so what directions are necessary in this respect". The Union on behalf of the wmkman and the management appeared before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court. On behalf of the management, a contention was raised that the workman had not raised anY. demand with the management and that there was therefore, no industrial dispute. The reference was - accordingly claimed to. be incompetent. The Labou_r Court overruled the contention, holding as a fact that the Union had raised a valid demand with the management. Ou merits, the Labour Court gave the following finding : "I, therefore, hold that the termination order in respect of this workman is illegal and malafide and that amounts to colourable exercise of power." Consequently, the management was directed to reinstate the workman with effect from 8th September, 1967 with the full back wages and benefits. The manage- ment invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi under Art. H 226 of the Constitution questioning the award of the Labour Court. The High Court went into a learned discussion on what was an Industrial Dispute and what was a jurisdictional fact, a discussion

SADHU RAM v. D.T.C. (Chinnappa JI.eddy, J.) which in our opinion was an entirely unnecessary·exercise. In launch" ing into a discussion on these questions needlessly, the High Court A appeared to forget the basic fact that the Labour Court had given two categoric findings : (i) that the Union ha.d raised a demand with the management and (ii) that the termination of the services of the workman was a malafide and colourable exercise of power. Delving into the evidence as if it was an appellate Court, and reappreciating B the evidence, .the High Court thought that one of t!ie document& upon which the Labour Court had relied was a suspicious document;· and the High Court went on to find that no demand had been raised · and there was no Industrial Dispute which could be properly refer- red by the Government for adjudication. On those findings a learned single judge of the High Court quashed the Award of the Presiding c Officer of the Labour Court. The decision . of the learned single judge was affirmed by a Division Bench. The workman has come before us under Art. 136 of the Constitution.

We are afraid the High Court misdirected itself. The jurisdic- D tion under Art. 226 of the Constitution is truly wide but for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great ·circumspection. It is not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate court over Tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitath:ely different from ordinary civil disputes and to readjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those Tribunals. That E the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere "ith the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circum' st;mces indicate that .the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if ·a reference is made and it is therefore F impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management. There was a concilia- tion proceeding, the conciliation had failed aJ!d the Conciliation G Ofli~er had so reported to the Government. The Government was justified in thinking thatthere was an industrial dispute and referring it to the Labour Court.

The High Court appeared to think that the. decision of this H Court in the Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. The Industrial

SOPRliMB COURT RBPORTS . [! 98~1 3 s.c.k. Tribunal of Gujarat(')' justified its conclusion that the failure of the conci!iction proceedings and the·report of the Conciliation Officer to the Government were not sufficient to sustain a finding that th ere was an industrial dispute. This was also what was urged by· the learned counsel for the respondents. The High Court was in error in so thinking. In Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat('), the question really was about tire 8' precise scope of the reference made by the Government for adjudica- tion; Throughout it appeared that the· only reference that the . Government could have made related to·the payment of retrencl\ment compensation whiclr alone was the subject matter of dispute .between the.parties. The conciliation which failed had also concerned'' itself witfr the questioff oCpayment of retrenchment compensation' and' in their claims before the management, the workmen had requested'. for payment of retrenchment·compensation' and raised no dispute regard· ing reinstatement. It was in those circumstances that /the court held that there was no industrial dispute regarding reinstatement. We do not.see how Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. The lhdustrial Tribunal of Gujarat can be of any assistance to the respondents.

_ Nor do we think that it was right for the High Court to interfere with the award of a Labour Court under Art. 226' on a mere technicality. Article 226 is a deviCc to secure and' ad\'ance justice and not otherwise. In the result, we allbw the appeal,~ set aside the judgment of the High·Court and rest-Ore the award of' the Presidfog. Officer, Labour Court.

H.S.K. Appeal allowed.

(I) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 515.