. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS·

67 A . BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA • v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS· B December.16, 1983

Constiflltio11 of India.-Article 32 (1)-Mode of intirpreting Article 3Z.....- "Appropriate proceedings", 1neaning of-Letter addressed· by a party on behalf of pers_ons belonging to socially and, economically weaker iRections co1n'p/aining violation ...• of their rights under vario~ts social welfare legislations-Whether can be t'reated as a writ petition._Maint~iltability of-Public ·Interest Litigation-Nature and scope of. .C • -- Constitution of India, Article 32 (2)-Appointmeftt of com1nissions _by ihe Supretn'! Court to enqui;e into the complaint made iii the writ petition anti rrlying upon the commi~sioners' re/,ort-Prop~iety of-Adver:;arial Procedure-How far binding on the Co.urt-Supreme Court Rules, 1966, O, ·xxxv, XLVI and XLVll, Rule 6- Code of Civil Procedure,.O,XXVI.

Inter-State Migra~t Work1nen (Regulation of .Employment and Conditions E of Service) Act. 1979-ss.² (/) (e), (b), (g), 4,§_)2 and Chapter V-Inter·State Mig- rant Workmen (Regulation of Employment aird Conditions of SerJ1ice) Central Rules, : 1980-Rules 23, 25-45-Definition ofinter-state 1nigrant workinen-Rights and benefits of inter-state mlgrant workmen ·explalned~Thekedars or Jan1adars recruitlng workers for· mine lessees/owners from outside the State are "contractOrs"-Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, J.970-:-ss. 2 (/)(a), (b), (c) (g), 16 to 21. . . F Bonded IAbour Sys(em (Abolition) Act, 1976-ss.² (f), (g), 4, 5, 10-15-Exis- ·, tene,!! ofForced Labour-Whether bonded.labour-Burden o} prooJ lies upon the em- ployer that the labourer is not a bonded labourer-Court will be justified in pressum- ing thilt the labourer ls a bonded labourer unless the pfesumption is rebutted by . producing satisfactory mai~rial.

Minbnum Wciges Act, Worktnen's C0mpensation 1Act, 1983,Paynient of Wages Act, ·E1npl0Yees State Insurance Act, Emplqyees Provident Fund and MisCel/aneous G Provisions Act, Maternity Benefits Act, 1957-Benefits accruing under these Acts- - .... Whether available to mine workers. -

The petitioner, an organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded . labourers in the country, addressed ·a Ieiter to Hon'ble Bbagwati, J. alleging : (1) H that there \Vere a large number of labourers from different parts ofthC: Country who wC:re work.1ng in some of the stone quarries situate in district Faridabad, State of . ' . '

• , 68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!982] 2 S.c.R.

A Haryana under 0 inhuman and intolerable cohditions; (2) that a large number of them were bonded labollrcrs; (3) that the provision·s of the Constitution and ·various social Weffare laws passed for the benefit of the ~aid workmen ~ere not be:- 'r-· ing implemented in regard to these IabOurers .. Th~ petitioner also mentioned in the letter the names of the stone. quarries and particulars of labourers who were work~ ing a_s bonded labourers and prayed that a w.t;it be issued for Proper implementation of the yarious provisiOni .of .the.., soda! welfare legislations, s:4ch as,· Min~s .B Act, 1952 Inter-State ~11grant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Con.:. ditiofls of Service) Act, 1979, Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, Minimum Wages.Act, Work- men's Compensation Act, Payment of Wages Act, Employees State Insurance Act, · Ma.tern'ity ~enefits Act et~. applicable t~ these'Iabour~rs Wo.rking in the said ,sto-ne quarries with a view to endiIJ,$ the misery, suffering, and helplessness of "these vic- tims of t~e inost inhllinan exploitation." · c The Coui't treated the letter as· a writ petition and appointed a commissi;>n to inqui.re ·into· the allegations made by the petitioner. The conunission while cori- , firming the allegatic;>ns of the petitioner, pointed out i~ its ref)ort that-(i) the v,.hole atmosphere in the alleged stone quarries was fuil of dust and it was difficult for any ·one tci breathe; ai) some of.the workmen were riOt allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced lab6ur; {i~i) there was no· facility of providing pure water to•drink and the labourers wefe compelled to' drink dirty water from D a nul/ah; (i11) the labourers were not ·having proper shelter but were living in jhug- gies With stones piled one upon the other as walls and straw caverning the top which Was too low to stanP, and which did not afford any proteCtion ag<iinst sun and rain; (v) some of ihe labourers were suffering from chronic diseases; (vi) no compensa- ·tion was being paid tO labourers~whq were injured due iO accidents arising in the Course of cmploymeiit; (vii) there were no f<icilities for medical ·treatment ·or ~chooling. At the direction of the Court, a· socio-legal investigation Was a.lso E carried out and it suggested measures for ·improving the conditions of the ·rn~ne workers;

BAND HUA· MUKTI MORCHA 'v. · UN~ON 69 social welfare laws, the State Government, Which is, under our constitutional sche!Jle, charged with the µiission of bringing about ·a new socio-ecomonic order \vhere there will be social alld economic justice for.every One equality of status and opportuniiy for all, would \-velcome an inquiry by-"the .court, so that if it is found .• - ·that there are ill fact bonded labourers or even if the workers are-not bof_1ded in the strict sense of the. term as defined in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 but they are made to proVide forced labour or are consigned to a·Jife of utter deprivatioD. ·and degradation~ such a situation can be set right by the State Govcrnm~nt. Even if the State Goveriunent"iS on its own inquiry satisfied ihilt .B the workm~ri are not bOnded and are not- compelled to provide forced Jabour and· are Jivjng and wOrking in decent conditions with all the basic neceSsities of iife ' provided to them, the State Government should not baulk an inquiry bY the court when a complaint is brought by ·a citizen, but it should be anxiolls to satisfy the· court and through tlie court, the pOOple of the coUntr.Y, that it is discharging its

II constitutional obligation fairly and adequately and the workriten are being ~nsured_ social and eeonomic justice. [IQ2A-D]. c 2.. Moreover, When a complaint is made on behalf of workmen that they are held in bondage and are working and living in miserable cOndltions Without· any proper or adequate. shelter ·over their heads, without any protection a~inst sun and rain, without two squaremeals per da:Y arid with- only dirty water from a nullah tO drink, it is diffic.ult how such a_ complaint can be thrown out on the ground that it is not violative of the fundamental right of the workmen. ·It is the fun- D damental right of every one in this.country, assure4. under the interpfetation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullen's Case, to Jive with 'human dignity, free from exploitatiori. This right to live with human _dignitY enshrined in Arti- cle 21 derives· its life breath from: the Directive Principles of State Poiicy and -parti- cullrly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, ;.< therefore, ,it mttst include protection Of the health. and strength of workers, men and women, and of.the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities 3nd"faci~ E lities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in cond!tionS of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity • relief. These are the ffiinimum.requirements which fllUSt exist in order to ertable a person to live with human dignity .and no State-neither thC Central Government nor ariy State Govefiiqient-has the right ta ,take any aCtion which will deprive a person of the enjoyment·of these·basic essentials. Since th,e Directive Principles of State Policy contained .in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Article 41 arid- 42 arC F -"" not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the jLidicial_ process to make provision by statutory ~nactment 'or executive fiat fOr ensuring· these basic essentials which go to make up a Jife of human dignity but"where legislation is· alteady enaGted by the State providing these ba-3ic require~ ments to the ~wOrkinen ·.and thus inv~sting their" right to Jive with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content,· the. State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation for inactiOn op. the part·of the State fn secur- ing implementation of such leg!slation would amount to denial of the right to live with human.dignity ~nshrined in·Articie 21, more so in the context of Article 256_ '--+, which provides 1hat the exceutive power of every State shall be so exercised as to · ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State. [103B-H-104A] ·

3. The State is Under a: cOnstituti.onaI obligation to see that there is no viola- 'H tion of the fundamental right of any person, particularly when lie ~clongs, to the

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 S.C.R·

.A ·. w~a~~r secti?ns of the con~unity and ls unable to wage a legal battlC against a strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting him. The Central Government is therefore bound to ensU.re obserVancC of various social welfare and,13.bour laws enacted by Parliament for the purpose of securing tO the workmen a life of basic ~uman dignity in compliance wifh · the_ Directive Principles of St~te Policy. It · niust also follow as a necessary corollary that the State of Haryana in which the stone quarries arc vested by reason of Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) ·Act . ·1973 and which is therefore the owner.of the mines cannot while giving its mines for stone quarrying operations, permit wqrkni.en to be denied the benefit of various· ')

social welfare and labour laws enacted with. a view to enabling them to live a life of humln di~nity. The State of Haryana n1ust therefore ensure that the mine- le'ssees or contractors, to whom it is giving its mines for stone quarrying opera- Y· tions, observe various social welfare and labour laws enacted for the benefit of the workmen. TJ:iis is a constitlltional obligat~on which can be enforced against the

c Central Government and the State of Haryana by a writ petition under Article ' 32 of the Constitution. [1.04 A·D] II .....

4. While interpreting Article 32, it must be borne in mind that our approach • 1nu~t-be guided nOt by any verbal or formalistic canons ef construction but by the paramount object and purpose-for 'vhich this Ariicie has been .enacted 3.s a Fund.a· mental Right in the Constitution and its interpretation 'must receive· illu.mination from the tiinity of provisions-which permeate and energise the entire Constitution D ~amely, the Preamble, the Fundamenta! Rights and the· Directive PrinciPles of ·, State Policy. ClauSe (I) of ~rticle.32 confers the righ~ to inove the_ Supreme c:otirt. ·for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;=> but it does not say as to who , shall have this right to move the Supreme Court -nor d0eS it say by what proceed- ing~ the Supreme Court may be so mov~d. There. is no limitation in the words of Clause. (J) of Article 32-that the fundamental right which is sought to be en- forced bY n1oving the Supreme Court should be o.ne belonging to the person who n1oves· the Suprerne Court nor does it say that the Supreme Court shoU:ld be moved E only by-a particular kind of proceeding.· It is clear on the plain language of clause' (l)' of ·Article 32 that wheriever there is ii violation of a fundamental right, any ' .One can move the Supreme Court for enforcement Of ,such fundamental right." Of course, the collrt would nbt, in exercise of its discfetion, intervene at the in· J ,. I stance of a ·meddlesome interloper or buSy body and would ordinarily insist that 0

only a person whose fundain"ental fight is violative should be allowed_ to activise the court, but. there is no fetter upon the power of the court to entertain a proceed- F ing initiated by ally person other than .the one whose fundamental right is violated, though the court would not ordinarily entertain such a proceeding, since the person whose fuiidamental right.is violated. can always approach the ·court-and if he docs not wisli to seek judical redress by moving the court, why should some one else be'.allowed to do so on his behalf~ This reasoning however breaks down in the case of~ person or·ciass of persons ,vhose fundamental right is violated but who canno·t have resort to "the court on acCount of their poverty or disability:or socially G or economically disadvantaged position and in such a case, therefore, the court can and rriust allow any membf:r of the public a~ting bona fide to esPouse thC cause of such person or class of persons. This does not violate, in the slightest measµro the Iallguage of the constitutional provision enacted in clause (1) of Article

32. [106 B·H-107AJ • •

ff s:~ Clause (1) of Articie. 32 s_ays that the Suprf.me Cotirt can_ be moved for cnforcenlent ·of a fundan1ental right by· any 'appfopriate' proceeding. There

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 71 is no liinitation in regard to the_kind o_f proceeding envisaged ·in clause (1) of Article · 32 except that the proceeding must be "appropriate" and this requirement of A appr.opriateness must be judged in the light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to· be taken, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right. The Constitution makers deliberately did not Jay down any pariicular forn1 of proceeding for en- forcement o·r a fundamental right nor di&, they stipulate that suCh proceeding should confonn to anY rigid pattern or straight jacket fonnula as, for example, in Erigland, becau5e theY knew that in a country like India· where there is so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and ~xploitation, any insistence on a rigid for· B mula of proceeding for enfotcement of a fundamental right would become ~elf~ defeating because it would place enforcement of fundamental r,ights beyond the reach of the comiµo"n man and~ the entire remedy for enforcetnent of fundamental rig_hts which the Constitution makers regarded as so precious and invaluable that they elevatCd it to the status of a fundii.mentaI right, would become a mere rope of

Ill sand so far aS; the large masses of the people in this country are concerned. The Constit~tion makers therefore advisedly provided in clause (1) of Article .32 that the Supreme Court may be moved by any 'appropriate' proceeding, 'appropriate' c not in terms of any particular form but •appropriate' with reference to· ·the purpose ,. of the p'oceeding. [107 A-F] · . . ~ ..... ' '

Therefore where a member of the public acting bona fide mOves the Court ' for.enforcement of a fi.!-ndamenta1 right on beha_lf of, a person or ~lass of persons who on-account of poverty or disability or socially of economicallY disadvantaged D position canriot approach the court for relief, such member of the public may mOve the collrt even by just writing a letter,' because it woi.Ild not be right or fair to expect a person' acting pro bono Publico to incur expenses out of his own pocket for going to a lawyer aii.d prepar.ing a regular writ petitiofi for being filed in court for enforce- ment of the fundamental right of the poor and deprived sections of the community and in such a case, a letter addressed by him can· legitimately be regarded as an." "appropriate" proceeding. [107 F-H] · E' .6. Public Interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation.but it is a challenge and an opportunity to the goYernment and its officers to make basic human rights meanirigful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the comn1unity and to assure them 'social and economic justice whici:) i~ the signature tune of our Constitution. When the Court 'entertains public interest litigation, it does no.t do so in a cavilling spirit or in a confrontational mood or with a yiew to tilting at . executive authority or seeking to unsurp it, but its attempt is only to ensure obser- F Vance ar social and economic rescue progfamrhes, legislative as wen as eXecutive, framed for the benefit of the have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them· against v;iolation of their basic hunian ;-ights, which is also thti eonstitutional obli· gation of the executive. The Court is thus merely assisting in the realisation of the constitutional. objectives. [102 D-E, G-H, 103 A-Bl

7Copy pinpoint7. Clause (2) of Article 32 conferring power on the Supreme Court "to issue G directions, or orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, manda- mus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari" which ever may ~e appropriate, • for enforcement of any of the fundamerital rights, is in the widest · terms.. It is not con,fined to issuing the high prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamust pro- hibition, certiorari, and quo warranto, which are hedged in by strict conditions - differing froin one writ to another. But it is i'.nuCh wider and includes within its H ~trix, Power· to issue any directions, orders or WtitS Which ' . may be appropriate

SuPREME COURT RE}?ORTS (1984] 2 S.C.R.

A fot enforctment of the fu~damental right in question and this is m3.de aniply clear by the inclusive clause which refers to in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, qua warranto and certiorari. ·Therefore even if the Conditions'· for issue of any of these high prerogative writs are not fulfilled," the Supreme ·court wou.ld have power to issue any directjon, order or ~it including a Writ in the nature of any high Prerogative .writ.· This provision conferring on the .SuPreme .court power to enforce the fundamental rights in the widest poss1ble terms shows the anxiety of the ·constitution makers not to a1Iow anY proceduraJ. technicalities to B stand· in the way Or enforcement of fundamental rights. Th6 Constitution makers 'clearly intended .that .ihe Supreme Court should have the an1plest power to issue whatever direction, order or writ may be 'appropriate. in a given case for enforce- \.'". ment of a fundamental right: That is why the Constit~tioll is silent as to what pro- cedurC sh<i.11 be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising the power to issue such direction or Order or writ as in Article 32 and advisedly so, beca.Sue the constitu- tion makers never_ intended to fetter· the discretion of the Supreme Court to C. evo!ve a procedure appropriate in the circumstances of a given case• for the purpose of enabliiig it to exercise its .power of enforcing a fundamental right. Neither claug;e (2) of Article 32 nor any other provision of"the Constitution requires that any particular procedure shall be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising its power to issue· an approrpriate direction, order or writ. The pprpose for which the power to issue "an appropriate direction, order or -writ is·conferred on the Supreme 'Court is to secure enfotcement of a fundtimeri.tal .fight.and obviously therefore, \vhatever D pr0cedure is necessary· for fu1filment of that purpose must be permissible .to the Supreme Court. [108 B-H, 109 A-BJ , ·

8,. It is notvat ail obtigatOrJ. that an <idversarial prot:edurc. where each· party producJs his own evidence tested by cross-examination by the other side .and the · judge sits like an umpire and decides the case only on the basis of such m8.terial ·as may be produced before him by both parties, must be .followed ih a proceeding "-'' 'E under Article 32 for enforcement of a fundamental right. In _·fact, there is no· such constitUtional compulSion enacted in clause ·(2} of Article 32 or ifn any other part of the Constitution. There is D.othing sacrosanct abOui the adversarial · " ,procedure with evidence led by either party and tested by cr_oss~xmainatfon by the other party and the judge playing ;i. positi.ve role has become a part of our legal sys- tem ·beCause it is embodied in the Code of Civil pro_Cedure and the. Indian Evidence ! .. ACt. But these statutes ·obviously have no· application where, a new jurisdiction is created in the Supreme Court for enforcement of a fWldamental ·right. There- F fore it Is rtot justified to impose anj" restriction on the power of the Supreme Cour::t' ).

adopt ·such procedure as it thinks fit in _exercise. of Its new jurisdication, by lngraft- ' ing adve.rsarial procedure on· it, when the constitution makers have deliberately chosen not tO insist, on any such requirement and instead left it open to the SuprCme C9urt to foliow such procedure as it thinks appropriate· for the purpose of securing the end for which the" power is conferred namely, enforcement of a funruin1eiita-1 right. [109 B-0) . . . G

9Copy pinpoint9. The strict adherence to the adversarial procedure can som~ times lead to injustice. Particularly when the parti~ are nOt evenly balanced Jn social or econo· mic strength. ·Where one of the parties to a· litigation belongs to a· poor and depriVed section of the·cOmin~nity.and do~ not possiss adeq~ate social and material resour· ·ces, he is bound to be at a disadvantage as against a strong and powerful opponent H uri,der the adversary,.system of justice, becasue of his.difficulty iii.getting competent legal representation and more than an)'thing else, his inability to· produce relevant·

• BANVHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION. 73

evidence· before ihe court. Th~refwe, when ihe. p~or come before the court'. parti- A cularJy for. enforcement of.their fun,daffiental .. rjghts, it is ~eces~ry to d~part f~om . . the adversarial procedure and to evoive·a ne":. pro_cedurc wh_1chw1ll_make It posSible for tbe poor and the weak to bring the necessary Ill~t.erial before the court for t~e purpose of securing enforcen1ent of their fundamental_ rights. If the adver.san~~ procedUre is truly followed in their case, they would never be able to enforce their fundamental rights and the" result ~ould be nothing but a mock~ry of the _-Con- stitution. Therefore the Courts should a:balldon the laissez faire approach in the· judicial process particularly where it.involves a question of enforcement of fun~a­ B inental rights and forge new tools, ·devise new methods and adopt new strategi~ ... for the purpose of making fundamental ri~ts meaningful for the large ma~es of people. And this is clearly pcnnissibli: on the language of clause (2) of Article 32 because the· Constitution makers while. enacting that clause haye deliberately and advisedIY not used 'and words restricting th.e .power of the court to adopt any pro- ---· cedure which it considers appropriate in the circumstances of a given case for en- forcing a fundamental right. [1_10 B·Fl '

10Copy pinpoint10. .it is. obvious that the .Poor and. the disadvantaged cannot possibly: pro- duce ~relevant materia-1 before the Court in support Of their caso and equally where . . an action is brought on their behair by a citizen- acting pr(J bono pub/ico. it would be almost impossible for him to gather the relevant !9.aterial and place it before the Court. lo such a case the Supreme Court would he faiiing in discharge of its con- 'tional duties of enfofcing a fundamental right if it refuses to intervene because th"e D stitupetitioner belonging to the underprivileged segment of society or a Public spirited citizen espousing his cause is unable to produce the relevant material before the court. If the Supreml;l Court \vere to agopt a passive approach arid decline to 'intervene in such a case because relevani material has not been produced before it by the party Seeking its intervention, the fundamental tights would remain merely a teasing i11usion so far as the poor and disadvanta~d sections of the community are concern- ed. Therefore the SuPren1e Court has evolved the practice of appointing conunis- E sions for the purpose of g~thering facts and data in regard to a Complaint' of breach of a fundamental right made on behalf.of the weaker sections of the society. The Report" of 'the commisSioner would furnish prima facie evidence of the facts and data gathered by the commissioner and that is why the Supreme Court is careful • to appoint a responsible person as commissioner to make an inquiry or investiga- tion into the fa~ts r~Jating to the complairit. Even in ·the· past the Supreme Court has appoii:ted sometimes a district magistrate, sometimes a district Ju~e; some- F . times a professOr of law,· sometimes a jciumalist, sometimes an officer of the court and soinetim~s an advocate practising in the court, for the purpose' of carrying out an enquiry of investigation and inaking report to the court because the com- missioner appointe'd .by the Court .must be a-responsible· person who enjoys the con- fiden~ of the court and who is expected to ·carry o-Ut his assignment objective~y and impartially without" any predilection or .prejudice. Once ·the report of the conimis- sioner is f~ived, copies of ii-would be supplied to the parties so that either party, G if it wants to 'dispute any·of the facts or date statedjn the Report, rnaY do so by ·filing au affidavit ~nd the court then ·eonsider the report of the co.mmissioner and thC affidavits which rilay have been filed and proceed to adjudicate upon the issue "aris- ing in the wdt" petition. It would. be entirely foi the Court io consider what wtiight to attach to the f<icts and data stated in the report of the commissioner and to what extent to act'upon such.facts and data. But it wOuld not be correct to say that the lI report of the commissioner has- no evidentiary value at al1, since the Statements

• 74 WPREME COURT REPORTS·. [1984] 2 s.c.R.

A m<lde :in it are not_ tested b~ cross-examina~ioQJ., To accept this co'ntentio'n would be to introduce the adversarial_ procedure-in a pr.occeding where in the given situa- . >- tion, it is totally inapposite. [111 B-H, 112, A-BJ ,

1.1. If is 'true that Order XL Vi of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 makes the provisions of Order x·xvr of the Code of Civil ·Procedure, except rules 13, 14, 19, io, 21 and 22 applicable to the Supreme Court and lays down the procedure for an B application, for issue of a Comm_ission, but Order XXVI is not exhaustive and does Il~t" d~tract from the-inherent power of th(l Supreme Court to appoint a conurll~sion, if the. appointment of such Comthission is found necessary for the purpose of secur- .ing enforcement ~fa funda1nental tight in- exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 32. Order XLYI Of_ the Supreme Court Rules 1966 cannot in any way n1ilitate against the power of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in fact rule 6 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 provides that noth.ing in these Rules "shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent Powers of the couft .- to niakC such orders as may be n~ss~ry for the cndS of justice. [l C-F]12 In the instant case, thf:refore, the Court did not act'beyond its power in appo- \ ... inting the commissions for the purpose of making ~n inquiry into the conditions of_ workmen employed i°' the st<iJ.e quarries. The petitioner in the writ petition spe- cifically alleged violation of the fundamental rights of the workmen employed in the D stone quarries under Articles 4.1 and 23 and ii was therefore necessary for the court to' appoint these comn1issioners for th,e purpose of in{iuiring i11to the facts related to this complaint. The· Reports of the Commissions were clearly docwnents . hri.ving cvidentiary value .ind. they fui-nished prima facie evidence 'of the facis and data stated in those Reports. Of course, it is f0r the' court to consider what ".'eight it Should attach to the facts and data contained in these Reports ,in the light of the various ri.ffidavits filed in the proceedings.[l,l.² F-H, 113 A-BJ. E • . 12.· The position pointed out as the power of_ the Supreme Couft to appoint con1mis~ionerS in the exercise of its jurisdictiOn under Article 32 1nust"apply equ3.lly in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article 226 for th~ tatter Jurisdiction is also a ne\V constitutional ju(isdiction and it is conferred in the same wide ten,ns as the jurisdiction Under Article 32 and the san1e powers F can and must therefore be exerCised by the High Court v.ihilc exercising jurisdic- 'tion under-Art.ide 226. In fact, ihe jurisdiction of th~ High Courts under Article 226 is much \Vider, because the High.COurts are required to exercise this jurisdictiOn not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement of any legal righ_t and there are many rights conferred on the poor and.. the disadvantaged which are the creation of statute and they need to be enforced,as urgently and vigo_tousl!' as fundan1ental rights .. [I I 3 B-D] · • G 3 : 1. The St~ne quarries in the instant case are "mines" within the meaning of the Section 2 (j) of the Milles Act, 1952 since they are excavations where operp.- .. tions for the purpose of searching for or obtaining stone by quarrying are ~eing carried on but they are not 'open Cas"t working' since admittedly e~Civations ,in the case of' these Stone quarries extend below superjacent.ground. Since the workings in these stone quarriciS extend below Superjacent ground t1-nd they are not 'open east \Vorkings' and 'moreover explosives are admittedly used in connection with ,

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 75 • the excavation, the conditions set out in the. proviso to see. 3 (i) (i) are not,fulfilled and hence the exclusion of the provisioris of the Minrs Act 1952 (other than the excepted sections) is not attracted and 'all the provisions of the Mines Act 1952 apply to these stone ·quarries. The" prOvJsions contailled in chapters V1 VI & VII of the Mines Act confer certain rights and benefits on· thfl workIQen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers and these rights <ind benefits intended to secure to the workman jus~ ar.d human conditions of .\\'ork ensuring a decent. standard of Iife· with basic human dignity. ·Since th~ stone quarries are not being exploited by the State of Haryana though it is the o.wner of the st.one quan·ies, but are being given out on lease by auction, the rn,ine-lessees who are not only lessees but also occupiers of the stone quarries arc the owners of the stone quarries within the mean.:. -( ing of that expression as used in section 2 (1) 3.nd so also are the owners of stone ' crushers ill relation to their establishment. The mine-lessees and owners of. stone crushers are, therefore, liable under section 18 of the Mines Act, 1952 to carry out

II their operations in accordance with the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 and the Mines Rules, 1955 and other Rules and Regulations made under that Act and to ensure that the rights and benefits conferred by these provisions are actually and c . concretelY made available to the workmen. The Central Government is entrusted under the Mines Act 1952 with the r~sponsibilit).' of securiilg compliance with the provisions of that Act and of the Mines Rules 1953 a.nd other Rules and Regula- tions made under that Act and it is the primary obligation of thci Central Govern- ment to ensure that .these provisions (\re complied with bY the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners. The State of Haryana is.also under an obligation to take D all necessary steps for the purpose of secµring compliance with these provisions by • ·the mine-ICssee~ and owners of stone crushers. The Staie of Haryana is .therefore, in-any event, bound to take action to enforce the provisions.of the Mines Act 1952 and the Mines ,g\lles 1955 and other·Rules and RegulatiOns made under that Act for the berrefit of the workmen. [113 G-H, 114 A, li5 A1 E: G, li6 B-F, 117 GD]

13. The Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulatio-n of Employment and, . E conditions of Service) Act, by ·sub-seCtion (4) of section (1) applies to every estab- lishn1ent in· which five or more inter-St;ite M-igrant workmen are employed or were·employed on any day of the preceding twelve n1onths .and so also it appiies ~o every contractoi· who employs or employed five or m~re inter~State migrant \Vorkmeil on any day of t_he preceding twelve m<:>ntJ:is. Section (2) sub-section (1) Clause (b) of the Act defines contractor, in relation to an establishment, to me?.n "a person \vho undertakes (whether as an independent contractor, agent, employee or otherwise) to' produce a given res Ult for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods and articles of n1anufacture to such establishment, b)• the employ- ment of workmen or to supply workmen to the establishment, and includes a sub- contractor, khatedar, sardar, agent or· any other person, by whatever name called, who recruits or employs workman." Clause (e} of s.Ub-section (1) of section (2) defines. "interstate Migrant Workmen" to .mean "any person who is recruited by or through a contractor in one State. under an a,greement or other arra~gement for employme·nt ·in an establishment in· anoiher State, whe'the1· with or with~out the ., knowledge of the principal employer in relation to Such establisbment." The ex- pression "pri~ipal en1ployer" is defined by claUse (g) of sub-~tion ·(1) of section 2 tO inean "in relation to a mine, the owner or agent of the mine ·and where a person has been named as the nianager of the mine, .the person so named." Obviously, therefore, the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers in the .present case would be principal en1ployers within the ·meaning of that expression as used in the Inter-

76 . SUPREME COUllT REPORTS . [1984] 2s.c.R. A State WorknlCn Act. Section 16 Jays a duty ·on every contractor employing inter State migrant work1nen i_n connection with the work of an csta blishment to prov id~ various other facilities particulars of. which are to be found in Rules 36 to ·45 of ~he Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules. (These facilities include me'dical facilities, protective ·clothing, di-inking water, latrines;_ urinaIS and •washing facilities, rest rooms, ca~teens, crccbe and residential accomn1odation) .. The obligation to provide these f<icilities is in rel~tion to the-inter-State migrant··wOrkmen employed in an B estab1ishn1ent to which the Act applies. Rut this liability is not confined only to the ·contracti;>r1 ,because Section 18 provides in so many terms that if any anowancc required tb be paid under-section 14 or 15 to an inter.,State migrant workmari is not paid by the contractor or if any facility specified in Section 16 is not provided for

-- · the benefit of such workman, such allowance shall be paid or as the casf'. may be, . the fa.cility"s'1.a11 be provided by the principal employer within ·such tin1e as ma.Y be prescribed by the Rules and all the allowances paid by the priricipal employer or all c the expenses incurred by him in thiS connection may be recovered by him from the con~ractor either by deductiori froln the iamount payable to the contiactor or as a ·.debt payable by the contractor. [117 F-H, U9 E-A-120 A]

14. Th"ethekcd'ir or jamadar who is engaged by. the 1nine lessees or the stone-. crusher own'ers to recruit workrrien or e1nplOy them on behalf of the mine lessees or stone crush:r o"Yners Would clearly be a 'contractor' within the meaning of that term as'defined in Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (b) and the \YOrkmen recruited by or thtough hin1 from other States for crnployni.ent in the stone quarries and stone • crushers in the State of Haryana w0:uld Undoubtedly -be inter·State migrant work· meri. Even ·when the thekedar or jamadnr recruits or employs workmen for the sL:>n~ qL11rries and ston~ 'crUsh~rs by sen·:lii1g word" through the "old hands", the • workmen so rhCruited· or "entployed would, h~ inter·State migl:a~t workmen, becausO the "old. hands" wo.uld be· really ·acting as ·agents of the thekedar or janiada·r fo'r the purpose 'of recruiting or employirig workmen crushers in the Sfiite of E · Haryana. (121-E] l5. In addition tO ·the rights and be~efits conferred upon hiin Under the Inter-State Migrant W0rkmen Act _and the" iriter-State Migrant \Vorkmen Rules~ an intcr·State migrant -workman is also, by reasori of Section 21, entitled to the benefit of the Provisions contained in the ·workmen's Cotnpen,sation Act 1923, The Payment of Wages Act 1936, The EmploYees' State Insurance Act 1948, . The Employees'. Provident Fu rids afld Misc. ·Provisions Apt, 1952, and_ the Maternity F Benefit Act 1961. ('122 B-C] •

The obligation to give effect to. the provisipns cOntain~d in .these various· laws is not only that of the jamadar or thekedar and the minelessees and stone crushers owners (provided of course there are 5 ~or more intC'r·State Migrant Work- men em.ployed ln the establishment) but;also: that of the. Central Govenunent because tpe. Central Government being 'the "~ppropriate Government" within G the meaui~ of Sectio.n 2(l)(a) is under an obligation to take necessary steps for the purpose of securing compliance with these , provisions by the thekedar or jamadar and mine-lessees and owners of stori.e .crushers. The State of Haryana is also bound to ensure that these provisions are observed by the thekedar or jama- dar and. minelessees and owners of .stoi1e crushers. [122·D:.F] ~

H 16.' If the Jan1adar or thekadar in a Stone quarry or stone ci;usheris a •con· trac.tor• within t~e meaning of the definition of the tem1 in the Inter~State Migrant

·. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION 77 WOrkmen Act, he wollld a fortiorari be ~contractor' also for the purpose of Con- A ti-act Labour Act and any workmen hired in or in cohncc.tio{i with the work of· stone quarfy or stone crusher by or through thejarn.adar or thekedar \vou1d be work- . men ·entitled to the-benefit of the provisions of the Contract labour Act.- .Where . therefore the tl;tekedar for Jan1adar is a Contractor, 3.nd the workmen are. employed as 'coritract labour'~within· the rtlealling of these expressions as used in the Con- tr'act Labour Act the Contractor is well as the principal employer would be liable io ~omply with the Provisions of the Co~tract Labo~r Act and the Contract Labour Rules ~nd to. provide to the contract labour rights and benefits collferred by these .B Provisions. The ·Central Government being the ''appropriate government'' witliin the meaning Of section 2 sub~section.(l) clause (a) would be responsible for ensuring compliance \ith the provisions of the Contract Labour A.ct and the Contract Labour Rules by the mine-lessees and Stone crus.hers 0¥.'ners apd the thekedar :or jamadar. So also, for reasons discussed while dealing with the applicability of the Mines Act ·1952 and the Inter State Migrant.'Norkmen Act, the State of Ha·ryana Woqld be · under an obligation to enfor~e the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the c Contract Labour Rules for the h:nefit.of the workm,en. [123 E-F, H .• 124 A·CJ

17. There can be no doubt and indeed this was not .disputed On behii.lf of the respondents·, t~at the Miniffium Wag,es Act"1948 is applicable.to workmen employed irl the stone quarries and stone crushers. Therefore whatever be the mode of pay- : ~. ment fclloWed by the mine lesSees and stone crusher owners, the V.'orkmen must . get nothing less than the minirrium .wage for .the joQ which is being carfied out by D them and if they are required to carry out additionally any of the functions per- taining to another job or occllpation for which a separate minimum wage is pre- scribed, they must be paid a proportion.ate part of such minimum wage in addition . to the minimum wage payable to them for the work priffiarily carried out bY them. · The system of payment which is-being followed in the stone quarries and stone cru~ shers, under which the expenses of the explosives and of drilling holes arc to be born·e by the workmen out of their own Wages, should be changed and the explo- E . sives required for carrYing out blasting should be supPlied by,_th·~ mine lessees or the .jamadar or thekedar without any deductio.n being made out of the v.-·ages ·of. the workmen and the Work of drilling holes and shot firing ·should be entrusted only ·~ .' to those who have received ·the req~isiie training un.der the" Mines Vocational Train- ' ing Rules 1966. So far as the complaint of the petitioner·that the workmen em- ployed in the stone quarries and stone cru.shcrs are not beir,g . paid the mfnlmum wage due and payable for the work cai·fied out by them is concerned,· jt is a matter F .• which would have to be i!J.vestigated and detem1i,ncd. Ll24 C, 125 A-E]

' The Bonded Labour system is intendc'i:l to strike against the system of bonded· 1 labour which has been a shameful scar on the Jndian ·Soda! Scene for decades and ,;,.hich has c6nti.nued to disfig~re the life of ihe nation even after independence. The 'Act was brought into force thro.ugh out the length and breadth of the country with effect from 25th October 1975, which means that the Act has been in force now for · .almost 8 years and if properly implemented, it sho.uld ha Ve ·by this time brought G · 8.bout cOmplete idehtification, freeing and rehabilitation of bonded labouf. Bllt as official, semi-official and non-offici?-1 reports show, we have yet to go a long way in wiping out this outrage against humrinity. [126 A-C]

18. It i.S clear bonded 1aboUr 1s a form of .forced labour and Section 1~ of the Bonded Labour Systein (Abolition) Act 1976 recognises this self-evident H l prc_>position by Jajringa duty on every District Magistrate and e-Very officer specified

78. SUPREME COURT REPORTS" [1984] 2 s.c.R. A by him to inquire whether any bonded Jabour SYS\em or a~y other form_ of fo~d labour is being enforced by or on behalf of any ,person and, if so, to take· such action as inay be necessary to eradicate the enforcement of such forced Jabour. The thrust of the Act is against. the continua-rice of any fornl of forced 1ab~ur. It is of course true that, strictly speaking, a borided labourer me~ns a labourer who incurs or .has or is presumed to have incurred a bonded debt· and a bori.ded debt m~ans an advance obtained or presumed to have been obtained by a bonded labourer B under or in pursuance 9f the 11ori~ed labour system and it wo~ld therefore appeaf that before a labourer can be regarded as a bonded labourer, he must not only be forced to ·provide 13.bour to the employer -but he must have also received an. advance or other economic consideration from. the employer unless he is made to provide forced labour in pursuance of any custoni or.social obligation 3r by reason of his birth i_n ~ny p1rticular ·caste or community. -J30 A~D] ·

c 19. The contention of the State of Haryana.that the burden of proof under the bonded labour System (Abolition)- Act, 1976 is upon the bonded labourers is misconceived. To insist that the bonded labourers n1ust first prove that they are. ·pzoviding forced lab_our in consideration of an ·adVance or othef .economic con~ sid~ration re·c:~ived Dy th~m and then only they woU.ld be eligible_ for the benefits provided urlder the Act, is nothing but asking tlicm to do a t'ask which is extremely diffi.:::Ult, ~if iiot impos~ible. _ The labourers w6'.ild have no evidence :it all .to prove .\~ • so and since employment of bonded labour is a penal Offence under- the Act, the D e:nployer \Vould im:nediately without any hesitation disown ha-Ying given any advance or e:;onomic consideration to the bonded. labourers. The insistance of proof from two labo'urers by the State Government which is constitutiOllally mindated to bring :ibout Change in the life conditions of the poor aad downtrodden and ·to ensure social justice to. the1n is rePrehensiblC . (130 F-H, 131 AJ .. • in· order to derive the benefits It would be cruel to insist that a bonded labour ')' E of this i;ocial welfare legislation, should have to go through a formal. process of t_rial with the normal procedure for recording of evidence. That. would be a totally

- futile process. because it is· obvious that a bonded ·labourers can· never stand "up. to the regidity and formalism· of· the legal process due to his poverty, illiteracy atld social and economic backwardness and if such a procedure were required to ~ be followed, the St.ate Government might as well obliterate this Act from the statute book. It is now statistically establ_ished that most of bonded labourers are members (

F of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes and ordinary course ·of human affairs would show, indeed· judicial notice can be takeri of it, that there ·would be nO occasion for a labourer to be placed in a situation wher~ he is reqiiired to supply (arced labour for no wige or for nominal wage, unless he has received some advance of other economic· consideration from the employer and under the consideration fron1 the employer and· under the pretext of not. having returned such a1Vance or other economic consideration, he is required to render service to the employer br is .deprived of his freedcim of -employment or of the right to moVe freely whereever he wants. Therefore, whenever it is shown that a labourers • is maae to provide forced labour, the Court ·would raise a, presumption that he is required to do so ln consideration of an advance o.r other economic consideration received bY him and he is therefore a bonded labourer. This presumption- may · b~ rebutted by the .employer and also by the State Government if it so chooses but unless and until satisfactory m:lterial is produced for reubut~ing this presump- H .tion, the Cotirt must ·proceed on the basis that-the lab.curer is a bonded labourer entitled to .the benefif of the provisions of the Act. The St~te Government _cannot

. ' ... • BAND:~UA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 79 be permitted to repudiate its obligation ·to identify, release and rehabilitate the · A bonded labourers on the ple3. that though the concerned labollrers m:iy be pro- viding forced labour, the State Government does not owe any obligation to them .. ·unl~Ss and until they ,show in an ·appropriate legal proceeding .conducted 'accordif\g to the· rules of adversary ~ystem of jllsti&,. ·that they are bonded labourers. [131 C-H, 132 A] 20.. Th~ugh section 13 provides for constitution of a Vigilance Committee in· each f:>istrict and each sub.-division of a 'District, 'the Government-of Haryana, B for some reason or the other,· did not constitute any Vigilance Conrmittee until ~ts attention was drawn to this requirement of the law by this Court. It· may be that according to the Go'vernment of Haryapa there .were not at any time any bonded labourers ·v.,ithin. its territories, .but everl so Vigilance COmmittees are required by Sectipn. 13 to be constltuted because the function of the Vigilance Committee is to identify bonded labourers, if there are any, and tO free and reha- bilitate them and it would.not be right for the State Goyernment not to constitute vigilance Comn1itteeS on the assumption.that there ate no bonded labourers at .c ~11. In constituting Vigilance· Committee in each District and.• sub-division, the Haryana Government would do well to include representatives of non-political social action group~ operating at the grass root level; for it is only through such social actioti groups and voluntary agencies that the problems of identification of bonded labour can be effectively 'solved. [128 E-H, 129 A·B] _·The magistq~.tes and jUdicial officers take. a very lenient view of _violations D o( labour laws enacted for the benefits of the workmen and Jet off the defaulting employers \\lith smaM fines. There have also. been occasions where the ·magistrate and judicial officers have scotched prosecutiOns and acquitted· or discharged the defaulting employers on hypertechrlicalities. This happens largely because the magistrates and judicial officefs are not sufficiently sensitised to the importance .' . " of the-observance of labour laws .\vith the result that the labour I<iws are" allowed to be, ignored a'nd breached \vith utter callousness and indifference ~nd the workn1en begin.to feel that the defaulting employers can, b)r vaying a fine which hardly touches .E · "their pocket, escape from the arm of law and \he labour laws supposdely enacted ---; fcir the'ir benefit are not ·meant to be observed but are 1nerely decorative appendages· intended to assuage the conscience of the workmen. The Magistrates ahd Judicial . ~ •• Officers shou[d take a strict yiew of violation of labour,'Jaws and t~ impose ad.equate punishment on the erring en1ployers so that they may realise that it docs n~t pay to commit a breach of such la\vs arid to deny the benefit of such la\VS to the F A_ ·workmen. [145 A-DJ

21. :rhe Court issued several directiQns to the ~entral Government and the State Government and the variouS authorities for implen1enting the provisions enacted in various social welfare la~vs for the benefit of the' ~orkmen employed in the stone qu~rries and stone. crushers in the state of Haryana. So that the poor workmen' who lead a miserable exlsteiicc-maY one day be able to realise that freedom ' is not Only the monopoly.._of a few but belongs tO them all and that they are also equally entitled along With others to pa.rt.icipate in the fruits Cif freedoiri and deve- G lopment. [1.32 D, 145 D-F] PER PATHAK, J CONCURRING ("l) Public Interest Litigation in its present form constitutes a new chapter • in olir judicial system. It has· acquired a significant degree of importance·in the jurisprud~ncc practised by our cot1rts~.and has evoked a iively, if Somewhat Con-

80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS • [19B4] 2 s.. C.R.

. troversial, resP~nse' in fogat circles, in the ~edia and ·among. the general public. In our country, this new class ·of litigiition is justificed by its protagonists on the basis generally of vast areas in our ·population of illite~acy and. poverty, of sqcial and eoonomic backwardness, and of an insufficient awareness and appreciation •. of individual and collective rights. These handicaps have denied nlillions' of our collntrymen access to justice. Public intereSt litigation is ~aid ·to possess the potential or providing su'ch access in the· nµlieu of a new ethoS; in which pa:rticipa· B ting sectors in the adininisttation of justice cO~perate in the creation of ~a 'system · which promises legeal relief without cu4bers~me formaufy arid heavy expe1lditure. In the resu~t, the-Jegal organisation has taken on a radically. new dimension, and correspondingly new per_spectives are opening up before judges and lawyers and State Law agencies in th_e tasks before tQ.em. A crusading z.ea.1 iS abro:ld, viewing the present as an opportunity to -~waken the political and legal- order to the objec- tives of social justice projecte~ in our ~oristitutional. system.- New slogans -fill c. the air, and new phrases .µave entered the legal dictionary, and one hears of 'the "justicing system" being galvanised into supplying justice to the socio-cconomi~ disadvanta'ges. These urges are responsible for t!le "birth of ne\V judicial concepts and the expanding horizqn calpower. They c1aith ·to represent an increasing em· phasis on social welfare and a progressive humanitarianism, To the mind trained · in ~he certainty of the law, of defined P.rificiples." of binding. precedertt, and- the common IaW doctrine :or stare decisis, ihC. future is fraught with confusion and disorder in the legal world and severe ·strains in ·the constitutional system_. At D the lowest, thefe is an uneasy· doubt about where we are going. If p-Ublic interest litigation is to command broad acceptance attention must be paid to certain . -releven~ consid~rations. The historY of human exPerience· show~· that Whell a revolution· in ideas. and ju action .enters the life of a nation, 'the nas·cent power so ·released possesses the potential of throwing. the prevailing social order into disarray. In.a changing society, wisdonl. dictates that reform sbOutd eme.rge in the existing polity as an ordered. change produce thrOugh its institution. ,Mo~eover1 E ·the pace of change needs to be handled'with care lest the institutions themselves be endangered. [152F-H; 153A~C; 153O;154 A-BJ I :2 Like the Warren Court's affifmative act~On programmes for the benefit of minorities: and· other· sociaUy or econ.omically disasivantaged~ interests through ·the avenues of Public Law, the courts in India, are beginning fo apply a similar conCept of constitutional duty. The doctrine Of· s~nditig has been enlarged in F India to provide, Where reasonably possible, access· to- justice to large sectors of people for whom so far it had been a matter of despair. It is tiine indeed 'for 'the law to do so. In larg'.e ril.e<isure, the traditional conception of adjudication rep- resented th~ socio-ei;Onomic Vision prevailing at the turn of. thC century. In India, as the consciousness of social justice- spread 'though our mUlti-Jayered social order, the constitutioll began to come under increasing pressure frOrri social action groups .. petitioning o~- ·behalf of the under privileged .and deprived sections of society for G the fulfilme~t of .their aspirations. Despite -the varying fortunCs of the number · of cases Or public interest litigation which have entefed the Sureme Court, ' '-Public InterCst, Litigation ·constitutes today_ a significant segment of -the court's , docket (154 D: )56 A-q 2:1. The Provisions of Article 32do.not specifica11y. indicate \vho can·movC a the Court. In the ab:;ence-of C'.Jrifining provisiq~ in that respect, it is plaiiJ. that • H a petitioner m1y be anyone in wham the Law recognises a standing_ to· maintain an action of such nature. (156 EJ '

· BANDHUA. MUKTI MORCl;IA V. UNION 81

· 2:2. As regards-the form of proceeding and its character, Article 12 speako A generally o( 11appropriate proceedings." It should be a pr_oceeding which can appropriately lead to an adjudication of the claim made for the enforcement of a fundamental _right and can result in the grant of effective relief. · Article 32 speaks Of ihe Court's power ''to issue direction or orders of writs'-', and the specific refCrenc:e to "writs in the nature of. habeas: corpus, man'damUs. prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari" is by way of illustration only. They do not exlmst the content of the Court's power under Article 32; [156 F-G] B 3 :1. A Practice has g~own in the pubii.c of invoking the jurisdiCtion of this Court by a simple letter complaining of a legal injufy to the author or to some other person or group of persons, and the Court has treated such letter as a petition

.. under Article 32 and entertained the proceeding "without anything more. It is only comparatively recently that the Court has begun to call fOr the filing of a regular petition on the l~tter. There is~ grave danger. in-here.nt in a pract~ce where

- a mere letter is entertained as a petition from· a person whose antecedents and status 'are unknown. or so Unce-rtain that no sei:ise of responsibility can, without • anything more,. be attributed to the communication. There is go,od reason for the insistence on a document being set out in a form, or accompanied by evidence, indicating that the allegations made in it are made with a sense of responsibility by a person who has taken due care and caution to verify those a1legations before making them. A ptaiQt instituting a. sllit is required bY the Cocte·of Civil Procedure to conclude with a clause verifying the pleadings contained in it: A petition or - application filed in court is required to be supported ·on ,affidavit. TJ:ie.se safe- guards are necessary because the document. a plaii1t Or petitiOn or application, commences a course of litigation invofVing the expenditure Of public time ~nd public money. besides in apprOpriate cases involving the issue of summons or notice to the defendant or respondent to appear and contest the proceeding. Men are· busy conducting the aff<iirs of their daily lives, and nO orte occupied with the responsibilities and pressures of present day existence Welcomes b.eing summoned to a law court and involved in a litigation. A document making allegations with- out any· proof whateVer of responsibility can conceivably constitute an abuse of the' process· of Ia\V. Therefore, iri special circumstances the document petition- ing the coUrt for relief should be supported by satisfactory verification. This requirement is· all the grea.ter where petitions are received by the Court through the post. . It is never beyond the bound of posSibility that an unverified communi- 9ation received through the post by the court may in fact have been employed 1nala fide, as an instrument of coercion or blackmail or other oblique motiive against F . :. >a person named therein who holds ·a position of-honour and respect in society. The Court must be ever vigilant against the abuse of its process. It cannot" do th.at better in this matter than insisting at the earliest stage, and before issuing riotice to the respondent,· that an appropriate verification of the allegations be · supplied. The ~equirement ,i$- iinperative in private law litigation. Having r~g3.rd to its nature and purpose, U is equally attracted to public interest litigation. While this Court has readily acted upon lc;tters and telegtams in the past, there is need G to insist now on an appropriate 'verification of the petitioner other 9om~unication. b~fore act_ing on it. It will always be a matter for the court to decide, on wha;t peti-' . ti<;>n will it require verification and when will it waive the rule. [157 B-H; 158 A-C]

3 :2. All communicatipns and petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the Court mu~t' be addressed to the entire Court, that is t6 say, the €hief Justice and his companion jud~es, No such communication or petition can properly be addresse~

82 SUPREME COURT RBPoRTS [1984] 2 s.c.R. •

A to a particular j~dge. When the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked, it' i! the jurisdiction of the entire court. Which Judge or Judges will hear .the _Case 11 exclusively a matter concerning_ the interital regulation of the business o(the Court, interference with whi,eh by a litigant or member of the public constitutes the grossest jmpropriety. It iS Well established that when a division of the Court house and de'cides cases 'it is in law regarded as a he'\fing and ~-decision by the Court itself. The judgffient pronounced· :ind the decree or order made are aCts of the Court, B and -accordingly !hcY are -respected, obeyed -and enforced throughout the land._ It 'is only right and proper that this should be known clearly to the lay public.. Communications and Petitions addressed tO a particular Judge are inlp~oper and : violate the institutional personality· of thC Court; They also embarrass the judge to ·whom they "are personally a:ddr.!ssed. The fundamental Conception· of the ' Court must be respected, that is a singfo indivisible institution, of · united purpOse and existing solely for the high constitutional .functioris for which it has been. c created. 'The conception ofthe Court as a Ioose·aggregate of individual Juages, to one or more of whom judicial access may be particularly had, undermines its very_existen~ arid endangers its·proper and·effective functioning. [158 E-H; 159 AJ • 4::.1. In 'public interest litigation, ·the role held by Ute Court is more assertive than in traditional actions, Viewed from the Warrei;i Court's experience the role ~f the Court is creative rather thari passive, and it assumes a more poSitive at.titude . ..... in determining facts. Not infrequentlY public interest litigation affects ihC rights . D of pefsOns not before the Court, and in shaping the relier the court must invari{l-bJy tilke into account its impaCt on those interests. Moreover, when 1ts jurisdiction .is invoked on behalf of a group, it is as. well to remember. that differences may exist in -eoritent and emphasis between the claims of different Sections of the grouP. For all these reasons the court must exercise the greatest caution and adopt procedures ensuring ~ufficient "Il.otici:: to all interests likely tO be affected. · MOreover; the . nature of the litigation sometimes invoJyes the Continued intervention Of the Collrt E over a period of time, and the· organising of the litigation to a satisfiictory con- clusion calls for judicial ~:tatemanship, a c(ose tlndeistanding· Of collstitutionaJ and legal values in the context or' contemporary social· forCes, and a judicious mix: of restraint and .activism determined bY the dictati;s of existing reaJities. Importantly, at the same. time, the Court must never fo_rge~ that its jurist.!ictipn extends no farther ~ _than the- legitimate limits of itS· constit\ltional powers, and avoid trespassing into i .Jiii political territory which under· the Constitutior:i has been appropriated· tb other F organs of the State. [159 B; D-0]

4~2., The Procedures acJop~d by the Court in cases. of public interest" litiga- tion must of.-course be proced_ures designed and shaped by the Court with a view to resolving the problem presented before it on 'determining the nature and extent of relief <lccessible in the circumstances. Whatever the Procedure adopted by the cow\ it must be procedure known to judicial tenets and chara~teristic of a G judicial proceeding. There are methods a:nd av~ues of procuring material avai- lable to e.._xecutive and legislative agencies and often employed by them .for the efficient and effective discharge of the tasks before them. Not .all those methods and avenues are available ·to the Court. The Court must ever remind itse'If that One of the indicia identifyillg it as a Court is the nature and character of the procedure· adOpted by it in determining a controVersy. It is 'in that sense limited fn H the evolution of proc~ures pursued by it in the process of an adjudication, and -in th~ grant and etecgtion of the relief. Legal juriSprudenoo has in its historical

BANDHUA MUKTI MDRCHA,V. , UNION 83 devciopment identified ~rtain fundamental _principles which. form the essential, A Constituents of judicial procedure. They are employed in every:judidal proceedin& and constitute th'e ·basic .infrastructure along whose chamaCts HOws the power or the Co.urt in the process of adjudication. it59 H; 160 A-DJ 4:3. What should be. the conceivable fratne work of pro~ure in public interest litigation does not admit of a clear cut aQSwer. It-is not poSsible to envisage a dCfinedfpattem of procedure applicii.ble to an cases. Of necessity the pattom whk:h the Court ·adopts will vary with the circuffistances of each case. But, B if there iS a statute prescribing a judici:i1 procedure governing the particular case the Court must follow such procedure. It is ·not open to th.e Court to bypass } the statute iind evolve' a different" procedure ·at variance with it. W,here, howevCr, the Procedure prescribed by statute is incomplete or insufficient; it will 'be open to the Court to supplement it by evolving iis ·own rules. Nonetheless, the sup-· ~i

- c plCmentary procedure must conform at all stages to the principles of natural justice. 'fhere can be no deviation from the principles of.natural jusiice and oiher, well ' accepted procedural nonns characteristic of a judicial proceeding. They ·cons- titute an entire Code of general principles of procedure, tried and pioven ii.nd hallowed by°the sanciity of common and c011sistent.acCeptance during long·_years of the historlC(lJ develop.mt'nt of the law. The general principles· of law, to which i-eference is made here, command ihe confidence, not merely of thC ,rUdge and the Iil.wyer and tlie' parties 'to· the litigation, but supply that basic credible to the judicial proceeding which strengthens public faith in the ·Rule of Law~ Th~y are rules D

in cases where . accepted procedural rules . . rooted in reason and fairplay and. their goveman1...e guarantees a just ciispositipn· of the case. The Court should be wary of suggestions favouring. nove1 procedures will suffice. 160 . E~H; 161 AJ

,s :I. Article 32 confers t_he widest amplitude of power of this Court in the matter of granting relief. ft has power to issue "directions or orders. of writs''.. ·. and.. tJlere is no speci~c indiCat1on, no express language, limiting or·circumscri~ing E that power. Yet, the power is limited by.1he very nature, that its judicial Power. rt is powe_r which pertains to the judicial organ of 1be State, identified by the .very nature of the judicial institution .. There are certain fundamerital constitutional concepts which, althoUB;h elemeptary, need to be·recalled at times. ·The constitu-. tion envisages a broad division of the power of the State between the legislature, • the exCcutive and the judiciary. Alth0ugh the diviSion is not precisely demarcated, tP,ere is genera( acknowledgement of its limits. The limits can be gathered from the ,Vritten text of the Constitution, ·from conventions and constitutional pfiictiee; F .. and from ·an entire array of judicial decisions. The constitutional lawyer COncedes a certain measure of overlapping in functional action among the .three organs-of .the State. But there is no warrant for a.Ssuming geometrical congruence. I,t is conun9n place that while the legislature enacts the law the eXecutive implements

.. ··it and the Court interpretS it and, iii doing so~ adjudicates on the Validity of execqtive. ac~on and, under ovr Constitution, even ju.dges the validity· of .the legislati9n itself;- And yet it is .We11 recognised ihat in a certain sphCre the JegisJature is pos~· G sessed of judicial power, the. executive possesses a measure of both legislative an& judicial functions, and thy cOurt, in i~ duty. of interpreting.the law, accomplished \ ·jQ its perfected action a marginal degree of Jegislative,exercise. NOnetheless, a tine and delicate balance is envisaged under· our Constitution between-these primary institutions of the State. In every case the Court should dete~ine the tr~e limits of ·its jurisdiction and, havjng d.one so. it should take care to remain wiihin the restra.ints of its jurisdiction. [161 B-H; 162 A] '·

84 SUPR!>Mi COURT REPOUS [1984] 2 s.c.R.

A 5:2. This aspect of Collrt action assumes especial significance in public interest litigation. It bears .upon the legitimacy of the judicial irntitution, and that legitimacy is affected as ·much .by the solution presented by the· Court in resolvina a controversy as by the manner in .which the solutibn is reached. ·1n' an area of judicial functioning where jlldi~ial acti~ism finds room for play, where coM"titutional adjudication 'can beco~c an instrument of social policy forged by !he personal pohtical philoophy o{ tho Judie, !his ls an important comidoration B ·10 keep in mind. [162 B·C]

. 5 :3. Whore Ibo Court embarks upon affirmative action in tho at«:mpt fo remedy· a consiitutional imbalance within the social order, few critics will ftc.d fault >11th it so Ions as it confines itself to the. soope of its legitimate authority. But there is always the possibility, In public interest.litigation, of succumbing to the temptation of crossing into te_rritofy which properly pertains to the Legislature or to the ExocYtive Government. For in mo!lt cases the jurisdiction of the Court c is _Invoked when a default occurs,in executive administration, and sometimes where .a void _in community life remains unfilled by legislative action. Tho resulting public grieva'nce~ finds" eXpression through social action groups, which consider. the Couri an appropriate forilm fo! feµioving the deficiencies. Indeed, the citizen -e:eems to find it more convenient to apply to the Court fof the vindicit.tion of con· ... stitutional rights than appeal to the executive or legislative organs of the State.. In the process of correcting executive error or' removing legislative omission the D Court can so easily find itself involved in policy making pf a quality and to a degree characteristic, of political authority, and indeed run the risk of being mistaken for one.. An excessively political role identifiable with political govCrnance betrays the Court into functions alien to its fundarµental character, and tends to destrqy ., the delicate balance 'nvisaged in our constitutional system between its three basic institlltions. The Judge, conceived in the -true c1assical mould, is an impartial. arbiter, beyond and above Political bias· and prejudice, functioning ·silently in ..... E ·&ccordan1re with the Constitution and his judicial conscience. Thus does h~ maintain tho legitimacy of the institution be selves and honour tho trust which his oftice

F _bas ,_ reposed in him. (162 D·HJ Tho aftirmative schemes framed in public interest litigation by the C.Ourt sometimes' require detailed adJninistration under. constarit judicial supervision over pro~ected periods. The lives of large sections of· people some of whom ·have T had no voice in the decisions, are shaped and ordered by mand<itory Court action .

- extending intq the f1,1ture. -Jn that context it is as wen to rerriember that public approval and public <:onsent assume material importance ·in fts successflll imple- ,. mentation. In contrast with policy making by legislation, where a large body bf legislators "debate on a proposed legislative enactment, no such visual impact can be perceiv'ed when judicial decrees are forged and fashioned by a, few judi_cial · personages in 'the confines of a Court. The mystique of the robe, at the stage of · decision-making, 'is associated ·traditionally with cloistered secrecy and confiden- G. tiality and the end-result commonly issues as a final definitive act of the Court. It is a serious question whether in every case the siu;ne awesome respect and revercn~ _will en4ure during different Stages .of affirmative action seeking ~o regulaie the lives of large numbers of people, some ?f whom never participated in the judicial process. [16~ A-DJ H s:4. Treating with public interest litigation requires more than legal ~ota:r- ship and a knowledge or' ie~t book law. It is -of the utmost importance in such

iiANDllUA MuKTI MORCHA V. UNION

cases th.lt- when formulating a scheme of action, the Court must have duo regard to -the particular circllmstances of the case, to surrounding realities including the pOtentiat for successful implementation, and the likelihood a!ld degree of response from the agencies on· whom the implementation will depend. In mo§t cases of public interest litigatiOn. there wilf .be neither precedent nor settled praCtice to add weight and force to the validity of the Court's action. The example of similar cases in other countries can afford little su"pport. The successful implementatjon of the orders of the Court· will depend upon the particuiar social forces in tht? backdrop of loca1 history, the prevailirig economic 'pressures, the duration ·of thc!I B stages involved in the implemeniation, the momentum of success from stage to stage, and the acceptabilitY of the Court's ac~on at all times by tfiose involVed in or affected by it. [163 E-Q] . o :5. An activist Court spearheading the movement for the development and ·oxtension of the citiz.en's constitutional rights, for the· protection of individual liberty and for the strengthening of tho socio-economic fabric in compliance With c dOclared constitutional objoctives, will need to move \Vith a degree of judicial cir.. curnspection. In the centre of a social order changing with dynamic pace,' tho Court needs to balance the authority of tho past with the urges of lhe future. . In that task the court muit ever be conscious of the constitutional truism that it possesses the"sanction of ncithetthe sword nor the pursue and that its strength lies b~sically in public confidence anc.l_support, and that consequently the legitimacy of its acts and decisions must remain beyond alt dOubt. Therefore, whatever the D case before it, whatever the context of facts ancl Jeagal rights, whatever the social ·and ·e-;onon1ic pressures of the times, whatever the personal philosophy of the. Judge, let it aot be forgotten that the essential identity of the institlltion, that it is a Court, must remain preserved sO that every action of the Court is infonnod by tho fund.a.mental norms of law, and by the principles embodied in tho Constitb- tion and other sources of law. -1r its contribution to the Jurisprudent;ial ethos of society is to -advance our ·consUtutional objectives, it must function in accord E w~th only those principles which enter into the coffii>osition of judicial action and ' give to it_s essential quality. [163 H; 164 A·D]

... .5 :6. There is a grea.t' merit in the Court proceeding .to decide an issue on the .basis of strict .legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional appeal. For that al One gi,ves the- decision Of the Court a direction which· is certain, and unfaltering, and that especial permanance in legal jhrisprudence which makes it a· base for the next step fo~ard in the further progress of the law. Indoed, both certainty of substarice and oortainty of direction are indispenaable requireiµents in the development of the law, and invest it with the credibility"whicft commands pubiic.confidenco In.its legitimacy. [165 A·B]

. This • warning is of especial significance. in these times, during a phase - of judicial history whel) a few social action groups tend to sl!ow evidence of pro- G suming that in CverY case the court must bend and mould its decision to popular notions of which way a case should be decided. [165 CJ ' · ·' As new area!· open before the Court with modem deyelopments ·in jurisw prudence,- in a World more seruitive to· human rights as well as the imPact of t"ech- nological progresl'!, the Co_urt will become increasingly consioUa of its expand.in.a: jurisdiCtion. That is. inevitable. But its res"ponsibiJities are correspondinaJy H ..llrO&t, aad perhaps never greater than now. [165 DJ

86 SUPREME COuRT REPORTS . [1984] 2 s.c.R. A It mrist 'be .remerµ'btrC<l that there is no higher" Court· to- correct ove-r the· Supreme Co_urt its errors, and ~at its Judge wear the mantle of infaUibility only . because their decisions are final. That the Judg!!S sit at the apex Of the judicial adininistration and their word,. by constitutional mandate, is the: law of tbO land can induce an unusual sense of power. It is a feeling Judges must guard against by constantly reminding themselves that every decision must be guided by reason Md by judicial principles. [165 E-F] · B 6:1. Persons in this countr.Y obliged to serve as bonded labour are entitled to invoke Article 23 of t~e Constitution.. The provisions erribodied in' that clause form a vital eonstitue!'lt of tho Fundamental Rights set forth in.Part III of the Constitution, and their violation attracts pfoperly_ the scope of Article 32 of tbC . Constitution. [165 OJ

6':2 .. It is true that-the reports of the court appointed Commissions haV'e not c been tested by cross examiBation, but then the record does not show whether any· atten1pt was IDade by-the respondents tO call them for cross examination. Further, whether the appointment of the commissioners fa11s within the terin of order' XLV! of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 is of technical significance only because •'there was inherent power in the court, in the p~rticufaf circumstances of this.case fo tak~ that action; However, the court Would do well io issue. notice tO the res· ·pondii~ts, before appointing any Corn.rnisSioner, in those cases where. ihere is little D . appreheruion of tho disappearance of eviden~. [166 B-q . 6:3. · . The present case is· one of considerable iritportance to a· section of Our people, who pressed by the twin misfortunes of poverty and-illiteracy. ate compelled to a condition ·of life ~hich long since should have passed into history. Tho con· tifiued existence of such pockets of oppression and misery do no justice to the promises and assurances extended by our ConstitutiO!J to its ci~zens. [166 D~E]

E PER AMARENDRA NATH SEN, J: (Concurrmg with Pathak, l.) • 1: l. Article 32 of the Constitution is clearly attracted to the facts of the case, as in the present case the violation of the fundamental right of liberty of ~e workmen l who are said to be kept in wrongful and illegal detention, employed in forced labour, is alleged. Forced labour is constitutionally forbidden by Article 23 of the Coo- ( ... .,,.. stiiution. [168 D-E] ' · F 1:2. ~ An'y person who .is wrongfully and illega1ly employed as -a labourer in violation of the provisions ·of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 is ·jn essence dePrived of· his liberty. A bonded ' labourer truly becomes a slave ·and thO freedoin of a bond~d .lab9urer in the nlatter of his_ employment and mOvemont is !Jlore or less completely taken away and forced laboUr is· thrust upon · him. When· any bonded labourer approached this Col,lrt the real grievance that he makes is-that he.should.be freed from this bo~dage and he prays for being set at libertY and liberty· is no doubt ·a fundamental right guaranteed to · every person Under the cOnstitution. There canpoi be any\manner of doubt that any person. who is wrongfully and illegally detained and is deprived of his libertY can ~pproach this Court under Article 32 of tlie Constitution for his freedom and wrongful and f. illegal detention, and for being set at' liberty. Whellever anY person is won8fully and. illegally deprived of his liberty, it is open to anybody who is interested in tho persop to Inove -this Co.urt unCler. Article -32 of the Coµstitution for his release. . It may not veri often be possible for the person who is deprived of his liberty to ' .•

BANDH\JA MUKTI MORCHA V, UNION 87 approach this Court, as by virtue of such illegal and wrongful Q.etention. he may not be free an~ ill a position to)llove the Supfeme.O?urt. [Hi_? E-H] . A

1 :3. The Bonded labourers working in· the f<ir away places are generally poc;>r an~ belong to the very· weak_ section of the people. They are <j.lso not very literate and. they .1nay not be conscious of their own rights. Further, as they are kept in b.ondage their freedom ·is also restricted· and they may not be in a position. to approach this Court. Thqugh no fundamental right of. the petitioner may be B said- to be infringed, yet th,!} petitioner who co.mplains of the violation of the funda.- niental tight of the workmen who. ~ave been wrongfully and illegally denied their - -{ freedorµ and deprived of their constitutional right must be held to be entitled to approach this Court on behalf of the bonded labourers for 'removing thein · from , illegal bondage and deprivation of liberty. [168 .B-C)

S.P. Gupta v: Union of India & Another, (1981] Suppl. S.C.C, 81, referred to. c i:I. Article 32 or for that matter any other ·article does nOt Jay down any procedure whfoh has to be followed to move this Court for relief against the vio.law tion of any fundamental riiht. Article 32 (1) only lays down that the right t~ n1ove this court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of .fundamental r~ghts is guaranteed. The Constitution very appropriately leaveS the question as to what \vill consµtute all approprfate· prOcee~tng{or the purpose of enforcement of fundaw D ment&l 5ights to be determined by th.e Court. · This Court when sought ·to be mewed under ·Article 32 by ·any party for redressing his grievance against the violation of fundamental rights has to consider whether the procedufe foJloWed by ~e pii.rty is appropriate enough to entitle the couit· to proceed to act on-the same. No doubt this Court has framed rules which a~e ·contained in part IV, Order :XXXV

•. "' of the Supreme Court Rules under the Caption "application for enforcement of fundamental rights" (''Article 32 of the Constitution") Generally speaking, any E

- party who seeks to move this Court under Article -32 of the Constitution should conform to ·the rules prescribed. The rules· lay dOwn ·the procedure ~hi ch is \! . normally to .be· followed in the matter of any application under ·Article 32 of .the ·eonstitution. These rules are rule_s· relating to the proct:dri.re to be adopted and the rules ar~ inten.ded to serve aS maids to the Deity of Justice. Procedural law· which also forms a part of the law and has io .be observed, is, however, 'Subservient .-le to substantive Jaw and the .law~ of procedure are preScribed for promoting ~nd furthering the ends of justice. There cannot be any doubt that this Court should F usually follow the procedure laid do\vn in O.XXXV of the Rules of .this Court and should normally i~ist on a petition properly verified by an affidavit to be _filed to enable_ the Court to take necessary action on the same. ·'Though· this Cou.rt · should normally iilsist on the rules of procedure being followed, it cannot be Said, '· taking into consideration the nature of right co~ferred under Article· 32 ·to move this Court by an appropriate proceeding and the Very wide ·powers cohferre4 on this Court fat granting relief in the case of violation of fundamental rights, tha't - G this Court will haVe no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding which. may not be in conforfnity with procedure prescribed by the Rules of this _Court. · ~e . Rules .undoubtedly lay ·down the procedure which .is normaJly to be followed for making an application under Article 32 of·the Constitution. They,_ howeVer, do not and cannot have the effeCt of limiting the jurisdiction of this Court of enter- .taining a proceeding under' Article 32 of the Constitution, if made, only in the H manner pr"'cribcd by the rul..~ [169 F-H; 170 A-DJ · ' .

88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19~4] 2 S.C.R.

A i:2. For effectively safeguarding the fundamerit3.1 rights. guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court in appropriate cases in the interests of justice wiU certainly be competent to treat a· P,roceeding, though_ not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of this Court,- as an appropriate proceeding under Article 32 &( the Constitution and -to entertain the same. Fundamental rights guaranteed under the Coiistitution are indeed t6o sacred to be' ignored or trifled ,vith merely on tl:ie ground of technicality or afly n.ile of procedure. The rules framed by this Court do not also lay .down th1;1.t this Court can be moved B under Article 32 of the Constitution only in accordance with the procedure pres- . cribed by the Rules and not otherwise. A merC technicality in the matter of form • or procedure Which may not in any way ·affect" the substance of. any proceeding should not stand in the way of the exercise of the 'very wide Jurisdiction and powers conf~rred on this Court under Article 32 of the Constituticin for enforcement of fundamental iights guaranteed under the Constitution. Taking into considera· ti on the substance of the matter-and the nature of allegations made, it will essentially 0 be a matter foi- the court 10 decide whether the procedure adopted ·can be con- sidered to be an appropriate proceeding Within the ambit ·of Article 32 of the , Constitution. The Court if satisfied on the inaterials placed in the form of a letter or ,other communication addressed to this Court, may take· notice of the same in appropriate cases. Experience &hows that .in many· cases it may not be possible for the party c9ncerned to file a regular writ petition in confonnity with procedure ..... ( Ia:id down in the Rule·s -of this ·eourf. The Supreme Court for quite somt; years D now has in rhany cases .propeeded to act on the basis of the letters addressed to it: A ·iong standing practice of the Court in ihe 1natter of procedure also acquired sanctity. Further in yarious· cases the Court has refused to take any n~tice· of letters or other kind of communications addressed to Court and in many cases also the Court on being moved by a letter bas direCted a formal writ ·petition to . be filed before it has decided to proceed further in . the matter. [170 F·H; 171 A·D]

E 2:3. It is bowel/er eminently desirable that normally the procedure pres- cribed in the rules of th.is Court should be followed while entertaining a petition under Article 32 of the Constitlition, though in exceptional cases and particulady in the matter of general public interest, this Court may, taking info con_sidetation the peculiar facts and ci~umstances of case, proceed tO .exercise its jurisdiction I Under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights treating 1 - the letter or the comµiunication in any other form ·as an appropriate proceeding F under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Further any party who addresses a letter oi' a6.y other communication to this cOurt seeking intervention of this Court on the basis of the said letter and communication· should address this letter or Communication to this Cow1 and not to any individual Judge by ·name. Such communication should be addressed to -the Chief Justice 'of the Court and his companion Justices. A private. communication by a party to any Learned Judge .. OVer any matter is not propef and may create embarrassment for tho Court and the Judge concerned. 11710-H;172 A] G ·In the present case, the unfoftunate workers who are employed and bonded labourers at a distant place, could not pos.sibly in view Of their bondage, move this Court, following the procedure laid down-in the RulOI of this Court, The Petitioner which claims to be a social welfare Organization interested in .restorina .H liberty and dignity to these ·unfortunate bonded labourers should be considered . competent to move this Cow·t by a letter or 4il'e conununication addressed to .

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA \'. UNION 89 this Court, to avoid trouble and expenses, as the petitioner is not moving this Court . A for ·any personal or private benefit. . ' ' · ·

. 3:1. Whenever, however, there is an_allegatioh of violation of fundamental rights, it becomes the responsibility and also the sacred 'duty of this Court to pro~ tect such fundamental rights guaianteed under the Constitution provided· that this Court is satisfied that a· case for interference by this Court" appears prima facie to have been .made out. ·Very· often the violation of .fundamental rights is not B admitted or .accepted. On a proper consideration of the materials the Court has to come to a conclllsion ·whether there has been any violation of fundamental rights to enable the court to grant appropriate reliefs in the matter. In various cases, ·because of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the Case the party approaching this Court.for enforcement of fundamental rights may not be in ii position to furnish all. relevant materials and necestary particulars. If, however, on a consideration of the materials placed, the Court is satisfied 'that' a propei.- probe into the matter is necessafy in the larger. interest of administration of justice and for· enforcement c of fundamental rights guaranteed, the Court, in v~ew of the Obligatiq,ns and duty cast upon it of preserving and·protec'ting fundamental rights, may require bett~r aµd further materials to enable the Court to take appropriate action; and there cannot' b:e anything improper in the proper exercise of Court's jurisdiction under. Article 32 of the Constitution to try to secure the necessary materials ·through appropriate agency. The conunission that the Court m3.Y appoint or ·the investi~ gation that the court n1ay direct -is essentially for the 'Court's satisfaction as to the correctness or otherwise of (be allegation of violation ·of fundamental rights to ~~blc the Court to decide the Course to bC adopted .fol: doing proper justi~ to the parties in the matter of protection Of .their fund3.mental rights. It has to be . bome in mi~d that in this land of ours, there are ·persons without education, ·with- out means and without opportunities and they· also are entitled to full protection of their rights or privileges which the Constitutions affords. Living in chilled penury without n~ssary resources and very often. not fully conscious of their rights guaranteed under the ConstitUtion, a very large section of the people com- \ tnonly termecl. as the weaker section live in this land. When this Court is approa- ched on behalf of this class of people .for enforcement of fundamental rights of which they have been denrived and which they are pqually entitled to enjoy, it becon1es the specl.al responsibility of the Court to sec that justice is not.denied to them a"nd the disadvantageous position in which they are placed, do not stand in the way of their getting justice from this Court. [172 D-H; 173 A·B] F . 3 :3. ThC po,ver to appoint a commission or an investigatiqn body for making enquiries in terms of directions given by the Court must be considered to be implied and ,irlherent in the power that the Court haS under Article 32 for enforcement, of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This is a powei;- which is indeed "incidental or anci11afy, to !he power which the Court is called· upon to exeraise in a proceeding under' Ar.tiCle 32 of the Constitution. G It is entirely in the discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of any case, to consider whether any such power regarding investigation has to be exercised or not. The Commission that the Court appoints or the investigation that the Court directs white dealing with. a proceeding under Article 32 of the" Constitution is not a commission or enquiry under the Code of Civ'il Procedure. Such power must necessarily be held. io be implied within the very wide Powers H conferred on this Court under Article 32 f~r enforcement of fuiidamental rights.

90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 S.C.R.

A F~r proper Cxercise of its ·powers under Article 32 of the Constitution ·and for due discharge of .the obligation and duty cast upon thi~ Court iii the matter of pro.· . tectibn ~nd enforcement of fundamental rights which the Constitution guarantees, . this .Court has an inherent power to act in such a manI1er as will enable this Court to discharge its duties and .obligations under Article 32 of the Constitution · properly and effectively in the larger" interest of administration of jU.sticc, ·and for proper protection of Constitution safeguards. [i73 C-G] B . 4. The ,litigation of ihis type particularly in relation to bonded Jab~urers· is really not in nature ·an adversary litigation and it becomes' the duty of the Stat'e and also of the appropriate "authorities to offer its· best cooperation to see that this cvifpractice which has been declared illegal is ended at_the earliest.- The existence .of bonded labour in the Court' is an unfortunate fact. Whenever there· is an allegation of the existence of bonded labour_ in any particular_ State, the State instead of seeking to come Out with a case of denial of such existen~ on the basis c ·of a feeling that the existenqe of bonde41abour in the State may cast a slur or stigma on its administratiVe machinery, should cause·.cffective.enquiries·to be made into , ·the matter and if the matter is pending in this ·court, should coop_crate with this Court to see- that death-knell is sounded On this illegal system which constitutes ' a veritable social menace aD.d stands in the way of healthy development of the nation. [174 A-CJ

.D PER CONTRA :.

5. The· grievance of denial Of Ot.h:er just rights to the workmen and the reliefs claimed for _givillg the. workmen the benefits to .which they _may· be entitled under various Icgislat~ons enacted for ·their Welfare are more of less in the ·nature of con-. sequential reliefs incidental to the main relief of freedom from bonded and forced labour to whiCh the workriien are rejected. In the facts and circumstances Of the ~se, it appears that the prOvisions of ·inter-State Migrant WorkmcD. (Regulation of E· Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 arc not applicable and therefore cdo not fall for any adjudication. [174 F-G] .. , Writ .Petition No. 2135 of 1982. l ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : ' Under Article 32 of the Constitution. F Govind Mukhoty,. S.K. Bhattacharya and N.R., Chaudhary for the Petitioner.

M.N. Phadke, K.B. Rohtcigi and S.K. ·Dhingra for the Respon- dent Nos. 4,5,7, 8. & 9; · · G K.B. R~htagi and S.J. Dhingra ·for tl:le Respondent No. 13 .. .; S.K. Verma for the Respondent No'. 6.

H Abdul Khadar Sr . .Advocate and Miss. A. Su6hash11i for the respondent.

BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA 'V. UNIO'I (Bhagwati. ·n 91

The following Judgments were delivered- A' BHAGWAl'I, J. The petitioner is an organisation dedicated, to the cause of release of ~onded labou.rers in the country. The syst.em of bonded labour has been prevalent ill' .various parts of the country since long prior to the attainment of political freedom and it con· stitutes an ugly and shameful feature of our national life. This B system based on exploitation by a few socially and economically powerful wrsons trading on the misery and suffering of large numbers .. of men arid· holding them iri bondage is a relic of a feudal hierarchical society which, hypocritically proclaims the divinity of men but treats .

r large masses of people belonging to the lower rungs of the social ladder or economically impoverished segments of society as dirt and . chattel. This system under which one person can be bonded 'to pro· · vide labour. to anoth~r fo.r years and years until an alleged debt'is c supposed to. be wiped out which never seems to happen during the · life time of. the bonded labourer, is totally incompatible with the. new egalitarian socio-economic order which we have promised to build and it is not only an affornt to basic human dignity but also con" D stitutes gross and revolting violatio~ of constitutional values. The appalling conditions in which bonded labourers live, not as humans ·but as serfs; recall to. the mind the following lines from·"Man with the Hoe" which' ~!most seem to have been written with reference· . to this neglected and forlorn species of Indian humanity : · E "Bowed· by. the weight or' centuries Ire leans ·.Upon his hoe and gazes on the ground . The emptiness of ages on his fac.e, And_·on his back the burden of the world,

They are non-beings, .exiles of civilization, Jiving a life worst·. F than ihat of animals, for the animals are at least free to roam about as they like and they can plunder or grnb food whenever they are hungry but these out castes of society are held in bondage, robbed of their freedom and'they are consigned to an existence where they have to live either in hovels or under the open sky and be satisfied with whatever 'little unwholesome food they can manage to get, in- G . adequate. though. it be to fill their hungry stomachs. Not having any · . choice, they are driven by poverty and hunger into a life of bondage · a dark bottomless pit from which, in a cruel ·exploitative society, thdy cannot hope to be rescued. .

This pernicious practice of bonded labour existed in . maicy •

92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984J 2 S.C.R.

A States and obviously with the ushering in of independence it could · not be allowed to continue to blight the national life any longer and· hence, when we framed our Constitution, we enacted Article 23 of , the Constitution which prohibits "traffic in human beings and 'begar. and other similar forms of fcmied labour" practised by any one. The system of bonded labour therefore stood prohibited by Article '23 B and there could have been no more solemn and effective prohibition than the one enacted in the Constitution in Article 23. But, it appears that though the Consti\ution was enacted as far back as 26th January, 1950 and many years passed since then, no serious.effort was made to give effect to Article 23 and to stamp out the shocking practice of ·· to ·bondild labour. It was only in 1976 that Parliament enacted the c Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 providing for th.e aboli~ tion of·bonded labour S)".Steni with a view to preventing the economic and physical exploitation 'of the weaker sections of the people. But, unfortunately, as· subsequent events have .shown and that is borne ont also by the Report made by the Centre for Rural ·Development Administration, I.ndian Institute of Public ·Administration to the D Mini,stry of Labour Government of India on "Rehabilitation of Bonded fabour in Monghyr Dfstrict, Jlihar", the Report made by the Public Policy and Planning Division of the Indian Institute of · Public Administration to the Ministry of Labour, Government of India on "Evaluation Study of Bonded Labour Rehabilitation Scheme In Tehri Garhwal, U.P.", the Report'ofLaxmi Dhar Misra, the Direc- ,4,- • E tor-General (Labour Welfare) of the Government of India based on On the Spot· Studies Regarding Identification, Release of Bonded_ Labourers and Rehabilitation of Freed Labourers in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh; Karnataka, Orissa, Bihar, Rajasthan, tamilnadu and .Kerala and the Report of the National " Seminar on "Indentification and Rehabilitation·of Bonded Labour" F l).eld from 7th to 9th February, 1983 that the pernidous practice of bonded labour has not yet been totally eradieated from the national scene and that 'it continu~s t6 disfigure the social and economic life of the country ai certain places. There are still ~ number of bonded labourers in various parts of the country and significantly, as point- ed o~t in the Report of the Natfoual Seminar on '.'ldentifi_catioµ and G Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour" a large number of them belong .to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled· Tribes account for the next largest number while the few who are not from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled. Tribes are generally landles's agricultural labourers. It is absolutely essential we would unhesitatingly declare that it is a H constitutional imperative-that the bonded labourers must be identified and released from the shackles of bondage Sb that they can assimilate

. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNlvN (Bhagwati, J.) 93